Baltimore v. B.F. Goodrich Co.

• Decision Date: 30 June 1988
• Docket Number: No. 86-665.,86-665.
• Citation: 545 A.2d 1228
• Parties: Robert L. BALTIMORE, Appellant, v. B.F. GOODRICH COMPANY, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

545 A.2d 1228

Robert L. BALTIMORE, Appellant, v. B.F. GOODRICH COMPANY, Appellee.

No. 86-665.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued September 29, 1987.

Decided June 30, 1988.

Alan C. Anderson for appellant.

Ronald G. Guziak, Washington, D.C., for appellee.

Before PRYOR, Chief Judge, and TERRY and STEADMAN, Associate Judges.

STEADMAN, Associate Judge:

Appellant Baltimore suffered a fall caused by the negligence of appellee B.F. Goodrich Company ("Goodrich"). The issue on appeal is whether the trial court properly entered a judgment non obstante veredicto denying Baltimore $64,347.00 in damages. The jury awarded this amount for income lost as a result of Baltimore's disability retirement allegedly forced by the fall. The trial judge granted Goodrich's motion for judgment n.o.v. on this element of damages¹ on the basis that Baltimore had failed to produce adequate expert testimony to support a jury finding that the accident was a substantial producing cause of Baltimore's subsequent retirement on disability. Baltimore contends that 1) no expert testimony was required in this case to support the jury's award of damages for lost income, and 2) even if expert testimony was required, he did in fact produce sufficient expert testimony at trial.² We disagree on both issues and hence affirm.

I.

The accident occurred on October 12, 1978, at a service station operated by Goodrich. The negligent operation of a hydraulic lift at the station caused Baltimore, a computer operator in his early 60's, to fall to the ground from a height of five to six feet.³ Baltimore was taken to the hospital where he was examined, x-rayed, and shortly released. The following day he was examined by his own cardiologist, Dr. David W. Williams, who concluded that Baltimore had cervical strain, multiple contusions, and an acute anxiety reaction resulting in the exacerbation of his existing hypertension. After a couple of weeks, Baltimore returned to work on a part time basis. His last day on the job was May 30, 1979. Baltimore took retirement on the basis of disability.⁴

Prior to the accident and up to the time of retirement, Baltimore suffered from numerous physical and psychological ailments. The trial judge in his written memorandum opinion and order granting the judgment n.o.v. ably encapsulated the situation:

[T]he evidence at trial showed the existence of many preexisting injuries and many medically complicated factors. Thus, for example, Mr. Baltimore was shown to have had a lumbar disc problem in 1957 as well as advanced degenerative osteo-arthritis, described by some physicians as "severe" or "marked." He also had a long-standing history of hypertension, hardening of the arteries, and progressive cardiovascular disease. These conditions produced a 1977 heart attack, for which he was hospitalized two weeks.

In addition, several expert witnesses described an array of personality disorders and difficulties, including severe chronic depression, anxiety, paranoid personality with depressive features, manipulative behavior, and somatizing, i.e., a tendency to translate tensions and emotional problems into physical symptoms. Apart from the accident, there were many sources of anxiety in Mr. Baltimore's life as of July 1979. One of the principal sources was a complaint he initiated almost ten years earlier alleging racial discrimination by his supervisors at work. After an adverse administrative decision on this matter, Baltimore filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. That case was ultimately tried before Judge Gasch and resolved unfavorably to Baltimore. In January 1979, the same month in which he filed the instant lawsuit, Baltimore's appeal from Judge Gasch's decision was dismissed.

Moreover, at the time of his retirement, Baltimore was experiencing marital discord and acrimony. Married for the second time in 1975, he and his wife separated in June 1978. According to some of the experts, this separation caused Baltimore considerable stress, frustration, and anxiety.

In short Baltimore's situation was, in the apt words of one of his physicians, "multifactorial" and highly complicated.

II.

To prevent the jury from engaging in speculation, we have held that in the absence of expert testimony, a jury may not consider the causal connection between a defendant's negligence and a plaintiff's claimed disability unless:

(1) the disability first emerged coincidentally with or very soon after the negligent act, or

(2) the disability was of a type which by its very nature reflected its cause, or (3) the cause of the injury related to matters of common experience, knowledge, or observation of laymen.

