Baltimore, C. & A. Ry. Co. v. William Sperber & Co.
| Decision Date | 29 February 1912 |
| Citation | 84 A. 72,117 Md. 595 |
| Parties | BALTIMORE, C. & A. RY. CO. v. WILLIAM SPERBER & CO. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Wicomico County; John R. Pattison, E Stanley Toadvin, and Robley D. Jones, Judges.
Action by William Sperber & Co. against the Baltimore, Chesapeake & Atlantic Railway Company and another. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant Baltimore, Chesapeake & Atlantic Railway Company appeals. Affirmed.
Argued before BOYD, C.J., and BRISCOE, PEARCE, BURKE, THOMAS, and URNER, JJ.
Robert P. Graham, for appellant. James E. Ellegood, for appellee.
The appellees sued the appellant and the Pennsylvania Railroad Company for damages sustained by them by reason of the alleged failure of the two companies to promptly and with diligence transport a car load of strawberries which were shipped by the Eastern Shore Produce Company from Mardela Springs, Wicomico county, Md., to the plaintiffs at Pittsburgh, Pa. The Pennsylvania Railroad Company moved to quash the return of service of process on it, and the court granted a motion made by the plaintiffs to sever and renew for that company. The case then proceeded against the appellant, resulting in a verdict against it, and this appeal is from a judgment rendered on that verdict. The appellant was the initial carrier, and issued the bill of lading under which the berries were carried. The narr. alleges that they were received by the appellant for transportation for hire to the city of Pittsburgh over its line and the connecting line or railroad of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, and that the latter company received them to be transported for reward with reasonable dispatch. It is further alleged that the defendants did not promptly and with diligence forward them but detained them at the point of shipment, at the point of destination and upon their respective roads, by reason of which detention the berries were damaged and failed to reach their destination until too late for the market of the day for which they were shipped and received, and for which they would have arrived in due time if the defendants had used due and reasonable diligence in the transportation and delivery of them to the plaintiff. The narr. further alleges that because of the delay and detention of the berries, they were greatly damaged and a large shrinkage in their value took place by reason of the deterioration of their condition, and they were rendered valueless.
The appellant filed three pleas: First, that it did not commit the wrong alleged; second, that it was not guilty of the wrong alleged; and, third, "that the goods shipped as alleged in the declaration of the plaintiff were transported over the line of the defendants at the earliest time consistent with their printed and published schedules." The plaintiffs joined issue on the first and second pleas and demurred to the third; the demurrer having been sustained by the court. If what is stated in the third plea could excuse the appellant, we see no reason why it could not have been offered under the general issue plea, and hence no injury was done by the ruling on the demurrer, but we do not deem it a sufficient answer to the declaration.
Without giving other reasons, if what is known as the Carmack Amendment to the Hepburn Act of June 29, 1906 (34 Stat. at L. 584, c. 3591, U.S. Comp. Stat. Supp., 1909, p. 1149), is applicable to this suit, then it could not be said that the plea was sufficient, as the narr. alleges delay on other lines and in delivery, as well as on the lines of this company. So we will determine whether it is applicable. That amendment is as follows:
In Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U.S. 186, 31 S.Ct. 164, 55 L.Ed. 167, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 7, the Supreme Court definitely settled the question as to the constitutionality of that statute which had been frequently attacked in other courts, although very generally sustained. When goods were shipped at a great distance over connecting lines, the rule which required a shipper sustaining loss to prove on which line it occurred oftentimes resulted in great hardship, and sometimes in a failure to recover, simply because the shipper could not produce evidence to show where the loss occurred. It may in some instances be burdensome to the initial carrier to be held responsible for loss, damage, or injury to the property caused by some other carrier to whom it is delivered, or over whose line it passes, but it cannot be denied that the initial carrier can generally protect itself far better than a shipper can, and it might easily have happened under the former rule that a shipper would be prevented from collecting a just claim by reason of the great expense incurred, and inconvenience sustained, in an effort to establish it in a distant court. On the other hand, if the holder of the bill of lading was now required to sue the initial carrier alone and was not permitted to sue the terminal or some other carrier great injustice might be done in that way, and hence probably for that, as well as other reasons, the proviso was added, "that nothing in this section shall deprive any holder of such receipt or bill of lading of any remedy or right of action which he had under existing law." ...
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