Baltimore City v. Beck

Decision Date14 January 1903
Citation53 A. 976,96 Md. 183
PartiesMAYOR, ETC., OF BALTIMORE CITY v. BECK.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

Appeal from Baltimore city court; George M. Sharp, Judge.

Action by Emma Beck against the mayor and city council of Baltimore city. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Argued before McSHERRY, C.J., and FOWLER, BRISCOE, and SCHMUCKER JJ.

Wm Pinkney Whyte and Charles W. Field, for appellant.

Lee S Meyer, for appellee.

BRISCOE J.

The plaintiff, who is a married woman, brought a suit on the 20th day of August, 1900, in the superior court of Baltimore city against the mayor and city council of Baltimore, for personal injuries received by her while driving along one of the public avenues of Baltimore city known as "Fulton Avenue." The case was tried before a jury in the Baltimore city court, and the plaintiff recovered a judgment for $1,000. The cause of action is thus stated and set out in the plaintiff's declaration: That Messrs. Thomas & Morgan, of the city of Baltimore, and each of them, placed and allowed to remain for a long time a large quantity of bricks and other building materials in the public highway of Baltimore known as "Fulton Avenue," at or near its intersection with Walbrook avenue; that these bricks and materials were placed so as unnecessarily to obstruct the highway in an improper and negligent manner, and during the nighttime were left without a light or signal to indicate danger, as required by the city ordinance; that on the night of June 26, 1900, the defendant negligently permitted the obstructions to remain on and upon Fulton avenue at or near its intersection, and negligently permitted the avenue to be and remain in bad repair and condition, omitted to have it properly lighted in the nighttime, and permitted it to remain in an unsafe condition for ordinary travel, in consequence whereof a carriage with the plaintiff, passing through the avenue, collided with the obstruction, and was thereby overturned, the plaintiff thrown out, and in consequence thereof was severely and permanently injured; that the injuries to the plaintiff were directly caused by the negligence and want of care of the defendant, and without fault or want of care on the part of the plaintiff directly thereto contributing.

The questions presented for our consideration arise upon exceptions to the granting of the plaintiff's prayers and to the rejected prayers of the defendant. At the close of the plaintiff's case the defendant offered three prayers to the effect that the plaintiff had offered no evidence of negligence on the part of the city, and that the case be withdrawn from the jury. We find no error in the ruling of the court upon the rejection of the prayers in this exception, and, as they were subsequently offered at the close of the case, we will consider them on the defendant's second exception.

It appears from the evidence that the plaintiff was in a carriage, with her husband and child, on the night of the accident, and was driving along Fulton avenue, Baltimore, and drove into a pile of bricks lying in the street, and was injured. The bricks had been placed in the street by certain builders and contractors, who were building houses at or near the place of the accident. The evidence further shows that there was no light burning at the time or at the place of the accident, either on the pile of bricks or in the street; that the city electric light was out, and had not been burning at Fulton and Walbrook avenues, for several nights before and after the accident, and there was no light burning to point out the obstruction in the street. There was also testimony that it was a dark night, and the entire avenue was dark; that the bricks were scattered from the curbstone to the car track, so as to obstruct the free passage of vehicles except down the car track. It is contended upon the part of the appellee that, if any liability exists at all in this case, it rests upon Messrs. Thomas & Morgan, the contractors and builders, and not upon the defendant, the mayor and city council of

Baltimore because by ordinance (section 87, art. 48, City Code) it is provided that "whenever any piles of bricks, stones, lumber or other building material shall be left in...

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