Banes v. Tenn. Dep't of Corr., 17-1003-JDT-cgc
| Decision Date | 22 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 17-1003-JDT-cgc,17-1003-JDT-cgc |
| Parties | TYLER BANES, Plaintiff, v. TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, ET AL., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee |
The pro se Plaintiff, Tyler Banes, filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on January 9, 2017, while he was incarcerated at the Hardeman County Correctional Facility (HCCF) in Whiteville, Tennessee. (ECF No. 1.) The complaint concerns events that occurred while Banes was housed temporarily at the Madison County Criminal Justice Complex (CJC) in Jackson, Tennessee. After Banes filed the required documentation, (ECF No. 5), the Court issued on order on January 31, 2017, granting leave to proceed in forma pauperis and assessing the civil filing fee pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 6.) Banes notified the Court on October 27, 2017, that he had been released from prison. (ECF No. 9.) The Clerk shall record the Defendants as the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC); TDOC Commissioner Tony C. Parker; Madison County, Tennessee;1 Madison County Mayor Jimmy Harris; Madison County Sheriff John Mehr; CJC Lieutenant First Name Unknown (FNU) Long; CJC Administrator Captain Tom Rudder; Officer FNU Greer; and Officer FNU Rogers.2
The complaint is a somewhat incoherent collection of allegations, causes of action, and legal arguments which the Court will attempt to decipher.3 Banes alleges that on December 31, 2015, he was transported to the CJC in Jackson, Tennessee, because he was scheduled for a court appearance on January 7, 2016. (Id. at 8.) On Saturday, January 9, 2016, while still at the CJC, Banes allegedly was attacked "for no reason" by two other inmates. (Id.) The other inmates allegedly assaulted Banes for forty minutes, then told him not to leave his cell until the next shift change and closed his door. (Id.) Banes alleges that he kicked his door for about twenty minutes, but it was not until Banes told some other inmates to beat on the pod window that an officer arrived to open Banes's door. (Id.) In a set of confusing allegations, Banes asserts that he asked Defendant Rogers4 to let him go back out in the pod to call his sister-in-law, who thencontacted the CJC and told them Banes had been beaten severely and needed medical attention; Rogers then came to the pod and saw that Banes was bleeding. (Id.) Rogers left for fifteen minutes, then returned and took Banes to the CJC clinic; however, they allegedly could not stop the bleeding at the CJC clinic, so Banes was taken to the Jackson-Madison County General Hospital at around midnight. (Id.)
At the hospital, Banes alleges he was treated with stitches in his lip and ear. (Id.) Tests also were done on his head, and extensive x-rays were done to determine if he had any broken bones or loosened teeth; Banes states that he had two teeth left. (Id.) When he was returned to the CJC at approximately 4:30 a.m. on January 10, 2016, Banes was placed in an observation cell, where he remained until he was transported to the Whiteville Correctional Facility (WCF) early the next morning. (Id.) While he was in the observation cell, Banes alleges he wanted to write a grievance about the incident, but no one would give him a pen or paper. (Id.)
While en route to the WCF, Banes allegedly told the transporting officer he needed to go to the clinic because he was in pain. (Id.) He states the CJC did not give the transporting officer Banes's medical records from the hospital or any medication or medical supplies for his injuries. (Id.) Therefore, upon arrival at the WCF Banes explained what had happened to Nurse Martin, who gave him pain medication. (Id.) Nurse Martin also obtained Banes's records from the hospital. (Id.) Banes further alleges that he suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of the assault and that Nurse Martin helped him get medication for that condition. (Id.)
Banes alleges that Defendant Greer moved him from one part of the CJC on A side to a cell on AA so they could paint the A side pod.5 (Id. at 9.) He further alleges that an unidentified officer lacked proper training and was negligent in his or her duty to observe the movement ofinmates through the surveillance camera, which resulted in his injuries. (Id.) Banes also states there is surveillance footage that shows the conduct of Defendants Rudder, Greer and Rogers at the time of the incident. (Id. at 11.) He seeks compensatory damages. (Id. at 21.)6
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may be granted, the court applies standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). "Accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, the Court 'consider[s] the factual allegations in [the] complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.'" Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681) (alteration in original). Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 ( ).
Hill, 630 F.3d at 470 (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 328-29 (1989)).
Whether a complaint is factually frivolous under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) is a separate issue from whether it fails to state a claim for relief. Statutes allowing a complaint to be dismissed as frivolous give "judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless." Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827 ( 28 U.S.C. § 1915). Unlike a dismissal for failure to state a claim, where a judge must accept all factual allegations as true, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50, a judge does not have to accept "fantastic or delusional" factual allegations as true in prisoner complaints that are reviewed for frivolousness. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28, 109 S. Ct. 1827.
"Pro se complaints are to be held 'to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,' and should therefore be liberally construed." Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants and prisoners are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, No. 09-2259, 2011 WL 285251, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) () (quoting Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975)) (alteration in original); Payne v. Sec'y of Treas., 73 F.App'x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003) (); cf. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004) (); Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423 F. App'x 506, 510 (6th Cir. 2011) ( ).
Banes filed his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable...
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