Bandoni v. State, 95-563-A

• Citation: 715 A.2d 580
• Decision Date: 21 July 1998
• Docket Number: No. 95-563-A,95-563-A
• Parties: Robert J. BANDONI et al. v. STATE of Rhode Island et al. 1 ppeal.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island

Page 580

715 A.2d 580

Robert J. BANDONI et al. v. STATE of Rhode Island et al. ¹

No. 95-563-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

July 21, 1998.

Marty C. Marran, Cranston, for Plaintiff.

William Mark Kolb, Assistant Attorney General, Kathleen M. Powers, Providence, for Defendant.

Before WEISBERGER, C.J., and LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, FLANDERS and GOLDBERG, JJ.

OPINION

GOLDBERG, Justice.

In 1983 the Rhode Island General Assembly enacted the Victim's Bill of Rights, codified in G.L.1956 chapter 28 of title 12. Three years later, the delegates to the 1986 Constitutional Convention ratified article 1, section 23, entitled "Rights of victims of crime," as an amendment to Rhode Island's Constitution. It is significant that neither the legislation nor the amendment provides for monetary damages in the event that officials charged with notifying crime victims of their rights fail to do so. Hence this case presents for our consideration a novel legal issue: does a cause of action for monetary damages accrue against state or municipal officers, in either their official or their individual capacities, when these officers fail to notify crime victims of their statutory and/or constitutional rights? ² Although we remain sympathetic to crime victims and in no way condone the officials' failure to notify victims of their rights, we are of the opinion that the Legislature, and not this Court, is the proper branch of government to address the plethora of issues presented by this type of situation. Accordingly we affirm the judgment of the trial justice to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

I Factual History ³

On August 1, 1992, Robert J. Bandoni (Robert) was operating a motorcycle in the town of Coventry with his wife Lorraine as his passenger. The Bandonis' evening, however, was tragically cut short when they were struck by a truck operated by Robert L. Richardson, Jr. (Richardson). Lorraine was thrown clear of the wreckage and suffered only minor injuries. Unfortunately, Robert sustained serious injuries, including a shattered left leg and pelvis. Richardson was arrested at the scene and charged with driving while intoxicated. A subsequent chemical analysis confirmed that Richardson's blood-alcohol content was more than twice the legal limit. Thereafter, on August 5, 1992, Lorraine contacted the Coventry police to give a statement concerning the accident. It was at this time that Lorraine requested and received assurances that she and Robert would be kept apprised of the pending criminal case against Richardson. As the Bandonis would later learn, however, the criminal case against Richardson proceeded quickly and without their knowledge.

On August 12, 1992, Richardson was arraigned in the Third Division District Court and charged with one count of driving while intoxicated. Later, on September 23, 1992, also without the Bandonis' knowledge, Richardson appeared at a pretrial conference where he negotiated a plea bargain whereby he was permitted to enter a plea of nolo contendere to a reduced charge of "reckless driving and other offenses against public safety." Richardson's sentence included one year's unsupervised probation with no loss of license, and a $250 contribution to the Victims' Indemnity Fund, and he was ordered to pay court costs.

In preparation for a civil lawsuit against Richardson, the Bandonis retained counsel to investigate and pursue their claim. It was at this time that the Bandonis first learned that the criminal case against Richardson had been resolved without an opportunity for them to address the court. Pursuant to G.L.1956 § 45-15-5, the Bandonis filed a claim with the town of Coventry, arguing that town officials had disregarded their statutory and constitutional duties by failing to have advised the Bandonis of their rights as crime victims. After the town council rejected this claim, the Bandonis filed a two count complaint, later amended to three counts, against the town of Coventry, the State of Rhode Island, and the agents of these entities, (collectively defendants), asserting that had they been advised of Richardson's court dates, they would have, inter alia, objected to the plea bargain and requested restitution from Richardson.

