Balla v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections

• Decision Date: 01 November 1984
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 81-1165,78-1045 and 1-76-75.
• Citation: 595 F. Supp. 1558
• Parties: Walter D. BALLA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. IDAHO STATE BOARD OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants. Walter D. BALLA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Donald ERICKSON, et al., Defendants. (Two cases).
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Idaho

595 F. Supp. 1558

Walter D. BALLA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. IDAHO STATE BOARD OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants.

Walter D. BALLA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Donald ERICKSON, et al., Defendants. (Two cases).

Civ. Nos. 81-1165, 78-1045 and 1-76-75.

United States District Court, D. Idaho.

November 1, 1984.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Walter D. Balla, pro se.

Dean Schwartzmiller, pro se.

Robert R. Gates, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, Idaho, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION, FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER

RYAN, District Judge.

Introduction

Each of these actions was brought by Mr. Walter D. Balla, an inmate of the Idaho State Correctional Institution (ISCI), alleging constitutional deprivations taking place at ISCI. Each of these cases was previously consolidated by the Honorable Ray McNichols, District Judge, and a class of persons was certified under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure described as "all persons confined at the Idaho Correctional Institution, Main Site, located south of Boise, Idaho, as of May 13, 1981, together with all persons confined there between the period of May 13, 1981, and the entry of final judgment in this case."

Initially, this court had reservations about the ability of the class representative (Inmate Walter Balla) to fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. By reason of these reservations, the court attempted to procure an attorney or attorneys to represent these pro se litigants. The court was not successful in obtaining attorney representation for the pro se litigants, and perhaps even if an attorney could have been found, it would have resulted in a significant delay in the ultimate resolution of these cases, which cases were crying to be heard and disposed of. The court thereupon, in February 1984, appointed Mr. Dean Schwartzmiller, an inmate at ISCI, as lead lay counsel. Mr. Balla and Mr. Schwartzmiller thereafter shared responsibilities for the presentation of the inmates' cases.

After reading the pleadings in these cases, the court determined that although the pleadings were very rambling and sometimes incoherent, they generally alleged eighth and fourteenth amendment deprivations along with numerous pendent state claims, together with prayers for relief of declaratory judgment, injunction and damages. In order to try these cases, the court was faced with a real management problem, to bring together and cause to be tried a sensible and coherent case where all parties could then have some sense of direction in order to put on their evidence in a somewhat orderly fashion.

After holding a pretrial hearing and status conference at the prison site, the court scheduled the trial to begin on March 5, 1984, and caused the trial to be bifurcated and to deal only and strictly with the requests for declaratory and injunctive relief prayed for by the plaintiffs. The issue of damages, should it be necessary to reach their merits, will be tried separately.

The court ordered that it would not consider any pendent state claims asserted by the plaintiffs.

Further, pursuant to Rule 16(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court ordered that it would entertain evidence only upon plaintiffs' allegations of constitutional deprivations which relate to their eighth amendment claim of cruel and unusual punishment and their fourteenth amendment claim of denial of due process. Within the ambit of these two alleged constitutional deprivations, there appeared to be a number of disputed factual issues. Among the factually disputed issues relating to cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment claim, the court set them forth in its pretrial order as follows:

(1) whether or not the prison is in fact overcrowded;

(2) whether or not the classification system presently in use is constitutionally defective because it fails to rehabilitate the inmates, debilitates the inmates, and subjects them to physical and sexual assault;

(3) whether or not the classification and disciplinary systems as implemented by the Board of Corrections are constitutionally impermissible;

(4) whether or not the medical care and/or the lack thereof results in deliberate indifference to the serious needs of the inmates; and

(5) whether or not the food services are constitutionally inadequate as part of the general conditions of confinement.

The due process allegations under the Pretrial Order centered around three factually disputed issues, which are:

(1) whether or not there was a wholesale reclassification of the prison population without notice or an opportunity to be heard, with the attendant argument that such a wholesale reclassification gives rise to due process protections;

(2) whether or not due process rights are afforded and required at individual reclassification hearings; and

(3) whether or not due process of law has been afforded and is required at parole hearings.

The trial ended after thirteen days of testimony. The court established a briefing schedule for submission of post-trial briefs and memoranda. Those memoranda have been received and reviewed and studied by the court. Finally, on June 19, 1984, the court undertook an inspectional tour of ISCI. Included in the tour were the reception and diagnostic unit; the infirmary; the gymnasium, A-Block (medium custody); Housing Unit 9, including Tier C (protective custody) and Tier A (close custody); Housing Unit 7, including Tier A (death row and isolation cell) and Tier C (administrative segregation); Housing Unit 8, including Tier A (detention), Tier B (close custody), and Tier C (close custody); and Housing Unit 10, Tier C (medium custody).

There are three basic classifications of inmates at ISCI. Those classifications are medium custody, close custody, and maximum security. The major classifications represent a risk assessment undertaken by prison officials. Medium custody is composed of those individuals who are the least likely of any of the three categories to attempt an escape or to cause a disruption or violence. The classifications of close custody and maximum security each contain various sub-categories. Within the major classification of close custody, there are inmates in protective custody, detention, and what may be referred to for these purposes as "typical." Protective custody inmates are those isolated from the main yard population for their own safety. Protective custody inmates often have been the subject of homosexual rapes, or owe an unpayable debt to other inmates, and because of these situations have turned evidence about their situation over to prison authorities. Those persons in detention are those who have committed some transgression in violation of institutional rules and are in detention for a period of time as punishment for their violation. The "typical" close custody inmate is in close custody because he is an administrative risk as demonstrated by his prior record, propensity for escape, or his history of disciplinary reports which indicate that he is unfit for activity unless it is closely monitored. Within maximum security there are two sub-categories: administrative segregation and death row. Those inmates in administrative segregation present an even greater threat to institutional security and possibility of flight than do those inmates in close custody.

This suit deals primarily with the main site of ISCI. There are a number of individuals in the minimum security facility located near the main site which is referred to as the "farm dorm." The conditions of confinement at the farm dorm are not properly before this court for determination at this time. However, there are aspects of these cases which specifically overlap with the evidence adduced at trial, and to that extent the minimum security facility is a portion of this litigation. For example, the health care at the main site is the only health care available at ISCI and as such, is used by both inmates at the main site and the farm dorm. Necessarily, the health care relates to the minimum security inmates at the farm dorm. Unless specifically referred to in this opinion, later in the Findings of Fact and/or Conclusions of Law the court speaks only to the main prison site south of Boise, Idaho.

Scope of Judicial Review

This court believes that the scope of its judicial review has been well defined by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir. 1982), Judge Clifford Wallace stated on behalf of the Ninth Circuit panel:

In entertaining a cause of action alleging Eighth Amendment violations in a state prison, federal courts must be cognizant of the limitations of federalism and the narrowness of the Eighth Amendment. Federal courts lack the power to interfere with decisions made by state prison officials, absent constitutional violations. Courts must recognize that the authority to make policy choices concerning prisons is not a proper judicial function. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1886, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). Any needed prison reform is an executive and legislative responsibility. The function of a court is limited to determining whether a constitutional violation has occurred, Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2400-01, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981), and to fashioning a remedy that does no more and no less than correct that particular constitutional violation. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., supra, 402 U.S. 1 at 16, 91 S.Ct. 1267 at 1276 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971).

The Eighth Amendment is not a basis for broad prison reform. It requires neither that prisons be comfortable nor that they provide every amenity that one might find desirable. Rhodes v. Chapman, supra, 101 S.Ct. at 2400; Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 125 (2d Cir.1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). Rather, the Eighth Amendment proscribes the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,"

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