Balmer Fund, Inc. v. City of Harper
| Decision Date | 16 February 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 17–1046–EFM |
| Citation | 294 F.Supp.3d 1136 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
| Parties | The BALMER FUND, INC., A Kansas Not-for-profit Corporation, and, Rosalea Hostetler, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF HARPER, Kansas, Defendant. |
M. Kathryn Webb, Law Office of M. Kathryn Webb, Wichita, KS, for Plaintiffs.
Allen G. Glendenning, Lee H. Davis, Great Bend, KS, for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This case involves a dispute regarding the demolition of a hotel and the personal property contained within the hotel. Plaintiffs, The Balmer Fund, Inc. and Rosalea Hostetler, allege that Defendant, the City of Harper, Kansas, violated their due process rights, converted their property, committed a trespass upon their property, intentionally inflicted emotional distress on Hostetler, negligently inflicted emotional distress on Hostetler, intentionally interfered with Plaintiffs' prospective business expectancy and advantage, and acted negligently when it demolished Plaintiffs' hotel and personal property contained within the hotel.
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's motion for summary judgment and/or motion to dismiss (Doc. 20) and Plaintiffs' motion to strike (Doc. 29). For the reasons stated below, Defendant's motion is granted in part and denied in part, and Plaintiffs' motion is denied.
In 1999, Rosalea Hostetler quitclaimed a hotel located at 121 West Main Street, Harper, Kansas, to The Balmer Fund, Inc., while reserving a life estate in the property. In 2013, Plaintiffs hired Engineering Consultants, P.A., to evaluate the structural integrity of the hotel. Plaintiffs' consultants confirmed that the hotel was deteriorating, found that saving the hotel would require significant money and effort, recommended various repairs, and recommended that the public not be allowed in the building or along the sidewalk near one corner of the building until repairs are completed. In 2014, the City hired D & B Engineering, LLC, to inspect the property, and on May 22, 2014, D & B performed an inspection of the exterior of the hotel. D & B determined that none of the repair work recommended in the 2013 evaluation had been started, and that protective measures for the public were needed right away.
On June 2, 2014, a special City Council meeting was held to discuss the hotel. Plaintiffs attended the meeting. The City Council passed a resolution declaring the hotel an immediate hazard, and the City immediately padlocked the hotel and restricted access to it. On July 14, 2014, the City Council began advertising for bids to demolish the hotel, and on August 25, 2014, the City Council began opening bids for the hotel's demolition.
Defendant sent Plaintiffs a letter on August 27, 2014, requesting that Plaintiffs provide proof of their financial ability to pay for repairs to make the hotel safe. Plaintiffs did not provide a statement documenting their ability to pay for the necessary repairs by the City Council's meeting held on September 8, 2014, and the City Council voted to accept a bid to demolish the hotel for $148,000.
The next day, Plaintiffs filed a Petition in the Thirtieth Judicial District, District Court, Harper County, Kansas, requesting an order temporarily restraining Defendant from taking steps to demolish the hotel. Approximately one week later, the state court issued an Agreed Journal Entry. The order included the following excerpts:
Plaintiffs did not provide notice that they had secured $110,000 by January 15, 2015, and on January 20, 2015, the City signed a demolition contract and notice to proceed with the demolition. The City Council scheduled the demolition work to begin on February 26, 2015.
On March 5, 2015, the City Council convened a special meeting at Plaintiffs' request. At the meeting Plaintiffs revealed that they had secured $21,000 for repairs, but the City Council did not vote to breach the demolition contract. The City Council asked Plaintiffs if they had plans to remove property from the hotel before demolition, and Plaintiffs responded that there were no plans. The parties disagree as to when demolition actually began, but Plaintiffs allege that the hotel and all of its contents were demolished on March 6, 2015.
On February 24, 2017, Plaintiffs filed this action alleging violations of Plaintiffs' due process rights, conversion, trespass, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional interference with prospective business advantage, and negligence.
Summary judgment is proper if the moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.2 A fact is "material" when it is essential to the claim, and issues of fact are "genuine" if the proffered evidence permits a reasonable jury to decide the issue in either party's favor.3 The movant bears the initial burden of proof and must show the lack of evidence on an essential element of the claim.4 If the movant carries its initial burden, the nonmovant may not simply rest on its pleading, but must instead "set forth specific facts" that would be admissible in evidence in the event of trial from which a rational trier of fact could find for the nonmovant.5 These facts must be clearly identified through affidavits, deposition transcripts, or incorporated exhibits—conclusory allegations alone cannot survive a motion for summary judgment.6 The Court views all evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.7
Under Rule 12(b)(6), Defendant may move for dismissal of any claim where Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Upon such motion, the Court must decide "whether the compliant contains ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ "8 "[T]he mere metaphysical possibility that some plaintiff could prove some set of facts in support of the pleaded claims is insufficient; the complaint must give the court reason to believe that this plaintiff has a reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support for these claims."9 The Court does not "weigh potential evidence that the parties might present at trial," but "assess[es] whether the plaintiff's complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted."10 In determining whether a claim is facially plausible, the Court must draw on its judicial experience and common sense.11 All well-pleaded facts in the complaint are assumed to be true and are construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs.12 Allegations that merely state legal conclusions, however, need not be accepted as true.13
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, res judicata, accord and satisfaction, the statute of limitations, and equitable estoppel, and that Plaintiffs' damages should be limited as a matter of law. Further, Defendant argues that even if Plaintiffs' action survives these doctrines, several of Plaintiffs' claims fail to state a claim for which relief can be granted. Plaintiffs respond by arguing that none of the doctrines identified by Defendant bar their claims. Instead of substantively responding to Defendant's arguments that several of their claims fail to state a claim, however, Plaintiffs move to strike this portion of Defendant's motion. The Court will begin its analysis by addressing the doctrines Defendant argues bar Plaintiffs' claims, as well as its argument in favor of limiting damages. The Court will then address Defendant's assertion that several claims in the Complaint fail to state a claim for which relief can be granted, and Plaintiffs' motion to strike those arguments.
"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction," and "possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute."14 The Rooker–Feldman doctrine precludes lower courts from "exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments."15 Application of the doctrine extends only to "cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments."16 In addition to claims actually decided by a state court, the doctrine also applies to "claims inextricably intertwined with a prior state-court judgment."17
" ‘[T]he type of judicial action barred by Rooker–Feldman consists of a review of the proceedings already conducted by the [state] tribunal to determine whether it reached its result in accordance with law.’ "18 The doctrine prohibits a ...
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...is extreme, the court does not need to address whether the conduct was extreme and outrageous. See Balmer Fund, Inc. v. City of Harper , 294 F. Supp. 3d 1136, 1151–52 (D. Kan. 2018). To recover for the tort of outrage, the emotional distress must be "extreme or severe." Valadez , 290 Kan. a......
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...and are not supported by facts that would support a finding that Plaintiff has stated a claim. See Balmer Fund, Inc. v. City of Harper, 294 F.Supp.3d 1136, 1152 (D. Kan. 2018). In his response, Plaintiff asserts that it would be reasonable to infer that he has suffered “severe depression if......