Ball v. City of Blackfoot
| Decision Date | 23 March 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 38530.,38530. |
| Citation | 273 P.3d 1266,152 Idaho 673 |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
| Parties | John Frederick BALL and JoAn Ball, husband and wife, Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. CITY OF BLACKFOOT, Defendant–Respondent. |
Maguire & Penrod, Pocatello, for appellants. David K. Penrod argued.
Nelson Hall Parry Tucker, P.A., Idaho Falls, for respondent. Blake Hall argued.
JoAn and Fred Ball (JoAn and Fred, collectively the Balls) are patrons of the City of Blackfoot's (the City) municipal pool. JoAn slipped on ice accumulated on the sidewalk between the pool and the parking lot. The Balls brought suit against the City. The district court granted summary judgment dismissing the Balls' claims on the ground that, under Pearson v. Boise City, 80 Idaho 494, 333 P.2d 998 (1959), property owners are not liable for injuries resulting from natural accumulations of snow or ice. We reverse.
On February 28, 2008, moments after Fred parked at the Blackfoot municipal pool and JoAn stepped out of their vehicle, JoAn slipped, fell, and was knocked unconscious. As a result of the fall, JoAn suffered physical and neurological injuries
including a sore back, double vision, loss of hearing, dizziness, and momentary blackouts. The Balls brought suit, asserting that the City negligently failed to keep the sidewalk free of ice and snow and that defectively designed landscaping caused ice to accumulate on the sidewalk.
The City moved for summary judgment and both parties submitted affidavits. The pool manager claimed to have sprinkled ice melt on the sidewalk three times before pool patrons began to arrive on the day of the accident. The manager stated she applied ice melt in the area where JoAn later fell. A City building official stated that the construction of the sidewalk where the fall occurred met relevant codes and regulations. Fred stated that, immediately after the fall, he observed signs that ice melt had been applied near the pool entrance, but did not observe similar signs on the sidewalk where JoAn fell. Fred stated that ice had accumulated on the sidewalk where JoAn fell, making it very slick. Both Fred and another pool patron asserted that the City had piled snow on the grassy slope that abutted the sidewalk. When the piled snow melted, the runoff flowed down the slope, where it accumulated and froze on the sidewalk. The other patron stated that she had complained of these conditions to the pool manager prior to JoAn's fall.
The City moved to strike portions of the affidavits submitted by the Balls. The district court ruled on the City's motion to strike and its motion for summary judgment simultaneously, holding that the motion to strike was moot because "the particular facts of this case fall so squarely within Idaho Supreme Court precedent, that the affidavits submitted by the Balls have no bearing upon the viability of their claims." The court concluded that the Balls had alleged facts virtually identical to those in Pearson v. Boise City, 80 Idaho 494, 333 P.2d 998 (1959), and since Pearson established that a property owner is not liable for natural accumulations of ice and trivial sidewalk defects, the City was not liable to the Balls. The district court thus granted the City's motion for summary judgment. The Balls timely appealed.
This Court applies the same standard in reviewing the appeal of an order granting summary judgment as did the trial court in granting the motion. Estate of Becker v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522, 525, 96 P.3d 623, 626 (2004). We will construe all disputed facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id. "The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). "The existence of a duty is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review." Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244, 247, 985 P.2d 669, 672 (1999).
The district court granted the City's motion for summary judgment "[b]ased upon the overwhelming similarity between the facts pleaded in the Balls' Complaint and the Idaho Supreme Court's dismissal of Pearson v. Boise City on almost identical facts...." In Pearson, the trial court dismissed the negligence claim of a woman who slipped on ice that had accumulated in a half-inch deep depression in a city sidewalk. 80 Idaho 494, 496, 333 P.2d 998, 999 (1959). She asserted the city was negligent because it had not repaired the defect that permitted the ice to accumulate. Id. at 497, 333 P.2d at 999. This Court affirmed, first noting that "[m]ere slipperiness of a sidewalk, occasioned by smooth or level ice or snow, is insufficient to charge the municipality with liability for injury resulting therefrom where the snow or ice does not constitute an obstruction." Id. at 497, 333 P.2d at 999–1000. The Court held that "[p]edestrians must assume the risks attending a general slippery condition of sidewalks produced by natural causes and which remain despite the efforts of reasonable care and diligence." Id. at 498, 333 P.2d at 1000 (quoting McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3rd Ed., Vol. 19, § 54.84, p. 316). We then considered the appellant's claim that the depression was a defect upon which liability could be predicated. We held that the claimed defect was trivial and did not give rise to liability because the injury was caused by ice that had naturally accumulated. Id. at 503, 333 P.2d at 1003.
