Ballard v. Hendl

Decision Date30 March 2018
Docket NumberCIVIL ACTION NO. 15-00627-BAJ-EWD
PartiesJOSEPH BALLARD v. FELICIA HENDL
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana
RULING AND ORDER

Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss Verified Complaint and Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 39) filed by Defendant Felicia Ann Hendl in her official capacity as Clerk of Court for the Twentieth Judicial District Court for the State of Louisiana ("20th JDC"). Plaintiff Joseph Ballard filed an opposition, and Defendant filed a reply.1 For the following reasons, the Motion to Dismiss Verified Complaint and Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 39) is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

Ballard is an inmate at the Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola located in West Feliciana Parish, Louisiana2 Ballard sued Clerk Hendl, in her official capacity as Clerk of Court for the 20th JDC, for allegedly burdening his right to access the courts by unconstitutionally applying the Louisiana Prison Litigation Reform Act ("LPLRA").3 Ballard also seeks a declaratory judgment that the LPLRA is unconstitutional as applied in the 20th JDC by Clerk Hendl.4

On September 29, 2006, Ballard filed a lawsuit in the 20th JDC alleging medical malpractice against several officials and employees with the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections ("LDPSC") and the Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola ("Angola").5 Ballard alleged that he lost the sight in his right eye because defendants in that case failed to correctly diagnose and timely treat him after he reported issues with his vision.6 Contemporaneously with his pro se lawsuit, Ballard filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, which was granted by the state court on October 2, 2006.7 The order granting Ballard's request to proceed in forma pauperis relied on the LPLRA, which automatically stayed the proceeding until all court costs or fees due to the clerk were paid by the Plaintiff.8 Ballard alleges that the order assessed $900.00 in advanced costs.9 The LPLRA also contains a provision that if a prisoner fails to pay full court costs or fees within three years from the date they are incurred, the suit shall be dismissed without prejudice.10

The October 2, 2006 order granting Ballard in forma pauperis status also set a payment schedule requiring him to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the prior month's income credited to his prison account.11 The order stipulated thatmonthly payments were to be automatically forwarded to the court by the Centralized Inmate Banking Section for the LDPSC without further action by the Plaintiff.12 Ballard alleges that on October 5, 2006, three days after the order was granted, he requested that Clerk Hendl provide him a regular statement of the payment of fees on his account.13 Ballard claims that he needed this information in order to determine the balance owed, as well as whether to arrange a special payment above the 20 percent provision from his inmate account, which he contends would not be authorized by LDPSC without an invoice from the clerk.14 Ballard also alleges that Clerk Hendl assessed his account an additional charge of $6 every time she received his written inquiries, as well as a $6 fee for every written response.15

Ballard asserts that in the three year period that he was allowed under the LPLRA to pay court costs and fees, his prison account totaled, at various times, $4,021.14.16 Ballard alleges that during that time period, Clerk Hendl applied only $381.04 to his cost obligation despite having $804.23 (20 percent of his total prison account) available.17 Ballard further alleges that between October 2, 2006 and February 25, 2013, shortly before he moved to lift the civil stay in his case and over six years after he was granted in forma pauperis status, Clerk Hendl applied $881 tohis cost obligation, despite having $1,996.77 available during the six year period.18 Ballard alleges that when he filed his Motion to Lift the Civil Stay in March of 2013, he was informed by Clerk Hendl that he still had an unpaid balance of $19.00 remaining on his account.19 Ballard asserts that on March 18, 2013, he arranged a special payment from his inmate banking account to extinguish the $19.00 balance.20

