Ball v. Haughton, 76-1368

• Decision Date: 12 May 1978
• Docket Number: No. 76-1368,76-1368
• Citation: 17 Ill.Dec. 888,377 N.E.2d 78,60 Ill.App.3d 562
• Parties: , 17 Ill.Dec. 888 Hattie BALL, a/k/a Hattie Burrough, a/k/a Hattie Walton, Petitioner-Appellee, v. James HAUGHTON, M.D., Respondent-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 78

377 N.E.2d 78

60 Ill.App.3d 562, 17 Ill.Dec. 888

Hattie BALL, a/k/a Hattie Burrough, a/k/a Hattie Walton Petitioner-Appellee, v. James HAUGHTON, M.D., Respondent-Appellant.

No. 76-1368.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fifth Division.

May 12, 1978.

Howard T. Savage, Samuel L. Patterson and Patricia Unsinn, Chicago, for respondent-appellant.

George F. Archer and Mel Sloan, Chicago, for petitioner-appellee.

SULLIVAN, Presiding Justice:

Count I of the petition filed in this action sought the registration and enforcement under the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 68, par. 101, et seq.) of a foreign support order entered in New York; and Count II asked for the registration and enforcement under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 77, par. 88, et seq.) of a foreign judgment entered in California. Respondent's motion to dismiss was granted as to Count I but denied as to Count II and, after an evidentiary hearing, judgment was entered in favor of petitioner on Count II in the amount of $22,816.06. Respondent appeals the judgment and the order denying his motion to dismiss Count II. The issues presented for review are: (1) whether this action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations; (2) whether certain evidentiary rulings of the trial court were erroneous; (3) whether the judgment was against the manifest weight of the evidence; (4) whether this action is barred by the equitable doctrine of laches; and (5) whether petitioner has the standing to bring this action. Petitioner has cross-appealed, asserting the court erred (a) in dismissing Count I and (b) in its computation of the arrearage which formed the basis of the judgment amount.

It appears that twin daughters (Debra and Denene) were born to petitioner on July 3, 1948 and, as their guardian ad litem, she obtained support decrees in California and New York on their behalf. On January 17, 1950, the Superior Court of the State of California found respondent to be the twins' father and ordered him to pay $60 per month as support to the office of the court, subject to its further order or until the girls reached their legal majority. Shortly afterward, respondent moved to New York and made one $50 support payment directly to petitioner. No other payments were made until 1958 when, with the assistance of the Los Angeles City Attorney, petitioner sought the registration and enforcement of the California decree in the State of New York. After examining the California petition, summons, and decree, the Domestic Relations Court of the City of New York held a hearing on the matter and, on May 15, 1958, ordered respondent to pay $50 per month as support to the court. Thereafter, in November, 1970, respondent became a resident of Illinois and, on May 23, 1975, petitioner brought the instant action.

Her petition sought the registration and enforcement of the New York (Count I) and the California (Count II) decrees. Pertaining to each count, petitioner alleged that she had been the sole support of Debra and Denene; that respondent has not paid her all amounts due and owing for the support of the twins; that difficulty in ascertaining respondent's whereabouts, illness, and lack of financial resources have hindered her in bringing action to collect the arrearages due her; that at all relevant times, respondent has been gainfully employed and possessed of valuable personal and real property; and that she lacks the financial resources to pay her attorneys' fees; whereas, respondent has adequate resources to assume the responsibility for such fees. Concerning the New York support order, petitioner sought a judgment of arrearage in the amount of $5,200 in addition to attorneys' fees and such other relief as the court may deem equitable. In regard to the California judgment, she sought $13,900 arrearage, plus interest in addition to attorneys' fees and such further relief as the court may deem equitable.

