Baltimore & O.R. Co. v. Boyd
| Decision Date | 16 March 1887 |
| Citation | 10 A. 315,67 Md. 32 |
| Parties | BALTIMORE & O. R. CO. v. BOYD AND OTHERS. (THREE CASES.) BOYD AND OTHERS v. BALTIMORE & O. R. CO. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Baltimore city court.
John K. Cowen, Hugh L. Bond, and W. Irvine Cross, for appellants.
C.J. Bonaparte, for appellees.
The record now before us contains four appeals; three by the defendant from three several judgments against it, and one by the plaintiffs from one of those judgments. There were three several actions of trespass quare clausum fregit brought by the plaintiffs below against the defendant, the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, and, by agreement, the three actions were tried together, but a separate verdict was rendered in each case, and, consequently, separate judgments were entered.
The first of these cases was here on a former appeal, and is reported in 63 Md. 325. The facts of that case are substantially the facts of all the present cases, so far as the main question on these appeals is concerned; the only material difference being that the two last cases were brought to cover two successive periods of time. The locus in quo in all three of these actions is the same as that described in 63 Md. 330, and the circumstances of the entry upon and user thereof by the defendant are there fully stated. In that case, the court having determined that as the defendant's entry upon and user of that portion of the lot of vacant and unimproved ground in the city of Baltimore, belonging to the plaintiffs, occupied as a bed for the tracks of its railroad, was unauthorized, and therefore a wrong, the plaintiffs were entitled to recover therefor. But in view of the facts then disclosed, this court held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover exemplary damages there being no element of fraud, or malice, or evil intent, on the part of the defendant, in entering upon and using the ground as it did.
In the trial of the present cases, the main subject of contest was as to the proper measure of damages to be awarded to the plaintiffs. At the request of the plaintiffs, the court granted three prayers as instructions to the jury as to what damages should be allowed; and, at the instance of the defendant, two other prayers were granted upon the same subject, but the first prayer offered by the defendant was refused by the court. The plaintiffs excepted to the instructions given on the request of the defendant, and the latter excepted to the instructions given at the instance of the plaintiffs, and also to the refusal to grant its first prayer. The rulings upon the prayers are the subjects of the third bill of exception taken by the defendant, and of the second bill of exception taken by the plaintiffs.
By the first of the instructions for the plaintiffs, the jury were directed that, upon finding the facts enumerated, their verdict, in the first case, should be for the plaintiffs, "with such damages as would, in the judgment of the jury, amount to a fair compensation for the said unauthorized use of the said tracks." And, as applicable to the second and third cases, the jury were directed that, in finding for the plaintiffs, their verdict should be for such an amount as would, "in their judgment, fully compensate the plaintiffs for such continued and unauthorized use of the said tracks, between the dates named, against the wishes of the plaintiffs, and under all the circumstances disclosed by the evidence." By the first of the defendant's prayers, which was refused, the court was asked to instruct the jury that there was no evidence legally sufficient from which they could find that there was any substantial damage or injury done to the locus in quo by the acts of the defendant, and therefore the verdict should be for nominal damages only. The court, however, while refusing to require the jury to find their verdict for nominal damages merely, did instruct them, by granting the second prayer of the defendant, that if they found from the evidence that no substantial damage or injury was done to the plaintiffs' lot of ground, by any act or user thereof by the defendant, the verdict should be for nominal damages only. We do not understand that there is any question made as to the propriety of granting the defendant's third prayer by the court.
It clearly appears that since the death of Philip D. Boyd, in 1881, who held a life-estate in the premises, the defendant in these cases has been, down to a very recent date, a tort-feasor, in the use and continual occupancy of the locus in quo, as against the heirs at law of Mrs Clarissa Boyd, deceased; those heirs being plaintiffs in the present actions. It is true, the original entry into, and the construction and use of railroad tracks over, the locus in quo, were all supposed to be authorized by virtue of certain condemnation proceedings had under certain city ordinances for opening of streets, but which proceedings proved to be defective and insufficient to secure to the defendant the right of way over the lot of ground in question. The defendant, therefore, was not a willful wrong-doer. This was determined by this court in the case reported in 63 Md. 325. The lot of ground belonging to plaintiffs was, and still remains, uninclosed, and without any improvement thereon whatever, apart from the railroad tracks placed there by the defendant. The space occupied by the road, in passing through this lot, was very small, being only about 18 by 36 feet. The defendant, since the decision of this case on the former appeal, has procured condemnation of the right of way for its road through the lot, and the inquisition has been confirmed; but the present actions were brought for the repeated trespasses on the lot from the time of the death of Philip D. Boyd to the time of the taking of the recent inquisition by the defendant. That the entry upon and use of the land, though under color of right, and though the ground was uninclosed and vacant, was unlawful, and therefore a trespass, admits of no question or dispute; and consequently, for such invasion of their rights, the plaintiffs are entitled to recover some damages of the defendant. It is not necessary, in order to entitle the plaintiffs to a verdict, that they should have given affirmative proof that they had sustained any...
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