Baltimore and Philadelphia Steamboat Co. v. Brown

• Decision Date: 11 February 1867
• Citation: 54 Pa. 77
• Parties: The Baltimore and Philadelphia Steamboat Company <I>versus</I> Brown.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

54 Pa. 77

The Baltimore and Philadelphia Steamboat Company versus Brown.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

January 11, 1867.

February 11, 1867.

January 11th 1867.

Before WOODWARD, C. J., THOMPSON, READ and AGNEW, JJ. STRONG, J., at Nisi Prius

Error to the District Court of Philadelphia.

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P. McCall, for plaintiffs in error.—The effect of the parol evidence was to alter and contradict a written contract. A bill of lading is partly a receipt and partly a contract; the receipt may be varied by parol, the contract cannot: 1 Greenl. Ev. § 305; Ellis v. Willard, 5 Seld. 529; Wolfe v. Myers, 3 Sandf. 7; Heebner v. Worrall, 2 Wright 376; Harbold v. Kuster, 8 Id. 392. Such evidence, when admissible, must be received with strict caution: Stine v. Sherk, 1 W. & S. 195; Farmers' Bank v. Fordyce, 1 Barr 457; Hain v. Kalbach, 14 S. & R. 159.

Groves was the agent of the Baltimore and Philadelphia Steamboat Company, the terminus of whose line was at Baltimore, and no authority in him to contract for carriage beyond Baltimore could be implied: Seiple v. Irwin, 6 Casey 513; Stevenson v. Hoy, 7 Wright 191.

Under the bill of lading alone, the steamboat company were carriers only to Baltimore, and forwarders from there: 2 Pars. on Cont., § 13; Nutting v. Conn. River Railroad, 1 Gray 505; Hood v. New York & New Haven Railroad, 22 Conn. 1; Vant Santford v. St. John, 6 Hill 157; F. & M. Bank v. Champlain, 18 Vt. 140; Jenneson v. Camden and Amboy Railroad Co., 4 Am. Law Reg. 234.

The prepayment of the whole freight makes no difference: Hood v. New York & New Haven Railroad, 22 Conn. 1; Hunt v. N. Y. & Erie Railroad, 1 Hill 231.

[During the argument, WOODWARD, C. J., referred to Peters v. Rylands, 8 Harris 497, and READ, J., to Penna. Railroad v. Schwarzenberger, 9 Wright 208, and Tanner v. Oil Creek Railroad, 3 P. F. Smith 411.]

Diehl, for defendant in error.—Brown had a right to show a contract differing from the bill of lading as to the destination of the goods; and no more was proposed: Warden v. Greer, 6 Watts 424; Chouteaux v. Leech, 6 Harris 232.

The steamboat company received the whole freight, which was an affirmance of the contract of their agent.

The opinion of the court was delivered, February 11th 1867, by THOMPSON, J.

It appears in the uncontradicted testimony of Mr. Falls, president of the Baltimore Steam Packet Company, that that company and the Baltimore and Philadelphia Steamboat Company had business connections during the month of April 1862, and that his company's line plied between Baltimore and Fortress Monroe and other points. Both were transportation companies, and of course common carriers. It appears by the bill of lading that the whiskey, for the loss of which this action was brought, was shipped by the defendants' line to Fortress Monroe, addressed "W. H. Brown," on the 2d April 1862. It never came to hand according to address, and was entirely lost to the plaintiff, but how or by what means does not appear. This, however, is not material, as there was no evidence or offer to prove that it was lost by any of the excepted perils mentioned in the bill of lading.

The clerk of the firm who shipped the whiskey and paid the freight, was called by the plaintiff and proved the undertaking of the defendants to carry the cask to its destination, and its shipment pursuant to the contract. It seems from his testimony that it had been the intention of the consignors to send it by Adams's Express, and that this determination was changed under the advice and contract of the defendants' agent to convey it by their line, he telling the witness that Adams's Express went by the same boat from Baltimore to Fortress Monroe, by which their freight would go, and would get there at the same time, and would be much less expensive. He shipped it by defendants' line, and prepaid the freight, under the agreement by the defendants' agent to carry it through.

The testimony disclosed very clearly an undertaking to transport the whiskey to Fortress Monroe on part of the defendants; but they objected to the evidence, and claimed that the bill of lading was the contract between the parties, and being in writing, excluded all oral testimony of it.

We do not think the doctrine to the extent contended for can be maintained in regard to a bill of lading, and that it is such a complete contract as to exclude all testimony of what is not expressed and necessary to a complete contract. On its face it is but a memorandum, and not in form a contract inter partes. It is doubtless an instrument fitted for the occasions in which it is usually employed, and while what it clearly expresses may not be contradicted by oral testimony, unless under the qualification of fraud or mistake, yet there is no rule which excludes testimony to explain it, and to show what the real contract was, of which it is but a note or memorandum at best.

The general rule undoubtedly is, that parol evidence is not admissible to contradict, vary or alter a written instrument, because the writing is the most exact, as well as the most deliberate and solemn mode of evidencing a contract. Whenever, therefore, evidence is admissible for any such purpose, it must generally have a foundation in pre-existing evidence of fraud, accident or mistake. But not so where the evidence is not to contradict or vary, but to explain the contract, as when something is omitted, and the like, so as to qualify the tribunal passing upon the writing to interpret it truly according to the intent of the parties. Our books are full of authorities to this effect, but only the following will be referred to at present: 8 Harris 464; 7 Casey 252-265; 11 Id. 212; 12 Wright 491; 10 Id. 420; 1 Greenl. Ev. 285, 288. The rule is well illustrated by the admission of parol evidence of a consideration not mentioned in a deed: 1 Penna. R. 486.

Nothing was contradicted by the oral evidence admitted here. But that without which the bill of lading was unintelligible was made perfectly clear, and an implication contrary to the fact was rebutted by it, which may be done (11 Casey 212), namely, that the reference to Fortress Monroe in the bill, purported that it was to be transhipped to that point by the defendants, but not conveyed or carried. The oral...