Bangen v. Bartelson

• Decision Date: 10 September 1996
• Docket Number: No. 950326,950326
• Citation: 553 N.W.2d 754
• Parties: Quentin BANGEN and Del Ray Bangen, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. John BARTELSON, Sr., and Helen Bartelson, Defendants and Appellees. Civil
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Page 754

553 N.W.2d 754

Quentin BANGEN and Del Ray Bangen, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. John BARTELSON, Sr., and Helen Bartelson, Defendants and Appellees.

Civil No. 950326.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

Sept. 10, 1996.

Wade G. Enget (argued), of Schulte & Enget, Stanley, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Todd L. Cresap (argued), of Kenner Sturdevant Peterson Cresap, P.C., Minot, for defendant and appellee John Bartelson, Sr.

Harris P. Kenner (appearance), of Kenner Sturdevant Peterson Cresap, Minot, for defendant and appellee Helen Bartelson.

MARING, Justice.

Quentin and Del Ray Bangen appeal from a declaratory judgment holding that a cash lease of farm property the Bangens entered into with Helen Bartelson was "null and void from the outset" and that the Bangens have no claim for money or profits from the disputed property for the 1994 crop year. We reverse.

The focus of this case is on three quarter sections of land in Mountrail County which are owned by John Bartelson, Sr., and Helen Bartelson as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. The Bartelsons were married when they acquired the property in 1945. They were married for 35 years, but, at the time of trial, had been divorced for 17 years. They nevertheless continue to own the property as joint tenants.

The Bartelsons had two children during their marriage. A daughter, Janice Anderson, owns a quarter section of land close to her parents' property. A son, John Bartelson, Jr., is divorced from the sister of Sharon Bangen. Sharon is married to one of the plaintiffs, Quentin Bangen. Del Ray Bangen, the other plaintiff, is the son of Sharon and Quentin. Sharon and Quentin also have a daughter who is married to Lynn Billadeau.

John Jr., who also owned a home and farmland in the area, wanted to sell or lease his property and began negotiating with Lynn Billadeau and Quentin and Del Ray Bangen. They reached a tentative agreement to lease, with an option to purchase, John Jr.'s property. But, as part of the deal, John Jr. also agreed to secure to them the lease of the three quarter sections owned by John Sr. and Helen, and the one quarter section owned by Janice.

On March 31, 1992, Quentin and Del Ray entered into a three-year cash rent lease agreement with Helen for the three quarter sections of land she owned in joint tenancy with John Sr. and also the quarter section of land owned solely by Janice. In the lease, Helen represented herself as the "owner" of the property. The lease called for total annual payments of approximately $12,000. However, neither John Sr. nor Janice signed the lease. The Bangens did not check with the register of deeds before entering into the lease.

Helen did not have any personal dealings with the Bangens regarding the lease. John Jr. took the lease to Helen for her signature. Helen explained she signed the lease for John Jr. because he wished to sell his property and she wanted to "help him out."

The Bangens farmed the land for the 1992 crop year, paid $12,000 in rent to Helen for that year, and filed the lease with the register of deeds in the fall of 1992. In October 1992, John Sr. notified Del Ray that he did not want the Bangens to continue farming the property. At the time, Del Ray was unaware that either John Sr. or Janice had any interest in the property, but later learned of their interests when he checked with the register of deeds. The parties then began negotiating a resolution for the 1993 crop year. The Bangens began applying anhydrous to the property and seeding it, and paid Helen $6,000 rent under the terms of the lease. The parties were able to reach only a partial resolution under which the Bangens were allowed to farm one quarter and John Sr. leased two quarters to others. Janice farmed her own quarter section. The Bangens placed all proceeds from the sale of grain from their quarter, and John Sr. placed all rental income from the remaining two quarters, into one escrow account. Also under the agreement, one-half of all escrow monies were distributed to John Sr.

In the fall of 1993, the Bangens commenced this declaratory judgment action against the Bartelsons under N.D.C.C. Chapter 32-23. Janice was not made a party to the action and her interest in the one quarter section of land purportedly leased to the Bangens by Helen was not an issue in the proceedings. John Sr. farmed the three quarter sections during the 1994 crop year.