Early v. Wagner, 391 A.2d 252, 254 (D.C. 1978) (citing Jones v. Miller, 290 A.2d 587, 590-91 (D.C. 1972)). See also District of Columbia v. Freeman, 477 A.2d 713, 719 (D.C. 1984). Thus, in cases presenting medically complicated questions due to multiple and/or preexisting causes, see, e.g., Gray Line, Inc. v. Keaton, 428 A.2d 360 (D.C. 1981), or questions as to the permanence of an injury, see, e.g., D. C. Transit Systems, Inc. v. Simpkins, 367 A.2d 107 (D.C. 1976), we have held that expert testimony is required on the issue of causation. In light of the complex nature of the disability claimed here, the multiple preexisting and concurrent possible causes, the length of time between the accident and Baltimore's retirement, this case falls within that category of "medically complicated" cases requiring expert testimony.⁵ Cf. Wilhelm v. State Traffic Safety Commission, 230 Md. 91, 185 A.2d 715, 719 (1962) ("[Al question involving the causes of emotional disturbances in a person sufficient to evoke, subconsciously, grossly exaggerated symptoms is an intricate and complex one, peculiarly appropriate for science to answer. To allow a jury of laymen, unskilled in medical science, to attempt to answer such a question would permit the rankest kind of guesswork, speculation and conjecture.")

To recover for post-retirement lost income in the present case, then, Baltimore was required to present expert testimony establishing, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty,⁶ that the accident in question "played a substantial part in bringing about" the condition existing at the time of his retirement. District of Columbia v. Freeman, supra, 477 A.2d at 715-16; Lacy v. District of Columbia, 424 A.2d 317, 318-22 (D.C. 1980). In determining whether Baltimore met this requirement, we must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Baltimore. Marcel Hair Goods Corp. v. National Say. & Trust Co., 410 A.2d 1, 5 (D.C. 1979).

III.

Baltimore claimed that depression, anxiety and related pain necessitated his retirement, and that the accident caused this condition. This claim required testimony showing that 1) Baltimore in fact had a condition that rendered him incapable of working, and 2) the accident played a substantial part in bringing about that condition.⁷ We conclude that while Baltimore may have succeeded in meeting the first requirement,⁸ his expert testimony failed to satisfy the second.

Dr. Lester Turner, a clinical psychologist, was one of Baltimore's experts asserted as providing the necessary expert testimony linking the accident to appellant's condition at of his retirement. Turner first saw Baltimore three years after the accident for the purpose of making a psychological pain assessment. On direct examination, Turner testified as follows:

Q. Now let me just clarify, Doctor. You said that you think he was depressed before the accident?

A. Probably, yes.

Q. Well, can you give us an indication of the relationship between the depression before the accident and after?

A. Well, depression before the accident, I don't think, was anywhere near as severe. He was having job problems, he was having marital problems, he was having heart problems, he had an ulcer. I mean, all of these factors sort of fit together to give me the notion that the depression didn't just start with the accident. I think that the accident probably made it worse or compounded the depression, and my feeling was that it's unlikely that it was going to get much better.

Some people just sort of get caught up in a chronic depression, and it just—let's see. When I saw him, it was around three or four years from the accident.

The depression was still severe. And considering his age, I felt the depression probably would pretty well stay around. While it could be reduced with medication, I just didn't feel it was going to go away.

Q. Now, I want to make sure I understand you, Doctor. So, are you saying that the accident had some effect on Mr. Baltimore's depression and, therefore, his pain?

A. Yes, that was my opinion.

Q. And is your opinion based on a reasonable degree of psychological certainty?

A. Yes.

Neither this nor other portions of Turner's testimony demonstrated that the accident had a substantial and lasting effect on appellant's condition. Baltimore's counsel asked Turner to affirm, to "a reasonable degree of psychological certainty," that the accident had "some effect" on appellant's depression. "Some effect," however, does not suffice. To impose liability on Goodrich, the accident must have had a substantial effect in bringing about the condition that necessitated appellant's retirement;⁹ that is, not only must the accident have had a substantial effect on Baltimore at the time of the accident but that effect must have continued to a substantial degree up to the time of retirement. Even if the level of disability remained as a constant, other preexisting or intervening influences could have dissipated and replaced whatever effect the accident caused at the time of its occurrence.¹⁰ In fact, when the trial judge asked Turner, "Do you have an opinion which you're prepared to state with a reasonable degree of scientific certainty that if this accident had never occurred Mr....