Ballas v. City of Reading, CIVIL ACTION NO. 00-CV-2943 (E.D. Pa. 1/__/2001)
| Decision Date | 01 January 2001 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 00-CV-2943. |
| Parties | MARIA BALLAS, et al. v. CITY OF READING, et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. The matter has been fully briefed and is ripe for decision. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants' Motion.
Plaintiff Maria Ballas ("Ballas") brings suit alleging retaliatory termination and wrongful refusal to permit her to repurchase her rights under a pension fund designed for employees of the City of Reading. According to the Amended Complaint, Ballas worked as purchasing manager of the City of Reading ("City") from 1974 to 1980, when she left for private employment. During this period of employment, Ballas participated in the City's pension plan ("Pension Plan") administered by Barbara Adams ("Adams") and the City of Reading Officers and Employees Pension Board ("Board"). Upon her resignation in 1980, the Board disbursed $4,263.43 in past contributions to Ballas. The City later rehired Ballas as purchasing manager in 1987. When she returned to City employment, Ballas attempted to invest $10,000 in the Pension Plan by repurchasing her pension rights for the time of her former employment with the City. Adams and the Board denied this request to invest. Subsequently, Ballas again sought to repurchase her pension rights. The Board discussed her request at two public meetings in February and March, 2000. At the later meeting, the Pension Board allegedly discussed a legal opinion prepared by its solicitor regarding Ballas' request and voted to deny her request. Because Adams later refused to provide Ballas with a copy of the minutes of the meeting and the solicitor's legal opinion, Ballas alleges that she was improperly denied her right to participate in the Pension Plan without due process.
Ballas' husband, S. Henry Lessig ("Lessig") was also involved in local politics as a member of the City Planning Commission and the Solid Waste Collection Task Force. Ballas and Lessig both supported comprehensive trash collection in the City of Reading prior to and on January 3, 2000, the date on which Joseph Eppihimer ("Mayor" or "Eppihimer") assumed the office of City Mayor. Ballas alleges that Eppihimer, who opposed comprehensive trash collection, immediately began a campaign of retaliation against supporters of comprehensive trash collection including she and her husband. Eppihimer and Jesus Pena ("Pena"), City Director of Human Resources, terminated Ballas on April 28, 2000. Ballas claims that her termination was effected without notice, cause, or an opportunity for a hearing, and through procedures that contravene those set forth in the Charter of the City of Reading ("City Charter").
On June 9, 2000, Plaintiffs initiated the instant suit against the City, Eppihimer, the City Council of Reading, Paul Hoh, President of the City Council, several members of the City Council,1 Pena, Adams, and the Pension Board. The original Complaint stated sixteen counts against Defendants. Plaintiffs subsequently filed an Amended Complaint on September 27, 2000, that dropped Paul Hoh and the individual members of the City Council as Defendants and reduced the number of counts.
The Amended Complaint contains eleven counts. The first four counts are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count I alleges that Defendants wrongfully deprived Ballas of her employment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Both Ballas and Lessig assert Count II, alleging that Defendants wrongfully terminated Ballas in retaliation for her speech opposing comprehensive trash collection in violation of her rights under the First Amendment. Ballas asserts in Count III that Defendants violated her right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by terminating her without following the procedures outlined in the City Charter. Count IV alleges that the Pension Board's refusal to permit her to repurchase her rights under the Pension Plan violated her due process rights. Plaintiffs do not specify against which Defendants these section 1983 counts are asserted. Based on the allegations, however, the Court assumes that Counts I — III are against the City, City Council, Pena and Mayor Eppihimer, and Count IV is against Adams and the Pension Board. Counts V through IX allege wrongful termination pursuant to the City Charter. Lessig asserts a cause of action for loss of consortium in Count X. Count XI seeks an injunction ordering Defendants to reinstate Ballas to her position of purchasing manager.
A claim may be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) only if the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle her to relief. ALA, Inc. v. CCAIR, Inc., 29 F.3d 855, 859 (3d Cir. 1994). The reviewing court must consider only those facts alleged in the complaint and accept all of the allegations as true. Id.
