Ballance v. City of Springfield

• Decision Date: 19 September 2005
• Docket Number: No. 04-3410.,04-3410.
• Citation: 424 F.3d 614
• Parties: David BALLANCE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, Illinois Police Department, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

424 F.3d 614

David BALLANCE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, Illinois Police Department, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 04-3410.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued June 6, 2005.

Decided September 19, 2005.

John A. Baker (argued), Baker, Baker & Krajewski, Springfield, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Frank S. Martinez (argued), Office of the Corporation Counsel, Springfield, IL, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before ROVNER, WOOD, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge.

David Ballance, a former police officer, sued the Springfield Police Department for race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., for matters arising from his termination. The issue before us is whether the district court erred by finding that no genuine issue of material fact existed for trial on Ballance's reverse race discrimination claim. We find that although Ballance has established his prima facie case, he has failed to satisfy his burden of showing that the police department's legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for terminating him were pretextual, and therefore, affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

We give a brief outline of the facts here, and will discuss them in greater detail where relevant to our analysis. Ballance, a white male, was a police officer with the Springfield, Illinois Police Department from October 1989 until his termination on October 17, 2000 by then-police Chief John Harris. Chief Harris stated that he terminated Ballance for three reasons: first, Ballance's involvement in a July 27, 2000 event where he allegedly battered his wife; second, Chief Harris's finding that Ballance had obstructed the internal affairs interview regarding this domestic battery; and third, Ballance's prior record of disciplinary actions.¹ Ballance ultimately brought a reverse race discrimination suit against the department in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois. Specifically, Ballance claims that the department discriminated against him based on his race because Chief Harris would not have fired an African-American officer for the same reasons that he terminated Ballance.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the police department, and Ballance timely appeals.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

We review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment. Lamers Dairy Inc. v. United States Dep't of Agric., 379 F.3d 466, 472 (7th Cir.2004); Ind. Family & Soc. Servs. Admin. v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 476, 479 (7th Cir.2002). Summary judgment is properly granted when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). When determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, we consider evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Material facts are facts that "might affect the outcome of the suit" under the applicable substantive law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute over material facts is genuine if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.

B. Ballance's Reverse Race Discrimination Claim

Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of sex or gender. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2005). Plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases can avert summary judgment by presenting either direct or indirect evidence showing discriminatory intent by the defendant or its agents. O'Regan v. Arbitration Forums, Inc., 246 F.3d 975, 983 (7th Cir.2001). Given that Ballance does not provide any direct evidence of discrimination on the basis of race, he must proceed under the familiar four-part burden-shifting test established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) and refined in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). Under the McDonnell Douglas scheme, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817; O'Regan, 246 F.3d at 983.

Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff attempting to establish a claim of race discrimination must establish four prongs: first, that he is a member of a protected class; second, that he was meeting his employer's legitimate performance expectations; third, that he suffered an adverse employment action; and fourth, that he was treated less favorably than similarly situated individuals who are not members of his protected class. See Ineichen v. Ameritech, 410 F.3d 956, 959 (7th Cir.2005). It is well settled law that the protections of Title VII are not limited to members of historically discriminated-against groups. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 96 S.Ct. 2574, 49 L.Ed.2d 493 (1976); Greenslade v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 112 F.3d 853, 863 (7th Cir.1997). When analyzing reverse discrimination plaintiffs, we have held that in order to establish a prima facie case, in addition to meeting the second, third and fourth prongs above, such a plaintiff must show that "background circumstances" exist to show an inference that the employer has "reason or inclination to discriminate invidiously against whites" or evidence that "there is something `fishy' about the facts at hand." Phelan v. City of Chicago, 347 F.3d 679, 684-85 (7th Cir.2003); see also Mills v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 171 F.3d 450, 455-57 (7th Cir.1999).

Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the decision. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817; Ineichen, 410 F.3d at 961. If the defendant satisfies its burden, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the defendant's explanation was pretextual. Id. at 961. Pretext requires more than showing that the decision was "mistaken, ill considered or foolish, [and] so long as [the employer] honestly believes those reasons, pretext has not been shown." Jordan v. Summers, 205 F.3d 337, 343 (7th Cir.2000). Pretext "means a dishonest explanation, a lie rather than an oddity or an error." Kulumani v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Ass'n, 224 F.3d 681, 685 (7th Cir.2000).

The police department argues that the district court erred by finding that Ballance established his prima facie case. We disagree. In this case, the district court was correct to find that background circumstances existed to show an inference that the police department may discriminate against whites. The district court noted that the City of Springfield commissioned Husch & Eppenberger, LLC, a law firm, to investigate charges of racism in the police department. Husch & Eppenberger produced a report which stated in part:

Many expressed resentment that women and minorities appeared to get special treatment . . . Based upon several interviews, including Chief Harris', race and gender are taken into consideration at various stages, including hiring, work assignments, promotion, and determination of disciplinary action or determination of the need for an internal affairs investigation.

Husch & Eppenberger Report at 58-59 (emphasis in original). We agree with the district court's finding that this report supports the inference that the police department, through Chief Harris, gave preferences to minorities and women in the disciplinary process.

We also agree with the district court's analysis that Ballance was meeting his employer's expectations. Although Ballance's record shows that he was disciplined by the police department (as we will examine more in detail in our pretext analysis), he was also highly commended during his career. Ballance received the police department's Porter Williams Award for bravery, as a result of an incident on Thanksgiving Day 1995 when Ballance attempted to make a traffic stop. The driver ran from the car and pointed a gun at Ballance. Ballance shot and killed the driver in self-defense. In 1999, Ballance found a baby that had been shot in the head. Ballance immediately called emergency medical personnel who took the baby to the hospital. The baby ultimately survived. An independent commission recommended that Ballance receive the police department's highest award, the Silver Suarez Award, for actions above and beyond the call of duty. Chief Harris rejected the recommendation of the commission but gave Ballance a letter of commendation for his actions. The police department argues that Ballance's disciplinary issues overshadow any issue of material fact that he was meeting the police department's legitimate performance expectations. We disagree. Although Ballance was disciplined (he received 31 days of disciplinary suspension time at different times in his career while employed with the police department), the award, letter of commendation, and nomination for the top award in the police department help create a genuine issue of fact concerning whether he was meeting his employer's legitimate expectations.

The parties also disagree as to whether Ballance can show that he was treated less favorably than African-Americans at the police department. Ballance argues that Chief Harris treated an African-American police officer, Larry Stelivan, more favorably than he. Stelivan was arrested for domestic battery after slapping his wife twice during a weekend drive. In his motion opposing the police department's motion for summary judgment, Ballance presented evidence that Stelivan lied during his internal...