Balliet v. Baltimore County Bar Ass'n, 25

• Decision Date: 10 November 1970
• Docket Number: No. 25,25
• Citation: 259 Md. 474,270 A.2d 465
• Parties: Thomas C. BALLIET v. The BALTIMORE COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 474

259 Md. 474

270 A.2d 465

Thomas C. BALLIET v. The BALTIMORE COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION.

No. 25.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Nov. 10, 1970.

Randolph N. Blair, Dundalk (Allen E. Buzzell, Dundalk, on the brief), for appellee.

Argued before HAMMOND, C. J., and BARNES, FINAN, SINGLEY, SMITH and DIGGES, JJ.

DIGGES, Judge.

On December 23, 1968 Thomas C. Balliet, a practicing attorney, was tried in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County and convicted of larceny after trust (Md.Code, Art. 27, § 353) for converting a client's funds to his own use. He was sentenced to a three year prison term, but on March 28, 1969, the unserved portion of his sentence was suspended upon the condition that he stay within the State and make full restitution. At the same time, though it does not appear on the docket entries, the trial court (Maguire, J.) prohibited Balliet from practicing law while he remained on probation.

On July 2, 1969 The Baltimore County Bar Association filed a petition for disciplinary action against Balliet pursuant to Md.Code (1957, 1968 Repl.Vol.) Art. 10, § 13 and Md.Rule BV3. On the same day the appellant was directed by order of court to answer this petition by July 22, but when it proved impossible to serve him, the court renewed its order on October 21, directing him to answer by November 18. This time Balliet was served and he responded on November 25 with a motion raising preliminary objections, contending that the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of the proceedings and that any question of disciplinary action had become res judicata once Judge Maguire had 'suspended' him from the practice of law. A hearing before a three judge panel, in accordance with Rule BV4 c, was set for December 10, but for unclear reasons Balliet did not receive timely notice of this hearing date. Unaware that the appellant was excusably absent, the court proceeded ex parte to receive the record of his conviction into evidence, Rule BV4 f 1, and upon determining that larceny after trust was a crime involving moral turpitude, the panel signed an order providing for Balliet's disbarment. Md.Code, Art. 10, § 16. Balliet promptly filed a motion for rehearing which was granted, although the court refused to rescind the December disbarment order. On January 12 the appellant appeared before the panel and was given an opportunity to present any evidence or legal arguments in his behalf. Unable to persuade the panel to rescind its previous order he now brings this appeal.

In addition to res judicata and lack of jurisdiction, Balliet claims on appeal that the charges against him were not prosecuted within sixty days from the date the petition was filed as required by Sections 12 and 13 of Art. 10 of the Md.Code. He also claims that he was not given a proper hearing under Rule BV4 e, and that on rehearing he should have been granted a continuance to enable him to employ an attorney and adequately prepare his defense. These contentions are so completely without merit they can be disposed of in a few brief paragraphs.

Balliet was granted a rehearing and was given an opportunity to present any evidence or legal arguments in his behalf on January 12. He became aware of the disciplinary petition in November and thus he had been given sufficient time to obtain the services of an attorney to prepare his case. As Rule BV4 f 1 provides that 'an attorney's final judgment of conviction by a judicial tribunal of a crime shall be conclusive proof of the guilt of the attorney of such crime,' we perceive no need for a de novo hearing for the mere purpose of re-introducing the undisputed record of his conviction into evidence. Since all of the appellant's arguments were legal rather than factual in nature, he was in effect granted a continuance when the panel allowed him twenty days after January 12 in which to file an additional memorandum, as authorized by Rule BV4 f 2.

Similarly, we reject Balliet's contention that the proceedings did not conform to the time limits set forth in Art. 10, §§ 12 and 13. Those sections indicate that if a judge of any of the several courts of the State.

'shall have reasonable ground to believe that any attorney admitted to the practice of law * * * is guilty of professional misconduct * * * (or) crime involving moral turpitude * * * he shall issue an order directed to the bar association and/or State's attorney of the city or county * * * requiring said bar association and/or State's attorney to prosecute the charges named in said order on a day specified therein, which day shall not be less than fifteen nor more than sixty days from the date of said order * * *' (emphasis added).

Section 13 allows a bar association to initiate a similar action but it directs that 'such proceedings shall be had as if said charges had been filed by the court and specified in the order directing the prosecution thereof, referred to in § 12 of this article.' Assuming that 1) this oblique statutory phraselogy imposes a sixty day prosecution time limit on the very same bar association which filed the petition initially, 2) this unique requirement is mandatory rather than directory, and 3) the procedural aspects of both sections have not been superseded by Rules BV4 and 5 ¹ (where there are no specific time limits) we must nevertheless point out that the prosecution here was begun within the sixty day period. The Bar...