Counts 1 and 2 alleged a common law negligence theory against the state and the town for defendants' failure to notify the Bandonis of the pending criminal case against Richardson. In addition, Count 3 set forth that a cause of action for monetary damages emanates directly from article 1, section 23, of the Rhode Island Constitution. Following the submission of memoranda, the trial justice granted defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

On appeal the Bandonis proceed under both negligence and constitutional deprivation theories to recover monetary damages for defendants' failure to notify them of their rights as crime victims. In doing so, the Bandonis propose that they be allowed to conduct a mini-trial in which they would address a Superior Court trial justice and present the victim's impact statement that they should have been able to present at Richardson's pretrial conference. The Bandonis argue that if after hearing their statements the trial justice determines that a reasonable District Court judge would have ordered restitution, then such amount would be the measure of their damages. We, however, respectfully decline to recognize either claim.

II

Negligence Claim

The Bandonis argue that they have established a prima facie case of common law negligence by demonstrating that both the Victim's Bill of Rights legislation and the victims' rights constitutional amendment place affirmative duties on defendants to apprise crime victims of their rights. The Bandonis contend that defendants' inexcusable failure to comply with these duties constitutes a breach requiring monetary damages to compensate them for their injuries. We do not agree. Among the statutory rights allegedly violated were G.L.1956 §§

"12-28-3. General rights.--(a) * * *

(15) To be informed by the prosecuting officer of the right to request that restitution be an element of the final disposition of a case."

"12-28-4.1. Right to address court regarding plea negotiation.--

(a) Prior to acceptance by the court of a plea negotiation and imposition of sentence upon a defendant who has pleaded nolo contendere or guilty to a crime, the victim of the criminal offense shall, upon request, be afforded the opportunity to address the court regarding the impact which the defendant's criminal conduct has had upon the victim."

"12-28-4.3. Pretrial conferences--Misdemeanors in district court.--

(a) In all misdemeanor cases heard before the district court, the victim of the alleged criminal offense shall be afforded the opportunity to address the court during the pretrial conference * * *. At the pretrial conference, the victim shall be afforded the opportunity to explain the impact which the defendant's criminal conduct has had upon the victim and to comment on the proposed disposition of the case."

"12-28-5.1. Restitution.--

When the court orders a defendant to make financial restitution to the victim of a crime of which the defendant has been convicted or to which the defendant has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere, a civil judgment shall automatically be entered by the trial court against the defendant on behalf of the victim for that amount."

It is well settled in this jurisdiction that when the language of a statute is unambiguous and expresses a clear and sensible meaning, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and obvious meaning. See, e.g., Wayne Distributing Co. v. Rhode Island Commission For Human Rights, 673 A.2d 457, 460 (R.I.1996). Furthermore, when a statute establishes rights not cognizable at common law, that statute is "subject to strict construction." Accent Store Design, Inc. v. Marathon House, Inc., 674 A.2d 1223, 1226 (R.I.1996).

In this case the Bandonis concede, as they must, that a duty requiring crime victims to be notified of their rights did not exist at common law. Indeed, in Rhode Island it was not until the enactment of the Victim's Bill of Rights in 1983 that these rights first became cognizable. See P.L.1983, ch. 265, § 1. Furthermore, the Victim's Bill of Rights is entirely devoid of any provision providing for civil liability because of an official's failure to inform crime victims of their rights. Since the General Assembly did not establish a cause of action in negligence, the Bandonis essentially ask us to create a private cause of action by judicial rule. "We have long held, however, that the creation of new causes of action is a legislative function." Accent Store Design, Inc., 674 A.2d at 1226; Ferreira v. Strack, 652 A.2d 965, 968 (R.I.1995) (citing Kalian v. People Acting Through Community Effort, Inc. (PACE), 122 R.I. 429, 432, 408 A.2d 608, 609 (1979)). Therefore, in the absence of such a provision, we must exercise our judicial restraint in declining to divine the Legislature's intent. See In re John, 605 A.2d 486, 488 (R.I.1992) ("because the statute does not plainly provide for a private cause of action, such a right cannot be inferred"); Knutson v. County of Maricopa, 175 Ariz. 445, 857 P.2d 1299, 1300 (Ct.App.1993) (refusing to create a cause of action in negligence where prosecutor failed to notify a crime victim of a hearing pursuant to a court rule); Bruegger v. Faribault County Sheriff's Department, 497 N.W.2d 260, 262 (Minn.1993) (holding that since no common law duty required officials to inform crime victims of their right to receive financial compensation, and because the Legislature failed to provide a remedy, no cause of action exists). This is particularly true when, as here, the General...