Baltic Mining Co. v. Commonwealth
| Citation | 207 Mass. 381,93 N.E. 831 |
| Parties | BALTIC MINING CO. v. COMMONWEALTH. |
| Decision Date | 04 January 1911 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts |
BALTIC MINING CO.
v.
COMMONWEALTH.
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.
Jan. 4, 1911.
Report from Superior Court, Suffolk County.
Petition by the Baltic Mining Company against the Commonwealth to secure the abatement of a certain tax. On report from superior court. Petition denied.
COMMERCE (s 74*)-INTERSTATE COMMERCE-TAXATION.
A foreign mining corporation maintained an office at Boston for the financial management of the company. The concern was engaged in interstate commerce, in selling its ore, and it sold ore in Massachusetts; but the office was neither necessary to nor maintained because of such sales. The company was taxed under St. 1909, c. 490, pt. 3, ss 54-56, which imposes taxes upon foreign business corporations which maintain a usual place of business within the state, which taxes are based upon the par value of their capital stock. Held, that the tax upon this company was not an interference with interstate commerce, for it could give up its office in Boston without affecting its interstate commerce, and by giving up such office it could avoid paying the tax; the tax being merely an excise tax imposed upon the privilege of maintaining an office in Massachusetts.
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Commerce, Cent. Dig. ss 124-133; Dec. Dig. s 74.*]
* For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep'r Indexes
Dana Malone, Atty. Gen., and Andrew Marshall, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the Commonwealth.
KNOWLTON, C. J.
This is a petition in equity, brought under St. 1909, c. 490, pt. 3, § 70, for an abatement of an excise tax of $500 paid by the petitioner under section 56 of this chapter. The petitioner's contention is that the statute under which the tax was imposed is in violation of the Constitution of the United States.
The question presented is the same that was decided by this court, after full consideration and the citation of many authorities, in Attorney General v. Electric Storage Battery Company, 188 Mass. 239, 74 N. E. 467, when it was held that the statute was constitutional. Since this decision the cases of Western Union Telegraph Company v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1, 30 Sup. Ct. 190, 54 L. Ed. 355, and Pullman Company v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 56, 30 Sup. Ct. 232, 54 L. Ed. 378, have been decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, in which it was held that a statute of Kansas imposing a tax [207 Mass. 384]upon foreign corporations was unconstitutional. The petitioner contends that these case require us to overrule our former decision. In the first of the two cases the decision was by five of the nine justices, the other four dissenting. In the decision of the second some of the justices did not participate, but those who took part were divided in opinion as in the first case. The question before us is whether the law laid down by the majority of the Supreme Court of the United States shows that the excise tax in the present case was unlawfully imposed.
When we considered the statute in the former case we held that it was inapplicable to corporations that maintain a place of business within the commonwealth only for interstate commerce, and the opinion recognized the fact that no corporation or individual could be prevented from engaging in interstate commerce within the commonwealth, by ordering that the injunction against the defendant, forbidding the prosecution of its business so long as it disobeyed the law, should except so much of its business as was a part of interstate commerce. The statute was construed as contemplating only this kind of an injunction.
It becomes necessary to consider the substance of the law established by the two decisions of the Supreme Court, in its application to a case like the present. In each of the cases three opinions were written, one by Mr. Justice Harlan and one by Mr. Justice White, these two concurring in the judgment of the court, and one by Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting. We do not understand
[93 N.E. 832
that the majority of the court intended to change the law laid down in former decisions; but the difference of opinion among the justices seems to have arisen chiefly from their different views of the two cases then before the court, as to the effect of the proper application to them of established rules of law.
We understand that the majority agree in the following views: A...
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