Ball v. City of Madison

• Decision Date: 07 May 1957
• Citation: 1 Wis.2d 62,82 N.W.2d 894
• Parties: Geraldine BALL, a minor, by Walter M. Bjork, her guardian ad litem, et al., Respondents, v. CITY OF MADISON, a municipal corporation, Appellant.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 894

82 N.W.2d 894

1 Wis.2d 62

Geraldine BALL, a minor, by Walter M. Bjork, her guardian ad litem, et al., Respondents, v. CITY OF MADISON, a municipal corporation, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

May 7, 1957.

Harold E. Hanson, City Atty., Alton S. Heassler, Asst. City Atty., Madison, for appellant.

Roberts, Roe, Boardman, Suhr & Bjork, Robert L. Curry, Madison, for respondent.

MARTIN, Chief Justice.

In our opinion this case is largely ruled by Cegelski v. Green Bay, 1939, 231 Wis. 89, 93, 285 N.W. 343, 345, where this court held:

'* * * the instant [toboggan] slide was in no sense a building or a structure. The slide followed the natural slope of the hill. The only allegation of the complaint having any relation to anything other than mere smoothing and keeping smooth and covered with ice or snow the surface of the ground and banking the sides of the course with snow is that the city 'erected on said premises a wooden railing to guide the direction of the skis or toboggans' using the slide. * * * If this railing were deemed a structure such as to constitute a public building, the railing is not alleged to be in any way unsafe or to have had any connection with the plaintiff's injuries. We consider that it can not be regarded as within the purview of sec. 101.06, Stats.'

Respondents' argument is grounded on the premise that the platform was a structure within the contemplation of sec. 101.01(12), Stats. From that it is reasoned that the platform and the iced track below it were inseparable component parts of the slide and thus the slide was a structure within the meaning of the statute. We cannot agree that the platform was such a structure.

The safe-place statute defines 'place of employment' very broadly; a place of employment can be almost any place. But the definition of 'public building' is much more limited. Sub. (12) reads:

'The term 'public building' as used in sections 101.01 to 101.29 shall mean and include any structure used in whole or in part as a place of resort, assemblage, lodging, trade, traffic, occupancy, or use by the public, or by three or more tenants.'

In Hoepner v. Eau Claire, 1953, 264 Wis. 608, 613, 60 N.W.2d 392, 394, where it was contended that a ball playing field constituted a public building, this court made an analysis of the statute which applies in the instant case:

'* * * we think the choice of the legislature of the word 'building' is particularly significant. While a public building is defined as 'any structure used in whole or in part as a place of resort, assemblage, lodging, trade, traffic, occupancy, or use by the public, or by three or more tenants', it must be kept in mind that the term 'structure' was employed in defining the words 'public building'.

'In view of this, we do not consider the definitions of the word 'structure' contained in decisions, such as Kosidowski v. Milwaukee, supra [152 Wis. 223, 139 N.W. 187], and Caddy v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., supra [195 N.Y. 415, 88 N.E. 747, 30 L.R.A.,N.S., 30], and decisions of other jurisdictions, wherein structure is defined without reference to a building, are applicable in determining what structures are embraced within the term 'public building' as used in our Safe-Place Statute.

'In Bent v. Jonet, 1934, 213 Wis. 635, 252 N.W. 290, 126 A.L.R. 1245, a temporary wooden bleacher used by spectators at a football game was held to be a structure constituting a public building; In Feirn v. Village Shorewood Hills, 1948, 253 Wis. 418, 34 N.W.2d 107, a swimming pier consisting of a boardwalk, a board platform supported by wooden posts, a wooden bench, a diving board, and an observation tower on a platform, was held to be a public building within the meaning of the Safe-Place Statute; and in Flesch v. City of Lancaster, 1953, 264 Wis. 234, 58 N.W.2d 710, a municipal swimming pool was likewise held to be embraced within the statutory term 'public building'. However, the structures in these three cases had some points of similarity to a building as that term is commonly understood. On the other hand, a ball field, such as we have in the instant case, has no such point of similarity. The fact that in constructing the same it was necessary to bring in soil as a fill and to provide the sand-clay surface did not constitute the same a 'structure' within the meaning of such term as used in our Safe-Place Statute in defining the term 'public building."

By using the word 'structure' in defining the term 'public building,' the legislature did not broaden that term to include anything that is built. The fact that something is constructed and intended for public use does not alone constitute the structure a public building unless it has some aspects of similarity to a building as that term is commonly understood. Since the word is used in the limited sense of defining 'public building,' it cannot be regarded as embracing a structure which does not have any of the characteristics of a building. Nor does the intended use of the platform so characterize it. It is not, as the complaint states, used 'as a place of resort and assemblage.' The same contention was made in Meyers v. St. Bernard's Congregation, 1954, 268 Wis. 285, 67 N.W.2d 302, where the court considered the character of a large concrete platform or concourse reached by two steps of stairs and located in front of the entrance to a church. This was used both as a means of travel by those going into and out of the church and as a place where members of the parish assembled before and after the services. It was held that nothing in the record showed that the steps and concourse were intended to be used as anything but an approach to the church and thus fell within the rule of the so-called 'side-walk' cases, such as Lawver v. Joint District, 1939, 232 Wis. 608, 288 N.W. 192; Baldwin v. St. Peter's Congregation, 1953, 264 Wis. 626, 60 N.W.2d 349; Mistele v. Board of Education, 1954, 267 Wis. 28, 64 N.W.2d 428.

As the place of 'take-off' for users of the toboggan slide, this platform was no more intended as a place of resort and assemblage than was the concourse in the St. Bernard's Congregation case. The fact that several people would gather there to seat themselves on a toboggan preparatory to sliding down the hill does not so characterize it. Like steps, a concourse, or a side-walk, it simply provides a means of travel from one place to another.

And this is another feature distinguishing the platform from the pier in the case of Feirn v. Shorewood Hills, 1948, 253...