Ball v. United Parcel Service, Inc.

Decision Date01 September 1991
Docket NumberNo. 11,11
Citation325 Md. 652,602 A.2d 1176
Parties, 121 Lab.Cas. P 56,878, 7 IER Cases 394 Lucille BALL v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC. Misc.,
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

David M. Williams, Chestertown, for appellant.

Alan H. Kent (Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis, on brief), Washington, D.C., for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, McAULIFFE, CHASANOW, KARWACKI and ROBERT M. BELL, JJ.

MURPHY, Chief Judge.

By ch. 721 of the Acts of 1972, codified as Maryland Code (1987 Repl.Vol.), Article 27, § 562A(a), the General Assembly of Maryland made it a criminal offense

"for any person, group or organization to engage in any act or conduct for the sole purpose of coercing or intimidating another person to contribute or donate any goods, materials, services, or moneys to any social, economic, or political association or organization."

Under subsection (c), persons violating the statute are subject to a fine not exceeding $100, or imprisonment for not more than ninety days, or both. 1

The single question presented in this case, certified to us by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, 2 is whether the United Way Fund is, within the contemplation of the statute, a "social, economic, or political association or organization."

I.

The case arose when Lucille Ball sued her employer, United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS), in the Federal District Court, claiming that her employment was unlawfully terminated because she refused to comply with her employer's directive that she donate part of her time and wages to the United Way Fund (the Fund). In her complaint, Ball contended that this directive violated the public policy of the State, as embodied in § 562A(a), because the Fund was a social or economic association or organization within the meaning of the statute. As a consequence, Ball contended that she was wrongfully discharged from her employment under Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981), thereby making UPS subject to her claim for monetary damages. UPS contended that Ball's claim was not founded on a violation of the public policy of this State under Adler because the Fund was neither a social nor economic association nor organization within the ambit of the statute.

Deeming the matter before it to present a question of state law, the district court, in certifying the issue to us, outlined the relevant facts as follows:

"(3) On or about March 1, 1977, plaintiff was hired by defendant corporation as a part-time employee.

"(4) On or about March 1, 1984, plaintiff was promoted by defendant corporation to the position of 'supervisor.' It is undisputed that plaintiff's employment in the supervisory position was 'at will' employment as defined by Maryland law: plaintiff had no written contract with defendant corporation nor was her employment defined by a durational term.

"(5) Plaintiff alleges that on or about September 1, 1985, defendant corporation began to require that plaintiff and other employees donate a portion of their wages and "part of their time" to the United Way Fund.

"(6) From approximately September 1, 1985, until about October 1, 1986, plaintiff complied with defendant's alleged requirement that she pledge money and time to the United Way Fund.

"(7) On or about October 1, 1986, plaintiff refused to authorize defendant corporation to deduct any money from her paycheck for the purpose of making a donation to the United Way Fund.

"(8) On October 14, 1986, defendant corporation terminated plaintiff's employment.

"(9) Plaintiff alleges that her refusal to authorize personal contributions or to donate any of her time to the United Way Fund was the sole reason for her termination by defendant corporation."

II.

Ball maintains that, by definition, a fund is an appropriation, deposit, or collection of money, or other resources, which is set apart for a specific objective. She claims that the United Way Fund necessarily functions as an economic organization in the collection, management, investment, and distribution of monies which it raises. She further contends that the Fund is a social organization because it is concerned with the welfare of human beings as members of society. This is consistent, she says, with the stated purpose of the United Fund of Central Maryland "to obtain and apportion funds to provide for the charitable, philanthropic and social agencies in the area served." According to Ball, it is clear from these definitions that the Fund is both an economic and social organization encompassed by the provisions of § 562A(a). She makes no contention that the Fund is a political organization.

UPS argues that the Fund is not a social or economic association or organization but rather is a charitable undertaking, not included within the provisions of § 562A(a). 3 Noting that § 562A(a) is a penal statute, UPS says that there is no basis to construe it more broadly than its plain language permits. Moreover, it argues that the legislature's silence as to charitable funds in § 562A(a) supports a narrow construction of the statute, which excludes contributions to charitable organizations. It also suggests that, in any event, § 562A(a) is unconstitutionally vague and therefore void insofar as the undefined terms, "social" and "economic," are included in the statute.