Defendants now seek dismissal of Counts I and III — X of the Amended Complaint, all claims against City Council, Pena, Adams, and the Pension Board, and all claims by Lessig. The Court will address each argument in turn.
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code provides a remedy against any person who, under the color of law, deprives another of his constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) a deprivation of a federally protected right, and (2) commission of the deprivation by one acting under color of state law. Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 689 (3d Cir. 1997). In Counts I and III, Ballas alleges deprivation of her rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects a person from state action that deprives her of life, liberty or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. am. XIV. While on its face this constitutional provision speaks to the adequacy of state procedures, the Supreme Court has held that the clause also has a substantive component. Nicholas v. Pa. State Univ., 227 F.3d 133, 138 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-47 (1992)). With respect to Count I, Ballas seeks relief under both the procedural and substantive prongs of the Fourteenth Amendment. With respect to Count III, Ballas asserts only a violation of her right to procedural due process. The Court will address each prong in turn.
The essential principle of procedural due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty or property should be preceded by "notice and opportunity for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985). For procedural due process to apply, the plaintiff must establish a property interest in her employment. Poteat v. Harrisburg Sch. Dist., 33 F. Supp.2d 384, 390 (M.D.Pa. 1999) (citing Abbott v. Latshaw, 164 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 1998)). Well-established federal law recognizes the existence of a property interest in public employment where state law supports a claim of entitlement to continued employment. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 913 F.2d 1064, 1077 (3d Cir. 1990). State law restricting discharge of a public employee except `for cause' supports such an entitlement to continued employment and thereby creates a protectable property interest. See Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 928-29 (1997); Bradley, 913 F.2d at 1077. Defendants argue that Plaintiff lacks a property interest in her employment.
As a rule, municipal employees in Pennsylvania are at-will employees. See Pa. Const. Art. VI, § 7; Cooley v. Pa. Housing Finance Agency, 830 F.2d 469, 471 (3d Cir. 1987), abrogated on other grounds by Foster v. Chesapeake Ins. Co., 933 F.2d 1207 (3d Cir. 1991); Stumpp v. Stroudsburg Muni. Auth., 658 A.2d 333, 334 (Pa. 1995). Municipal employees, therefore, assume their job subject to the possibility of summary removal by the employing authority for any reason or no reason. Cooley, 830 F.2d at 471; Scott v. Philadelphia Parking Auth., 166 A.2d 278, 280 (Pa. 1961). At-will employees can demonstrate a property interest in retaining their jobs only by showing an enforceable expectation of continued employment, or some guarantee of continued employment extended by the employing municipality. Shoemaker v. City of Lock Haven, 906 F. Supp. 230, 233 (M.D.Pa. 1995). The plaintiff has the burden of proving that she was not an at-will employee. Lynch v. Borough of Ambler, No. Civ. A. 94-6401, 1996 WL 283643, at *11 n. 10 (May 29, 1996) ).
For a public employee to claim a property interest in public employment in Pennsylvania, the hiring agency must have the specific statutory authority to create that interest. Cooley, 830 F.2d at 471; Demko v. Luzerne County Cmty Coll., 113 F. Supp.2d 722, 729 (M.D.Pa. 2000); Stumpp, 658 A.2d at 334; Scott, 166 A.2d at 282. Where a state agency or municipality contracts for tenured employment in the absence of enabling legislation, the contract is invalid and unenforceable. Scott, 166 A.2d at 282. The enabling legislation must contain a specific and explicit statement of the public agency's power to contract for tenured employment in order to create a property interest in public employment. Scott, 166 A.2d at 157; see also Cooley, 830 F.2d at 471; Demko, 113 F. Supp.2d at 729-30; Shoemaker, 906 F. Supp. at 234. General grants of power such as for the power "necessary and convenient to carry out the purposes of the [municipality], [or] . . . to make contracts of every name and nature" are insufficient to permit a public employer to contract...
To continue reading
Request your trial