Baltimore & O.R. Co. v. State to Use of Woodward

• Decision Date: 12 January 1875
• Citation: 41 Md. 268
• Parties: THE BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILROAD COMPANY v. THE STATE, use of JEANETTE WOODWARD.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

41 Md. 268

THE BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILROAD COMPANY v. THE STATE, use of JEANETTE WOODWARD.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

January 12, 1875

APPEAL from the Circuit Court for Frederick county.

This suit was instituted against the appellant by the appellee to recover damages for the killing of Charles Woodward, the husband of the equitable plaintiff. The facts of the case together with the exceptions to evidence taken by both sides are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the Court.

Exceptions to Prayers.--The plaintiff offered the following prayers:

1. If the jury shall find from the evidence that on or about the 24th day of September, 1869, a collision occurred on the road of defendant, between two of its freight trains, which caused the death of Charles Woodward, then in defendant's employ on one of said trains as conductor, and that said collision resulted from the failure of the defendant to use reasonable care in providing machinery proper and suitable for the working of said trains with a reasonable regard for the safety of the employés thereon; or, if having machinery in itself proper for that purpose, failed to provide the number of hands sufficient to operate the same with a reasonable regard for the safety of said employés, and that said collision resulted from the want of such number of hands then the plaintiff is entitled to recover, notwithstanding the said Woodward at the time of said collision was in the employ of the defendant.

2. That if the jury shall find from the evidence that a freight train of the defendant ran into another of its trains in advance of it, on which Woodward was employed, and by which collision he was killed, and that by the time-tables and regulations of the defendant said colliding train was required to travel so closely behind the train that was struck, as to be inconsistent with reasonable care for the safety of those employed on the latter train, and that said collision was attributable to said colliding train running so closely after the one in advance of it, according to said time-tables and regulations, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover notwithstanding said Woodward at the time of said collision was an employé of the defendant.

3. That if the jury shall find from the evidence that the death of Woodward was the result of a collision caused by the incompetency or carelessness of the engineer in charge of one of the defendant's engines, and that the defendant did not use reasonable care in the selection of said engineer, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover, notwithstanding said Woodward was, at the time of said collision, in the employ of the defendant.

4. That if the jury shall find from the evidence, that the injury to Woodward was caused by the negligent or careless running of his engine by one of the defendant's engineers, and that said engineer was not skilful and competent as an engineer, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover, notwithstanding said Woodward was an employé of the defendant, unless the jury shall further find that the defendant had used reasonable care and diligence in the selection of said engineer; and further to instruct the jury, that the management and conduct of said engineer of his train, at the time of the said injury, constitutes a part of the testimony, to be taken with all the other evidence, from which they may draw their conclusion, as to whether said engineer was in fact a skilful and competent engineer or not.

5. That if the jury shall find from the evidence, that the decedent, Woodward, was killed by a collision between the defendant's trains, and that in the happening of said collision, said Woodward was himself not entirely without fault; but shall further find, that the negligence of another employé of the defendant was the proximate and direct cause of the injury to Woodward, that then the degree of fault in Woodward was not such negligence on his part as will prevent the plaintiff from recovering in this action.

6. That if the jury shall find from the evidence, that the collision which resulted in the death of Charles Woodward, was not caused by the negligence of the defendant, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover, unless the jury shall further find that the death of said Woodward was subsequently caused by the gross negligence of the defendant, or its agents, acting in the course of their employment.

7. That if the jury shall find that the deceased, Woodward, was severely wounded and rendered helpless by a freight train of the defendant, then from whatever cause the collision occurred, it thereupon, at once became the duty of the employés and agents of the defendant to take him in charge, and carefully convey him to where he could receive proper care and treatment; and shall further find that said agents and employés, after said collision, did take said Woodward into their charge; and that while so in their charge, and in the course of removing him to the care and custody of his friends, they undertook to convey him to Frederick city, and in the course of such removal grossly neglected the instructions of a competent physician given to said employés, which were such as an ordinary person could easily perform, and that by reason of such neglect said Woodward suffered great loss of blood, which an observance of said instructions would have prevented, and that such loss of blood was the proximate cause of his death, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover.

8. That if the jury should find for the plaintiff, then in assessing the damages they are to estimate the reasonable probabilities of the life of the deceased, Woodward, when injured, and give the equitable plaintiff, Jeannette Woodward, such pecuniary damages as will compensate her for losses already suffered, as the direct consequence of said Woodward's death, and also for the prospective losses she will suffer as the direct consequences of said death during the period that the jury, under all the circumstances, shall deem to be the probable duration of her life.

9. That if the jury shall believe, from the evidence, that Charles Woodward was injured by a collision of trains in the employ of the defendant, in September, 1869; that after the infliction of said injury by said collision, the said Charles Woodward was taken in charge by the employés of the defendant, for the purpose of removal to Frederick; that in the course of such removal said Charles Woodward suffered such a loss of blood from the wound inflicted by previous collision, as to be the immediate, direct and proximate cause of his death; that he suffered such loss of blood by the negligence, carelessness or ignorance of any of the employés of said company engaged in the course of their employment; that then their verdict must be for the plaintiff, unless the jury shall find from the evidence that the said Woodward was, at the time of the suffering of said loss of blood by the negligence of the defendant's servants, actually engaged in the services of the defendant and in its employ.

The defendant then offered the following prayers:

1. That to entitle the plaintiff to recover damages for the death of Charles Woodward, resulting from the injuries to said Woodward, caused by the collision spoken of by the witnesses, the plaintiff must show to the satisfaction of the jury:

1st. That said collision was directly caused by the want of ordinary care and prudence on the part of the employés of the defendant on the train causing the collision.

2nd. That said employés were incompetent for their positions. 3rd. That the defendant did not use ordinary and reasonable care in the selection of the said employés.

4th. And even then the plaintiff cannot recover if the jury shall find from the evidence, that the injuries resulting from said collision could have been avoided by the exercise of reasonable care and caution on the part of the decedent.

2. That if the jury shall be satisfied from the evidence that Charles Woodward, at the time and place, when and where he suffered the injury complained of, was a conductor of a freight train in the employ of the defendant, and acting in his capacity as such, and that said injury was occasioned by the collision of engine No. 293 running into his train, crushing his leg, and from which injury he died, and that said Charles Woodward, by the negligence and carelessness of the engineman of engine No. 293, and the other servants of the company on said train, sustained the injury from which he died, and for which this suit was instituted, then that the said plaintiff is not entitled to recover, unless the jury shall believe from the evidence that in selecting the employés or servants, through whose negligence the accident occurred, the defendant did not use reasonable care in procuring for its operations faithful and competent employés, and that the plaintiff has offered no evidence that the defendant did not exercise all reasonable care in the selection of the said servants, or in procuring for its operations faithful and competent employés, and therefore their verdict must be for the defendant.

3. That if the jury shall be satisfied from the evidence that Charles Woodward, at the time and place, when and where he suffered the injury complained of, was a conductor of a freight train in convoy of Coal Trains No. 3 westward, in the employ of the defendant, and acting in his capacity as such, and that after the accident occurred by which said Woodward was injured, he was taken to the Point of Rocks, placed under the care of a physician and properly treated by him, and afterwards placed on the cars and in care of Thomas J. Stoddard, a conductor of a freight train in the convoy of trains known as Coal Trains No. 3 westward, conveyed to the home of his grandfather in ...