While the Pearson Court relied upon this "natural accumulation rule" in 1959, this Court held in Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 768 P.2d 1321 (1989), and Robertson v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Ctr., 117 Idaho 979, 793 P.2d 211 (1990), that the rule was abrogated by the Legislature's adoption of comparative negligence. In Harrison, this Court addressed the effect of the Legislature's 1971 enactment of I.C. § 6–8011 upon the open and obvious danger doctrine. 115 Idaho at 591–93, 768 P.2d at 1324–26. The common law doctrine precluded premises liability where an invitee knew or should have known of a danger before he or she encountered it.2 Id. at 592, 768 P.2d at 1325. We held that I.C. § 6–801 abrogated the open and obvious danger doctrine because the statute mandates that, as long as negligence of the party from whom recovery is sought exceeds that of the claimant, the claimant's responsibility for his or her injury "shall not bar recovery." Id. at 596, 768 P.2d at 1329; see also Salinas v. Vierstra, 107 Idaho 984, 695 P.2d 369 (1985) (). Beginning with Harrison, we thus established that "owners and occupiers of land will be under a duty of ordinary care under the circumstances towards invitees who come upon their premises." Harrison, 115 Idaho at 595, 768 P.2d at 1328. Our decision in Robertson v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center followed closely upon the heels of Harrison and expressly recognized that I.C. § 6–801's abrogation of the open and obvious danger doctrine included abrogation of the natural accumulation rule. 117 Idaho at 981, 793 P.2d at 213.3 Thus, I.C. § 6–801 abrogated the holding in Pearson that owners and occupiers of land are generally not liable for injuries caused by natural accumulations of snow and ice. Rather, they owe a duty of ordinary care under the circumstances.
On appeal, the City has focused on the fact that the defendant in Pearson was also a municipality and our statement that "[m]unicipalities are not insurers of the safety of those who use the sidewalks." 80 Idaho at 497, 333 P.2d at 999. The City's arguments in this regard fail to account for legislative developments that have taken place in the 63 years since our decision in Pearson.
In 1971, the Legislature passed the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA).4 1971 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 150, p. 743. Under the ITCA, a governmental entity5 may be liable for its tortious conduct, regardless of whether the tort arose from a governmental or proprietary function. I.C. § 6–903(1). The ITCA exempts governmental entities from liability for tortious conduct in certain circumstances, as provided by I.C. § 6–904, 6–904A, or 6–904B. As the maintenance of sidewalks is not the subject of an exception to the ITCA, the City may be liable for negligent maintenance of the sidewalk in this case.6 We therefore hold that the district court erred by holding that the simple accumulation of ice on the pool's sidewalk barred the Balls' claim as a matter of law. As this Court stated in Harrison, "[d]isputes in this area will normally present a jury question under particular facts, unless reasonable minds could not differ." 115 Idaho at 596, 768 P.2d at 1329 (citing McKinley v. Fanning, 100 Idaho 189, 595 P.2d 1084 (1979) ). Applying the proper legal standard, then, we must reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment if there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the City's negligence.
Concurrent with its motion for summary judgment, the City moved the district court to strike evidence contained within the Balls' affidavits. However, the district court declined to rule on the motion to strike on the basis that application of Pearson rendered all evidence contained within the affidavits irrelevant. This conclusion affects the issue on appeal because "trial courts must determine the admissibility of evidence as a ...
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