On May 8, 2013, the defendants in Ballard's underlying suit filed a motion to dismiss for his failure to pay costs within three years, citing the LPLRA.21 The state court granted the motion, dismissing Ballard's lawsuit on May 9, 2013.22 Ballard alleges that he filed a Motion to Set Aside the Dismissal on May 31, 2013, which was ultimately denied; however, the denial came with a notation that a hearing on the issue would be set after the costs were paid.23 Ballard contends that on August 15, 2013, in response to his inquiry, Clerk Hendl indicated in writing that he needed to pay his unpaid balance of $72.06 in costs before the motion to set aside could be adjudicated.24 Ballard asserts that Clerk Hendl lacked legal justification to require prepayment of the filing fee for the motion to set aside the dismissal, given that $900.00 in advance fees had already been collected by Clerk Hendl from Ballard's prison account, and Ballard's in forma pauperis status should have relieved him ofthe requirement to prepay any fees after his advance deposit was fully paid.25 Ballard also alleges that over $200 in filing fees incurred by the defendants in his underlying lawsuit were charged to his account.26

On August 21, 2013, Ballard alleges that he forwarded a special payment of $72.06 from his prison account to Clerk Hendl in satisfaction of his outstanding balance, and requested that the motion to set aside be heard.27 Ballard claims that after forwarding the special payment of $72.06, Clerk Hendl advised him that he was assessed another fee of $225.20, which had to be paid before the motion could be forwarded to the court.28 Ballard asserts that the motion has not been adjudicated to this day.29

Ballard filed the instant lawsuit on September 16, 2015, alleging violations of his constitutional rights against the 20th JDC, Judge Carmichael, and Clerk Hendl.30 In addition to filing his Verified Complaint, Ballard filed an Ex Parte Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, which was granted on November 2, 2015.31 On November 5, 2015, Ballard filed an Amended Complaint, correcting a deficiency in form that was identified in a Notice of Deficiency sent from the Court to Ballard, dated October 30, 2015.32 On February 9, 2017, the Court granted Defendant 20thJDC's Motion to Dismiss but it did so without prejudice and allowed Ballard leave to amend.

On March 9, 2017, Ballard filed a Second Amended Complaint against Clerk Hendl only, omitting his previous claims against the 20th JDC and Judge Carmichael.33 In his Second Amended Complaint, Ballard based his claim primarily on three actions allegedly taken by Clerk Hendl: (1) that she failed to collect the amounts required by the October 2, 2006 Order; (2) that she refused to provide Ballard with adequate notice of any deficiency in his account; and (3) that she unjustly refused to forward Ballard's motion to set aside dismissal to the district court until a pre-filing advance fee had been paid.

Ballard asserts that as a result of these actions, Clerk Hendl obstructed his right of meaningful access to the courts in violation of the First Amendment, the Privileges and Immunities Clauses of both Article IV and the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Ballard further argues that as a result of Clerk Hendl's violation of his constitutional rights, his lawsuit languished and caused the complete extinguishment and forfeiture of his right to be compensated for the medical malpractice which cost him the use of his right eye. Ballard seeks an award of damages against Clerk Hendl as well as a declaratory judgment that the advance fee requirements of the LPLRA, as applied in the 20th JDC by Clerk Hendl, are unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. RULE 12(b)(6) Legal Standard

At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court must accept the well-plead factual allegations in the complaint as true.34 The Court views the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, resolving all doubts in his favor.35 However, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions."36 The Court will not "strain to find inferences favorable to the plaintiff."37 If the facts as plead allow the Court to conclude that plaintiff's claims for relief are "plausible," the motion must be denied.38 To satisfy the plausibility standard, the plaintiff must show "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully."39 "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."40

B. Rule 12(b)(1) Legal Standard

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; without jurisdiction conferred by statute, they lack the power to adjudicate claims.41 Under Rule 12(b)(1), a claim is "properly dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction when the court lacks thestatutory or constitutional power to adjudicate" the claim.42 A court should consider a Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack on the merits.43 Considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss first "prevents a court without jurisdiction from prematurely dismissing a case with prejudice."44

In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, "the court is permitted to look at evidence in the record beyond simply those facts alleged in the complaint and its proper attachments."45 A motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction should only be granted if it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claims entitling him to relief.46 However, "[t]he burden...

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