Baltimore & O.R. Co. v. Rose
| Decision Date | 23 June 1886 |
| Citation | 4 A. 899,65 Md. 485 |
| Parties | BALTIMORE & O. R. CO. v. ROSE. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Baltimore circuit.
Action to recover damages for injuries sustained by plaintiff in falling from a defective stairway on defendant's premises. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and appeal therefrom on exceptions by defendant.
John K. Cowen and W. Irvine Cross, for appellant.
A H. Taylor and W. S. Keech, for appellee.
The appellee, the plaintiff below, was employed as steward upon the steam-ship Leipzig, of the North-German Lloyd Line, which ship was lying at pier No. 9, in the harbor of Baltimore discharging and taking in cargo. The said pier is the property of the appellant, and is used for the accommodation of those engaged in traffic with it. The ground abutting upon said pier also belongs to the appellant, and on it are constructed tracks for the running of cars and engines, for the purpose of conveying articles of merchandise to and from this pier, and other piers and wharfs adjacent thereto. There is also a trestle, with railway tracks on it, and a gangway on the side of which persons can walk in going to and from Towson street. At the end towards the pier the ascent to and descent from this trestle is by a stairway; and in descending this stairway the appellee was injured by a fall occasioned by the broken condition of the steps. He brought suit against the appellant in the court below for the recovery of damages, on the ground that the injury was caused by the negligence of the defendant in not keeping the said steps in proper condition to afford a safe transit. The verdict and judgment being for the plaintiff, the defendant appealed.
It is admitted by an agreement in the record "that the steps from which the defendant fell were part of a trestle-work situated on the land of the defendant, adjoining the pier, also, of the defendant, and were the exclusive and private property of the said defendant." It is also agreed between the parties to the cause that "the piers of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, of which pier No. 9, mentioned, is one, are used by the ships of the North-German Lloyd Steam-ship Company Line for the purpose of lying at them, and discharging freight and passengers upon them by permission of the defendant, without wharfage charges paid by the owners of said steam-ships, or others, to the defendant, but in order that the freight and passengers brought by said steam-ships may be transferred from the ships of said steam-ship company to the cars of said defendant, lying upon certain tracks of said defendant, constructed out upon said pier; no reference here being had to the tracks upon the elevated trestle on shore, near by, used for coal cars for the purpose of making said transfer more conveniently."
The trestle referred to is about 14 feet in elevation at the end, in proximity to the pier, and is ascended by a stairway. At the other end is an outlet to Towson street. This trestle had three tracks for cars, and a gangway about three feet wide, with a hand-rail on the side. At the time of the accident the tracks were only used for the purpose of placing empty cars in position for making up trains, and loaded cars were not run on the trestle, which had been abandoned for that purpose. The ground below was covered with tracks constructed for the conveyance of freight to and from the vessels lying at the piers. There was a narrow foot-path on the side adjacent to the trestle, which was not marked by any curbing. There is no evidence in this record of the construction of any way by the defendant for the especial and exclusive use of persons passing to and from the vessels, and it is proved that many passengers used the trestle while others selected the pathway below. Undoubtedly, under the arrangement existing between the two companies, persons employed on board the steamer had a right of transit over the property of the defendant. If there was no particular road or pathway designated and set apart for their use, they were constrained to seek such route as they found open and convenient, and the only obligation resting on them was the observance of due care and caution in the avoidance of danger. The defendant, however, had a right, if it saw fit, to inhibit the use of the trestle, and restrict the passengers to the use of the ground below. There is evidence that this was done by a notice placed in a conspicuous position, but this evidence is met by countervailing proof, and the fact thus in dispute should necessarily be left for ascertainment by the jury.
The obligation of the defendant to keep any property over which other persons have a right to pass, in a safe condition, cannot be questioned. As was said by the supreme court of Massachusetts, in Sweeny v. Old Colony & N. R. Co., 92 Mass. 373: "The general rule or principle applicable to this class of cases is that an owner or occupant is bound to keep his premises in a safe and suitable condition for those who come upon and pass over them, using due care, if he has held out any invitation, allurement, or inducement, either express or implied, by which they have been led to enter thereon." If the owner, either "directly or by implication, induces persons to enter upon and pass over his premises, he thereby assumes an obligation that they are in a safe condition, suitable for such use, and for a breach of this obligation he is liable in damages." This is the recognized principle in this country and in England.
In Corby v. Hill, 4 C. B. 556, (N S.) COCKBURN, C.J., said: ...
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