Alleging that his obligation of support terminated on July 3, 1969, when Debra and Denene reached their legal majority, respondent moved (1) to dismiss Count I, because the effective date of the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act postdated the termination of his duty to support the twins and that such act made no provision for the collection of arrearages arising from orders of other jurisdictions or for the allowance of attorneys' fees; and (2) to dismiss Count II, because the petition was barred by the applicable statute of limitations (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 83, par. 16). The trial court granted the motion as to Count I but denied it as to Count II. Thereafter, and pursuant to respondent's request, petitioner filed a verified bill of particulars, stating that in partial satisfaction of the New York and California decrees she had received $1,450 from respondent and that Debra and Denene reached their legal majority on July 3, 1969. Respondent then filed, and the court denied, a motion for declaratory judgment which again raised the statute of limitations as a bar to Count II. At the hearing on Count II, petitioner testified that respondent paid $50 directly to her through the mail in 1950 and $1,400 in checks through the Los Angeles City Attorney from 1956 to 1969, but when apprised of the contents of the New York court records, she indicated that during the latter period she received $2,375 in support of the twins. An actuarial expert called by petitioner then rendered three alternative opinions as to the amount of the arrearage. His first computation assumed a duty to pay $60 monthly from January 15, 1950, through July 3, 1969, against which the $50 was credited. The resulting amount was $13,999 and, when 7% simple interest, computed upon each unpaid installment up to the date of the hearing was added, the total arrearage was brought to $30,068.50. The second computation was accomplished in the same manner, except that $2,375 rather than $50 was credited against the unpaid balance and resulted in a total arrearage of $25,246.75. The third computation assumed a duty to pay $60 monthly from January 15, 1950, through May 30, 1958, and $50 monthly from June 1, 1958, through July 7, 1969, against which was credited payments of $50 and $2,375. The resulting total of principal and interest was computed to be $22,816.06.

The parties then stipulated that respondent admitted under oath he does not recall ever making payments to the clerk of the court of Los Angeles. When petitioner was recalled under section 60 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 110, par. 60), she testified that the Los Angeles City Attorney was the signatory of support checks received for the benefit of Debra and Denene, and that while in New York City during January, 1970, she made a demand upon respondent to remit the arrearage owed her and that, although she was aware that he was in the process of moving to Illinois, she did not know until 1971 that he had actually made such a move.

Petitioner then called a court reporter, who read portions of respondent's discovery deposition disclosing that he had never notified petitioner of his whereabouts and did not reply to the letters which he received from petitioner's attorneys.

During the course of closing argument, respondent's attorney argued that the payment of $2,375 indicated in the New York records underestimated the amount of support actually paid, as petitioner had testified to receiving an unspecified amount in a year not included within those records. Judgment in favor of petitioner was then entered in the amount of $22,816.06

After this cause was taken under advisement at the close of oral argument, it was suggested of record for the first time that petitioner had died subsequent to the dates on which the notices of appeal and cross-appeal had been filed. Pursuant to the motion of petitioner's attorney, we appointed Debra as special administrator of petitioner's estate for the purpose of defending the appeal and prosecuting the cross-appeal. Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 110, par. 54(2), ch. 110A, par. 366(a)(2).

OPINION

Respondent contends the trial court erred in failing to also dismiss Count II of the petition, which he argues is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. In their briefs and during oral argument in this court, counsel for both parties confined their comments to the question of whether or not the five year "catch-all" limitation contained in section 15 of An Act in Regard to Limitations (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 83, par. 16) is a bar to the action alleged in Count II.

In this regard, it appears that in 1951, the Illinois General Assembly expressly limited the registration of foreign judgments under the newly enacted Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act to those "application(s) made within the time allowed for bringing an action on a foreign judgment in this state" (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 77, par. 89), and that such period has long been held to be five years with the running not tolled by a nonresident's absence from the state. Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 83, par. 19; Schemmel v. Cooksley (1912), 256 Ill. 412, 100 N.E.2d 141; Davis v. Munie (1908), 235 Ill. 620, 85 N.E. 943; see also, Light v. Light (1957), 12 Ill.2d 502, 147 N.E.2d 34. Here, the California judgment of January 17, 1950, for which petitioner sought registration and enforcement in Count II, states by its own terms that respondent must remit not to her but to the office of the court periodic payments for the support of Debra and Denene until they reached their legal majority. Petitioner, in a verified pleading, admitted they reached legal majority on July 3, 1969, and thereby conclusively established that the last installment accrued on that date. (Yarc v. American Hospital Supply Corp. (1974), 17 Ill.App.3d 667, 307 N.E.2d 749; Burdin v. Jefferson Trust & Savings Bank (1971), 133 Ill.App.2d 703, 269 N.E.2d...