Baltimore & O.S.W. Ry. Co. v. Allen

• Decision Date: 21 February 1902
• Citation: 63 N.E. 262,195 Ill. 423
• Parties: BALTIMORE & O. S. W. RY. CO. v. PEOPLE ex rel. ALLEN.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

195 Ill. 423

63 N.E. 262

BALTIMORE & O. S. W. RY. CO.

v.PEOPLE ex rel. ALLEN.¹

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 21, 1902.

Appeal from Clinton county court; Joseph Hanke, Judge.

Proceeding by the people, on the relation of James Allen, treasurer and ex officio collector of taxes in and for Clinton county, for judgment against the Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern Railway Company for delinquent school tax. From the judgment, defendant appeals. Plaintiff assigns cross errors. Reversed.

Edward Barton, Creighton, Kramer & Kramer, and W. T. Bonham, for appellant.

McGaffigan & Ford, for appellee.

WILKIN, C. J.

This is an appeal from the county court of Clinton county to reverse a judgment rendered in favor of the county collector of that county for a part of the school taxes levied in school district No. 3, assessed against the railroad property of appellant. In January, 1900, the voters of that district authorized the school board to purchase a site, build a school house to cost not to exceed $20,000, and issue bonds in that sum to pay for the same; this amount being in excess of the limit fixed by the constitution and statute, only $10,500 of the bonds were sold, the district realizing therefor $11,355.75. On July 30, 1900, $700 of this sum was paid for a lot upon which the school house was to be built. On August 7th, at a public letting of the work of constructing the school building, the bid of W. B. Gay was accepted, the contract price being $19,854, and he was ordered to meet the board at a subsequent time and sign a contract. On the next day, August 8th, the tax levy which had been passed by the school board was filed with the county clerk, providing for a levy upon the taxable property of the district of 2 1/2 per cent. for building purposes and 2 1/2 per cent. for school purposes. Prior to this date a levy of 61/100 per cent. for interest and sinking fund had been passed and filed with the county clerk, the latter being a provision to pay the principal and interest on the above-mentioned bonds. The valuation of appellant's property in the district for the year 1900 was $125,518, and the school tax extended against it, under the foregoing levy, was $1,319.36. Of this amount it paid $874.74, but refused to pay the remainder of the tax, namely, $544.49, and this amount was returned by the county collector as delinquent. When the collector made application to the county court for judgment against the railroad property, objections were filed by the company, as follows: First, ‘because levy for educational purposes is in excess of the amount allowed by law;’ second, ‘because levy for building purposes is in excess of amount allowed by law;’ third, ‘because taxes were levied to pay an unconstitutional debt;’ fourth, ‘because objector has paid all taxes legally assessed against it by the school district.’ Upon the hearing the court rendered judgment against the appellant for $301.03, with penalty and costs, which, in effect, sustained the taxes levied to the extent of 2 1/2 per cent. for educational purposes, and 2 1/2 per cent. for building purposes, but refused to sustain it as to the 61/100 per cent. for principal and interest on the bonds, which was held to be in excess of the amount authorized by the statute. To reverse that judgment this appeal is prosecuted. The collector assigns cross errors, insisting that the whole tax should have been sustained.

The principal objection relied upon by counsel for appellant is the third, the contention being that the indebtedness of the school district incurred for the purpose of building a school house was in excess of 5 per cent. of the taxable property of the district, as shown by the last regular assessment, and therefore illegal and void, and that the 2 1/2 per cent. levied for building purposes, being to pay that indebtedness, is also illegal and void.

The argument of counsel on either side is largely devoted to the question whether the contract to build the school house was actually entered into before the levy was made, The certificate of levy was filed with the county clerk on August 8th. That act completed the levy (St. Louis, R. I. & C. R. Co. v. People, 177 Ill. 78, 52 N. E. 364), and the levy must be deemed to have been made as of that date.

On the 7th day of August,-the day before the levy was filed with the county clerk,-the school board accepted the bid of W. B. Gay to construct the school building, the contract price being $19,854. Counsel for appellant insist the acceptance of that bid must be treated as the incurring of an indebtedness to the extent of the amount thereof, and, if this is so, it is conceded by counsel for appellee that the district actually became indebted beyond the constitutional limit before the tax was levied....