III.

In determining the questions before us, we turn to the time-honored canons of statutory construction, chief among which is the rule that, in seeking to ascertain the legislative intention, the beginning point is the language of the statute itself. See Bacon v. State, 322 Md. 140, 147, 586 A.2d 18 (1991); In re Demetrius J., 321 Md. 468, 473, 583 A.2d 258 (1991); Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 513-16, 525 A.2d 628 (1987). Thus, in achieving this result, we focus primarily on the words of the statute, which must ordinarily be given their natural and usual meaning in the context of the legislative goals. State v. Bricker, 321 Md. 86, 92, 581 A.2d 9 (1990); Webb v. State, 311 Md. 610, 618 n. 2, 536 A.2d 1161 (1988); Tucker v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 73, 517 A.2d 730 (1986). We have said that a statute is not vague "when the meaning of the words in controversy can be fairly ascertained by reference to judicial determinations, the common law, dictionaries, treatises or even the words themselves, if they possess a common and generally accepted meaning." Eanes v. State, 318 Md. 436, 460, 569 A.2d 604 (1990); Bowers v. State, 283 Md. 115, 125, 389 A.2d 341 (1978).

The parties agree, and we concur, that there is no relevant written legislative history which sheds light on the legislatively intended reach and application of § 562A(a). We therefore turn to the "usual and natural" meaning of the words used in the statute. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2161-62 (1981) recites a lengthy and multi-faceted definition of the word "social." Its five main thrusts are:

"1: involving allies or confederates ... 2: marked by or passed in pleasant companionship with one's friends or associates ... 3: forming or having a tendency to form cooperative and interdependent relationships with one's fellows ... 4: of or relating to human society ... 5: of, relating to, or based on rank or status in a particular society or community...."

The main concepts of the word "economic" are defined by the same dictionary, at 720, as follows:

"1 usu. economical, archaic: of or relating to a household or its management: of or relating to a divine dispensation or system of government 2 usu. economical: given to thrift: productive of saving: sparing in quality ... 3 a: of or relating to the science of economics ...: of, relating to the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities ... b: having practical or industrial significance, uses, or application ...: affecting or liable to affect material resources or welfare ... c: operated or produced on a profitable basis: producing an excess of returns over expenditures ...: capable of or liable to profitable exploitation."

In considering the application of the phrase in § 562A(a) "social [or] economic ... association or organization" to the United Way Fund, we note that the record extract before us does not set forth the purposes or charter of the Fund. The record does, however, contain Articles of Amendment and Restatement of the United Fund of Wicomico County, Inc. and the Articles of Incorporation of the United Fund of Central Maryland, Inc. While the relationship, if any, between these entities and the United Way Fund is not disclosed by the record, the parties appear to accept the premise that the Fund, like the other two entities, is a nonprofit organization which raises money for charitable purposes. It is, therefore, not unlike the United Fund of Central Maryland which, according to its charter, is organized and operated "exclusively for charitable and philanthropic purposes," raising funds "to assist with the operating budgets of such nonprofit organizations as the Corporation may from time to time desire to assist." In this regard, the Attorney General of Maryland has characterized the United Fund of Central Maryland as a "[f]ederated fund-raising organization" under Code (1990 Repl.Vol.), Article 41, § 3-201(d) (see 62 Op.Att'y Gen. 155 (1977)), which is thereby defined as

"a federation of independent charitable organizations which have voluntarily joined together, including but not limited to a united fund or community chest, for the purpose of raising and distributing money for and among themselves and where membership in the federation does not confer operating authority and control of the individual charitable organizations upon the federation."

Section 3-201(b)(1) defines a "[c]haritable organization" as "a benevolent, educational, philanthropic, humane, patriotic, religious, or eleemosynary organization [which] solicits or obtains contributions...

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