The trial court found that the Bangens "were under the assumption that Helen Bartelson was the owner of all" of the property when they entered into the lease and that the lease was "void from the outset" because Helen lacked "ownership in a portion of the land leased." The court found no fraud on the part of the Bangens, but did find that Helen "was of legal age, competent, and held herself out as the owner of all four quarters of real estate" described in the lease. The trial court found John Sr. "verbally acquiesced" to the Bangens renting the three quarter sections during the 1992 crop year. The trial court ordered Helen to return to the Bangens $6,000 in rent they paid to her for the 1993 crop year and also awarded the Bangens the remaining 1993 funds held in escrow that had not previously been turned over to John Sr. The court ruled the Bangens had no claim to any crops or monies for the 1994 crop year. The Bangens appealed.

I

The Bartelsons assert the Bangens' requested relief should not be granted because declaratory judgment is inappropriate under the circumstances and because the Bangens have accepted the benefits of the trial court's judgment. We reject both arguments.

A

The Bartelsons argue declaratory relief is inappropriate because the violation of rights complained about has already occurred. We note that this action for declaratory judgment began while the three-year term of the lease, on its face, was still in effect. If the Bartelsons' argument is that declaratory relief is inappropriate because a breach of the lease had already occurred, or that Bangens should instead have sued for breach of the lease, Bartelsons are incorrect.

First, "[t]he existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate." N.D.R.Civ.P. 57. Moreover, N.D.C.C. § 32-23-02 specifically allows a court to determine any question of construction or validity arising under a contract, and N.D.C.C. § 32-23-03 allows a court to construe a contract before or after a breach. See Hoops v. Selid, 379 N.W.2d 270, 272 (N.D.1985). Although, under N.D.C.C. § 32-23-06, a court may refuse to enter a declaratory judgment where the judgment would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in declaring the rights of the parties under the lease in this case. We conclude a declaratory judgment action was an appropriate procedure to determine the validity of the lease.

B

The Bangens paid Helen Bartelson $6,000, or one-half of the annual rent, at the beginning of 1993 for the 1993 crop year. As part of the resolution of this case, the trial court in the judgment ordered that Helen return the $6,000 in 1993 lease payments to the Bangens. It is undisputed that the Bangens have accepted Helen's return of the $6,000. The Bartelsons argue that N.D.C.C. § 9-03-25, and the principle that a party who accepts the benefits of a judgment waives the right to appeal, both bar the Bangens from challenging the judgment.

N.D.C.C. § 9-03-25 provides:

"Acceptance of benefit equivalent to consent. A voluntary acceptance of the benefit of a transaction is equivalent to a consent to all the obligations arising from it so far as the facts are known or ought to be known to the person accepting."

This statute is clearly inapplicable here. The Bangens did not voluntarily accept the $6,000 as a benefit of the lease agreement they had with Helen. They accepted the $6,000 as a benefit of the trial court's judgment, not the lease agreement.

As a general rule, a party who accepts substantial benefits under a judgment waives the right to appeal from the judgment. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 534 N.W.2d 6, 8 (N.D.1995). But not any acceptance of a benefit of the judgment precludes a party from appealing. In Brunswick Corporation v. Haerter, 182 N.W.2d 852, 859 (N.D.1971), this court explained:

"Although, as a general rule, a party who accepts a benefit of a judgment or an order cannot afterward prosecute an appeal to review the same; however, we held in State ex rel. Wenzel v. Langer, 64 N.D. 744, 256 N.W. 194 (1934), that this rule does not apply where the parts of the order or judgment are separate and independent and the receipt of a benefit from one part is not inconsistent with an appeal from another, or where the right to the benefit received is conceded by the opposite party.

"It is also a general rule that a right of appellate review survives the acceptance of a benefit which is not placed in jeopardy by the review sought. Therefore, where the controversy raised by the appeal is confined to the additional amount claimed but not allowed, the appellant is not estopped from taking such appeal by acceptance of the amount allowed. 4 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error, Section 255."

Because the appellant in Haerter argued it was entitled to relief in addition to that awarded by the trial court, we declined to dismiss the appeal, reasoning the appellant's "position on this appeal is not inconsistent with the judgment appealed from nor does this question place in jeopardy the amount allowed by the judgment from which the appeal is taken." Id.

In a similar vein, this court has declined to dismiss an appeal where the appellant's right to the benefit was not disputed by the appellee's filing of a cross-appeal to contest the benefit. See, e.g., Spooner v. Spooner, 471 N.W.2d 487, 489 (N.D.1991). As we explained in Sanford v. Sanford, 295 N.W.2d 139, 142-143 (N.D.1980):

"Acceptance of...