Ballog v. City of Chi., Docket No. 1–11–2429.

Citation2012 IL App (1st) 112429,366 Ill.Dec. 597,980 N.E.2d 690
Decision Date26 October 2012
Docket NumberDocket No. 1–11–2429.
Parties Eleanor BALLOG, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. The CITY OF CHICAGO, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant–Appellee.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

2012 IL App (1st) 112429
980 N.E.2d 690
366 Ill.Dec.
597

Eleanor BALLOG, Plaintiff–Appellant,
v.
The CITY OF CHICAGO, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant–Appellee.

Docket No. 1–11–2429.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Sixth Division.

Oct. 26, 2012.


980 N.E.2d 691

Joseph V. Roddy and Jeane N. Brown, both of Law Offices of Joseph V. Roddy, of Chicago, for appellant.

Stephen R. Patton, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Benna Ruth Solomon, Myriam Zreczny Kasper, and Justin A. Houppert, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellee.

Justice GARCIA delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

366 Ill.Dec. 598

¶ 1 Plaintiff Eleanor Ballog appeals from the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to defendant City of Chicago (the City) in her suit charging the City with negligence. The plaintiff fractured her foot when she tripped as she stepped from the portion of the street that had been excavated, refilled with concrete, but not resurfaced. We append two photographs of the location, identified as "Plaintiff's Exhibit # 1" and "Plaintiff's Exhibit # 5." The plaintiff marked plaintiff's Exhibit No. 5 to show where she landed on the connecting sidewalk when she fell. The plaintiff contends summary judgment was precluded because two material questions of fact remain: (1) whether the condition that caused the plaintiff to fall was an open and obvious condition; and (2) whether the deliberate encounter exception to the open and obvious doctrine applied. We hold the condition of the street was open and obvious as a matter of law where the parties do not dispute the physical nature of the condition and the exception did not apply where no deliberate encounter occurred. We affirm.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On August 17, 2008, the plaintiff was injured in a fall at the intersection of North Leavitt Street and West Belle Plaine Avenue in Chicago. At her deposition on November 13, 2009, the plaintiff testified that at 11:15 a.m., she left her residence to walk five blocks to attend church services. She identified several photographs that depicted the intersection where she fell. Asked to describe how she fell, the plaintiff stated that she did not see the gap in the street as she crossed Belle Plaine Avenue in the crosswalk, as she walked southbound on Leavitt. She was "admiring" the construction that had been completed at the intersection, which had been ongoing for six months. During the construction, she had observed warning signs on the streets. When she walked to church while the streets were under construction, she would "walk in the middle of

366 Ill.Dec. 599
980 N.E.2d 692

the street" instead of using the crosswalk at the intersection. She could not recall if she had walked to church the week before the incident and could not recall the last time she was in the area prior to her fall. The plaintiff always walked the same route to attend church. She stated that she was familiar with the area and traveled in that location "[e]very week, or every two weeks" for years.

¶ 4 On the date the plaintiff fell, it was a beautiful, dry August day. The plaintiff testified, "There [were] no signs saying there was construction still, nothing. As I was walking, I had canvas shoes on, lightweight. It was summer." She continued, "There was nothing to say that anything was wrong with the streets. My foot went on the edge of the—that was up, twisted, I fell to my knees, and couldn't remember the rest because I woke up and I was in a lady's arms." When asked whether anything distracted her immediately prior to her fall, the plaintiff answered, "The niceness of the streets, the clean up." Before she fell she "was looking towards the church," that was "[a]head of [her]." She stated that she did not see the unfilled portion of the street until she fell. When asked what caused her to fall, the plaintiff responded, "the street wasn't finished. The construction was not done." The plaintiff was asked, "[B]efore the accident, if you were looking down, were you able to see [the gap in the street]?" The plaintiff answered, "From crossing, no. You just thought to yourself it's done. Look how beautiful. That was it." The plaintiff fractured her right foot in the fall.

¶ 5 After the plaintiff fell, she observed the unfilled portion of the street. The plaintiff made clear that the gap where she tripped was not covered or obscured by leaves, debris, or anything else. According to the plaintiff, she could not see the gap as she entered the intersection because the elevated center of the street obscured her view of the other side. A photograph of the intersection depicted in plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1 reveals that in addition to the gap that caused her fall, a similar gap in the surface of the street existed at the corner from where the plaintiff began her walk across Belle Plaine Avenue.

¶ 6 The plaintiff marked where she landed after she fell on plaintiff's Exhibit No. 5, a photograph of the intersection. The gap abutted the beginning of the sidewalk and ran some unspecified, but short distance into the street. Neither party provided the dimensions of the gap from the end of the surface covering of the street to the start of the sidewalk. Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 5 depicts a plainly visible elevation where the concrete of the sidewalk abuts the street. The plaintiff did not measure the height of the elevation from the gap to the concrete of the sidewalk that is visible on plaintiff's Exhibit No. 5.

