Baltimore Humane Impartial Soc'y & Aged Women's & Aged Men's Homes v. Marley

• Decision Date: 25 January 1929
• Docket Number: No. 90.,90.
• Citation: 144 A. 521
• Parties: BALTIMORE HUMANE IMPARTIAL SOCIETY & AGED WOMEN'S & AGED MEN'S HOMES v. MARLEY.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

144 A. 521

BALTIMORE HUMANE IMPARTIAL SOCIETY & AGED WOMEN'S & AGED MEN'S HOMES

v. MARLEY.

No. 90.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Jan. 25, 1929.

Appeal from Circuit Court of Baltimore City; Eugene O'Dunne, Judge.

Suit by George Marley against the Baltimore Humane Impartial Society and Aged Women's and Aged Men's Homes. From an adverse decree, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Argued before BOND, C. J., and PATTISON, URNER, ADKINS, OFFUTT, PARKE, and SLOAN, JJ.

Leigh Bonsai, of Baltimore (Bonsai & Lee, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.

Abram C. Joseph, of Baltimore (Daniel C. Joseph, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

BOND, C. J. Marley, the appellee, sued in equity for cancellation and rescission of a contract he had made with the appellant, called in the contract the home, to become an inmate and receive care during the remainder of his life, and for the redelivery to him of a will he had made in favor of the home, and money which he had transferred to it as required by his contract. There was a provision in the contract that within a probation period of six months either the home or the inmate might terminate the contract without question with a return to the inmate of the admission fee paid by him, less $5 per week board for the length of his residence in the home; and Marley, within six months of his admission, declared his election to terminate the contract and demanded a return of the money previously transferred. And, this return having been refused by the home, he filed his bill in equity. The home in its answer set up the additional facts that Marley had entered the home with false representations as to the amount of his money, and at first had transferred only a small portion of it, concealing the remainder, and so attempting to gain the benefit of charitable care from the home, and at the same time to preserve his own independent resources; and that later, upon discovery by the home of the attempt, Marley acknowledged his mistake in making it, and made the full transfer required; but that in a few days he ehanged his mind, and resorted to the provision for termination of the contract as a further means of keeping his money. A demurrer by Marley to this answer was sustained, and the home appeals from that ruling.

In the argument the home contends that, in the first place, the bill has shown no ground for resorting to equity for the relief sought; then that there was no obligation under the contract to return the money transferred, especially under the additional circumstances shown in the answer; and that it follows from these additional circumstances that, if such a contract obligation might be found, Marley's attempted concealment and fraud on the home would disentitle him to the aid of a court of equity, because he would not come to it with clean hands.

The objection to the jurisdiction is based upon the general principle that the equity courts may be resorted to for cancellation or rescission of instruments only when some one of the peculiar grounds of equitable jurisdiction is involved, or when there is, for other reasons, no adequate remedy at law for the relief needed, and based also upon the fact that an action for money had and received would be a complete remedy here for the return of money transferred to the home, if Marley is entitled to it. 2 Story, Equity Jurisprudence (14th Ed.) § 993; 2 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, § 914; collection of decisions in note, 11 L. R. A. 68; Lipson v. Evans, 133 Md. 370, 376, 105 A. 312; Hertle v. Sehwartze, 3 Md. 366, 383; Wenstrom Motor Co. v. Purnell, 75 Md. 113, 119, 23 A. 134; Ranstead v. Allen, 85 Md. 482, 37 A. 15; Willson v. Williams, 106 Md. 657, 663, 68 A. 297, 598; Coan v. Consol. Gas. E....