Baltimore v. Hart
Decision Date | 06 November 2006 |
Docket Number | No. 16 September Term, 2006.,16 September Term, 2006. |
Citation | 910 A.2d 463,395 Md. 394 |
Parties | MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE v. Michael Lee HART. |
Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Darrell Chambers, Asst. Sol. (Ralph S. Tyler, City Sol. and William R. Phelan, Jr., Principal Counsel, on brief), Baltimore, MD, for petitioner,
Irwin E. Weiss (Morris E. Balser, on brief), Baltimore, MD, for respondent.
Argued before BELL, C.J., RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, and GREENE, JJ.
This case arises from a motor vehicle accident in Baltimore City. On February 16, 2002, a Baltimore City police officer, responding to a call, drove a marked police car through a red traffic signal without stopping and collided with a vehicle driven by Michael Lee Hart. On August 20, 2003, Hart, the respondent, filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore ("the City"), petitioner, and also against his insurer, Allstate Insurance Company ("Allstate"), alleging injuries resulting from the February 16, 2002, collision. Respondent asserted a single claim of negligence against the City and a count against Allstate as his uninsured motorist carrier.
Maryland's General Assembly has statutorily dictated the minimum safe driving conduct for emergency vehicles on a statewide level. Maryland Code , § 21-106 of the Transportation Article1 provides that, when responding to an emergency call, "the driver of an emergency vehicle may . . . [p]ass a red or stop signal, a stop sign, or a yield sign, but only after slowing down as necessary for safety ...." § 21-106(b)(2) (emphasis added). The Baltimore City Police Department, however, provides a more stringent standard in its Baltimore City Police Department General Order No. 11-90 (General Order 11-90). That rule provides that Baltimore City police, when responding to an emergency call for service, must first stop their vehicle when intending to cross an intersection against a red traffic signal and, when assigned as a primary or secondary unit for dispatched calls and responding in an emergency mode, must bring their vehicle to a full stop before crossing against any traffic control device. General Order 11-90(2)(b) and (4)(b).
Prior to trial, on January 14, 2005, petitioner filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of General Order 11-90. On March 3, 2005, following a hearing, the court denied petitioner's motion. Trial was held on March 30 and 31, 2005. At trial, evidence of General Order 11-90 was introduced by respondent. Petitioner objected to the introduction of the evidence, but its objection was overruled. On March 31, 2005, the trial court issued jury instructions, including an instruction on General Order 11-90. After deliberating, the jury found for respondent and returned a verdict of $46,894.05. The damages were split between petitioner—$20,000.00 (the statutorily mandated maximum)—and Allstate—$26,894.05.2
Petitioner noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. On February 2, 2006, the intermediate appellate court affirmed the decision of the Circuit Court. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Hart, 167 Md.App. 106, 891 A.2d 1134 (2006). Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of certiorari; which we granted on June 7, 2006. Baltimore v. Hart, 393 Md. 242, 900 A.2d 749 (2006).
Petitioner presented two questions for our review:
We hold that a police department's internal rules and guidelines are admissible in specific situations in a vehicular negligence case when they are relevant to whether an officer's conduct in that particular situation was reasonable. In the case sub judice, General Order 11-90 stated specifically what the conduct of a Baltimore City police officer should be when responding in an emergency mode before crossing an intersection against a red traffic signal— the officer must come to a full stop. General Order 11-90 was specifically relevant to the officer's conduct in the case sub judice and is, therefore, admissible. Violation of the General Order is not negligence per se, but it is relevant as to whether the officer's conduct was reasonable. Because we find the evidence admissible, the motion in limine was properly denied and we need not address further the introduction of the evidence at trial or the jury instruction3 pertaining to the General Order.
We adopt the facts as stated by Judge Davis, writing for the Court of Special Appeals in its decision below:
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