Baltimore Ohio Railroad Company v. Interstate Commerce Commission 17 20, 1909
| Decision Date | 16 May 1910 |
| Docket Number | No. 222,222 |
| Citation | 31 S.Ct. 621,55 L.Ed. 878,221 U.S. 612 |
| Parties | BALTIMORE & OHIO RAILROAD COMPANY, Appt., v. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. Argued December 17 and 20, 1909. Ordered for reargument |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Messrs. Frederic D. McKenney, John G. Johnson, and Hugh L. Bond, Jr., for appellant on original argument.
Solicitor General Bowers for appellee.
Messrs. Frederic D. McKennery, John G. Johnson, and Hugh L. Bond, Jr., for appellant on reargument.
Solicitor General Lehmann for appellee.
This is a bill in equity to annul an order made by the Interstate Commerce Commission on March 3, 1908, and for injunction. The order required the carriers within the provisions of the act of Congress of March 4, 1907, chapter 2939, 34 Stat. at L. 1415, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1909, p. 1170, to make monthly reports, under oath, showing the instances where employees subject to that act had been on duty for a longer period than that allowed. The statute, entitled 'An Act to Promote the Safety of Employees and Travelers upon Railroads by Limiting the Hours of Service of Employees Thereon,' is set forth in the margin.1 By stipulation there were introduced into record additional instructions issued by the Commission under date of August 15, 1908. These prescribed new forms, and also a separate form of oath for use in case there had been no excessive service; and it was further directed that reports of hours of service of the employees described should be made by the secretary or similar officer of the carrier.
It was agreed that a number of like suits brought by other carriers should abide the final disposition of this cause, and that meanwhile the reports should not be required.
The bill alleged that the purpose of the Commission in making the order was to secure from carriers evidence of infractions of the law in order that suits might be brought to recover penalties; that, even if this were not the purpose, the result of the requirement would be the same, because of the provision that the Commission should lodge with the proper district attorneys information of the violations coming to its knowledge; and that this compulsory disclosure, both as to the corporation itself and as to the officers concerned in such violations, was repugnant to the 4th and 5th Amendments of the Constitution of the United States. It was also alleged that the Commission was without authority to make the order, either under the provisions of the act or otherwise.
A demurrer for want of equity was sustained, and the complainant appeals.
First. Although the question was not specifically raised by the bill, it is now contended that the statute is unconstitutional in its entirety, and therefore no action of the Commission can be based upon it. It is said that it goes beyond the power which Congress may exercise in the regulation of interstate commerce; that while addressed to common carriers engaged in interstate transportation by railroad to any extent whatever, its prohibitions and penalties are not limited to interstate commerce, but apply to intrastate railroads and to employees engaged in local business.
The prohibitions of the act are found in § 2. This provides that it shall be 'unlawful for any common carrier, its officers or agents, subject to this act, to require or permit any employee subject to this act to be or remain on duty' for a longer period than that prescribed. The carriers and employees subject to the act are defined in § 1 as follows:
No difficulty arises in the construction of this language. The first sentence states the application to carriers and employees who are 'engaged in the transportation of passengers or property by railroad' in the District of Columbia or the territories, or in interstate or foreign commerce. The definition in the second sentence, of what the terms 'railroad' and 'employees' shall include, qualify these words as previously used, but do not remove the limitation as to the nature of the transportation in which the employees must be engaged in order to come within the provisions of the statute. If the definition in the last part of the sentence, of the words used in the first part, be read in connection with the latter, the meaning of the whole becomes obvious. The section, in effect, thus provides: 'This act shall apply to any common carrier or carriers, their officers, agents, and employees (meaning by 'employees' persons actually engaged in or connected with the movement of any train), engaged in the transportation of passengers or property by railroad (meaning by 'railroad' to include all bridges and ferries used or operated in connection with any railroad) in the District of Columbia or any territory . . . or from one state . . . to any other state,' etc. In short, the employees to which the act refers, embracing the persons described in the last sentence of the section, are those engaged in the transportation of passengers or property by railroad in the district, territorial, interstate, or foreign commerce defined; and the railroad, including bridges and ferries, is the railroad by means of which the defined commerce is conducted.
The statute, therefore, in its scope, is materially different from the act of June 11, 1906, chapter 3073, 34 Stat. at L. 232, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1909, p. 1148, which was before this court in the Employers' Liability Cases (Howard v. Illinois C. R. Co.) 207 U. S. 463, 52 L. ed. 297, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 141. There, while the carriers described were those engaged in the commerce subject to the regulating power of Congress, it appeared that if a carrier was so engaged, the act governed its relation to every employee, although the employment of the latter might have nothing whatever to do with interstate commerce. In the present statute, the limiting words govern the employees as well as the carriers.
But the argument, undoubtedly, involves the consideration that the interstate and intrastate operations of interstate carriers are so interwoven that it is utterly impracticable for them to divide their employees in such manner that the duties of those who are engaged in connection with interstate commerce shall be confined to that commerce exclusively. And thus, many employees who have to do with the movement of trains in interstate transportation are, by virtue of practical necessity, also employed in intrastate transportation.
This consideration, however, lends no support to the contention that the statute is invalid. For there cannot be denied to Congress the effective exercise of its constitutional authority. By virtue of its power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, Congress may enact laws for the safeguarding of the persons and property that are transported in that commerce, and of those who are employed in transporting Johnson v. Southern P. Co. 196 U. S. 1, 49 L. ed. 363, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 158; Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. pp. 177, 178, 52 L. ed. 443, 444, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 217, 13 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 764; St. Louis I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U. S. 281, 52 L. ed. 1061, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 616; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. United States, decided May 15, 1911. [220 U. S. 559, 55 L. ed.——, 31 Sup.Ct.Rep. 612]. The fundamental question here is whether a restriction upon the hours of labor of employees who are connected with the movement of trains in interstate transportation is comprehended within this sphere of authorized legislation. This question admits of but one answer. The length of hours of service has direct relation to the efficiency of the human agencies upon which protection to life and property necessarily depends. This has been repeatedly emphasized in official reports of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and is a matter so plain as to require no elaboration. In its power suitably to provide for the safety of employees and travelers, Congress was not limited to the enactment of laws relating to mechanical appliances, but it was also competent to consider, and to endeavor to reduce, the dangers incident to the strain of excessive hours of duty on the part of engineers, conductors, train despatchers, telegraphers, and other persons embraced within the class defined by the act. And in imposing restrictions having reasonable relation to this end there is no interference with liberty of contract as guaranteed by the Constitution. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549, 55 L. ed. ——, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 259.
If, then, it be assumed, as it must be, that, in...
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