¶ 7 Karin Meyers testified at her deposition on January 28, 2011, that on August 17, 2008, she was walking with her boyfriend to the grocery store and passed the plaintiff on the sidewalk as they walked in the same direction on Leavitt. "[A]nd then once we were halfway down the block after that intersection, we heard her fall." Meyers did not see the plaintiff fall, but as soon as she heard her fall, she "knew exactly what had happened ‘cause I almost tripped at the same thing crossing that intersection." According to Meyers, at that same intersection, "I didn't fall, but I had taken a little, you know, stumble at this same exact spot." When asked to describe how she stumbled, Meyers responded, "I think it was the edge of the road and then not getting my foot up for the edge of the curb in time, and so the tripping on the edge of the curb there in that ditch that's between the street and

366 Ill.Dec. 600
980 N.E.2d 693

the sidewalk." Meyers described the "ditch" as a "nonfilled-in area between the street and the sidewalk." Meyers did not see the gap until after she stumbled on it. She did not recall seeing any warning signs or barriers at the intersection on the date of the incident. However, the area was not covered or obscured by any debris.

¶ 8 After she heard the plaintiff fall, Meyers returned to the intersection to assist the plaintiff. According to Meyers, the plaintiff indicated she had fallen because of the "problem with the—you know, not being filled in right between the street and the curb." The City's attorney asked Meyers if she could recall the height difference between the downward slope of the sidewalk at the curb and the gap. Meyers responded, "I doubt it was more than two inches, but maybe around two inches. The problem is that it dips down and then—you've got this unexpected dip down even if it's not very deep and then an unexpected dip up or step up that's just a few feet—you know, just like a foot later, and so if you're walking in a normal distance between your feet, one of those is going to get tripped up either going in or going out." She stated that it was difficult to see the gap when approaching from the opposite side of the street. Meyers identified the gap in the street in a photograph of the intersection: "I can see it looking at the photograph." However, she did not see the gap as she crossed the street because she was "expecting it to be like a normal street meeting the curb, so I was looking just up and about at, you know, trees or my boyfriend or whatever." Meyers did not know how long the gap was there prior to the plaintiff's fall. Meyers stated, "I mean it hadn't been there always. I have the sense that maybe it had been there for just a short time, maybe a week or something, I don't know because I hadn't been there—I don't think it had been there the previous time that I walked down there which was probably, you know, a couple of weeks beforehand."

¶ 9 On April 26, 2011, the City moved for summary judgment, arguing that the unfilled portion of the street was an open and obvious condition that did not give rise to a duty of care owed by the City to the plaintiff. The City contended the photographs and the plaintiff's testimony showed the gap was "clearly visible and any pedestrian walking along that portion of the crosswalk can see that part of the crosswalk was taken out." The City asserted that the open and obvious condition was not unreasonably dangerous; nor was it reasonable to require the City to anticipate that a pedestrian, in the exercise of ordinary care, would not have taken the precautions necessary to safely traverse the area. In other words, a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position...

To continue reading

Request your trial
18 cases
  • Torrence v. U.S. Bankr. Court for the N. Dist. of Ill., Case No. 17 C 3120
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. United States District Court (Northern District of Illinois)
    • August 21, 2017
    ...of the plaintiff.'" Vesely v. Armslist LLC, 762 F.3d 661, 665 (7th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted); see also Ballog v. City of Chicago, 980 N.E.2d 690, 695 (1st Dist. 2012) ("A duty of care arises when the law imposes 'upon defendant an obligation of reasonable conduct for the benefit of plai......
  • Atchley v. Univ. of Chi. Med. Ctr., 1–15–2481.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • September 28, 2016
    ...and obvious doctrine pertains to the element of duty in a negligence action. Ballog v. City of Chicago, 2012 IL App (1st) 112429, ¶ 20, 366 Ill.Dec. 597, 980 N.E.2d 690.4 64 N.E.3d 791¶ 33 Pursuant to that doctrine, a party which owns or controls land is not required to foresee or protect a......
  • McGregor v. United States, Case No. 13 C 7223
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. United States District Court (Northern District of Illinois)
    • March 17, 2016
    ...... City of Chicago , 754 F.3d 416, 420 (7th Cir. 2014). "The ..., the defendant cannot be found negligent." Ballog v . City of Chicago , 980 N.E.2d 690, 695, 366 Ill.Dec. ... evidence that Safety Specialist Pamela Pounds and docket clerk Henderson both testified that a rising dock plate can ......
  • Crespo-Fregoso v. City of Chi.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • August 9, 2021
    ...so would outweigh the apparent risk." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ballog v. City of Chicago , 2012 IL App (1st) 112429, ¶ 38, 366 Ill.Dec. 597, 980 N.E.2d 690. The deliberate encounter exception is applied most commonly, though not exclusively, in situations where "workers are compe......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT