Banister v. Davis

• Decision Date: 01 June 2020
• Docket Number: No. 18-6943,18-6943
• Citation: 140 S.Ct. 1698,207 L.Ed.2d 58
• Parties: Gregory Dean BANISTER, Petitioner v. Lorie DAVIS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

140 S.Ct. 1698

207 L.Ed.2d 58

Gregory Dean BANISTER, Petitioner

v.Lorie DAVIS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division

No. 18-6943

Supreme Court of the United States.

Argued December 4, 2019

Decided June 1, 2020

Gerard J. Cedrone, Goodwin Procter LLP, Boston, MA, Brian T. Burgess, Andrew Kim, Kelsey Pelagalli, Goodwin Procter LLP, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.

Ken Paxton, Attorney General of Texas, Jeffrey C. Mateer, First Assistant Attorney General, Kyle D. Hawkins, Solicitor General, Matthew H. Frederick, Deputy Solicitor General, Natalie D. Thompson, Assistant Solicitor General, Trevor W. Ezell, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Austin, TX, for Respondent.

Justice KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

A state prisoner is entitled to one fair opportunity to seek federal habeas relief from his conviction. But he may not usually make a "second or successive habeas corpus application." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). The question here is whether a motion brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to alter or amend a habeas court's judgment qualifies as such a successive petition. We hold it does not. A Rule 59(e) motion is instead part and parcel of the first habeas proceeding.

I

This case is about two procedural rules. First, Rule 59(e) applies in federal civil litigation generally. (Habeas proceedings, for those new to the area, are civil in nature. See Fisher v. Baker , 203 U.S. 174, 181, 27 S.Ct. 135, 51 L.Ed. 142 (1906).) The Rule enables a party to request that a district court reconsider a just-issued judgment. Second, the so-called gatekeeping provision of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), governs federal habeas proceedings. It sets stringent limits on second or successive habeas applications. We say a few words about each before describing how the courts below applied them here.

A

Rule 59(e) allows a litigant to file a "motion to alter or amend a judgment."¹ The time for doing so is short—28 days from entry of the judgment, with no possibility of an extension. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 6(b)(2) (prohibiting extensions to Rule 59(e)'s deadline). The Rule gives a district court the chance "to rectify its own mistakes in the period immediately following" its decision. White v. New Hampshire Dept. of Employment Security , 455 U.S. 445, 450, 102 S.Ct. 1162, 71 L.Ed.2d 325 (1982). In keeping with that corrective function, "federal courts generally have [used] Rule 59(e) only" to "reconsider[ ] matters properly encompassed in a decision on the merits." Id., at 451, 102 S.Ct. 1162. In particular, courts will not address new arguments or evidence that the moving party could have raised before the decision issued. See 11 C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2810.1, pp. 163–164 (3d ed. 2012) (Wright & Miller); accord, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker , 554 U.S. 471, 485–486, n. 5, 128 S.Ct. 2605, 171 L.Ed.2d 570 (2008) (quoting prior edition).² The motion is therefore tightly tied to the underlying judgment.

The filing of a Rule 59(e) motion within the 28-day period "suspends the finality of the original judgment" for purposes of an appeal. FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal. , 468 U.S. 364, 373, n. 10, 104 S.Ct. 3106, 82 L.Ed.2d 278 (1984) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Without such a motion, a litigant must take an appeal no later than 30 days from the district court's entry of judgment. See Fed. Rule App. Proc. (FRAP) 4(a)(1)(A). But if he timely submits a Rule 59(e) motion, there is no longer a final judgment to appeal from. See Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney , 489 U.S. 169, 174, 109 S.Ct. 987, 103 L.Ed.2d 146 (1989). Only the disposition of that motion "restores th[e] finality" of the original judgment, thus starting the 30-day appeal clock. League of Women Voters , 468 U.S. at 373, n. 10, 104 S.Ct. 3106 (internal quotation marks omitted); see FRAP 4(a)(4)(A)(iv) (A party's "time to file an appeal runs" from "the entry of the order disposing of the [ Rule 59(e) ] motion"). And if an appeal follows, the ruling on the Rule 59(e) motion merges with the prior determination, so that the reviewing court takes up only one judgment. See 11 Wright & Miller § 2818, at 246 ; Foman v. Davis , 371 U.S. 178, 181, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962). The court thus addresses any attack on the Rule 59(e) ruling as part of its review of the underlying decision.

Now turn to § 2244(b)'s restrictions on second or successive habeas petitions. Under AEDPA, a state prisoner always gets one chance to bring a federal habeas challenge to his conviction. See Magwood v. Patterson , 561 U.S. 320, 333–334, 130 S.Ct. 2788, 177 L.Ed.2d 592 (2010). But after that, the road gets rockier. To file a second or successive application in a district court, a prisoner must first obtain leave from the court of appeals based on a "prima facie showing" that his petition satisfies the statute's gatekeeping requirements. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(C). Under those provisions, which bind the district court even when leave is given, a prisoner may not reassert any claims "presented in a prior application." § 2244(b)(1). And he may bring a new claim only if it falls within one of two narrow categories—roughly speaking, if it relies on a new and retroactive rule of constitutional law or if it alleges previously undiscoverable facts that would establish his innocence. See § 2244(b)(2). Still more: Those restrictions, like all statutes and rules pertaining to habeas, trump any "inconsistent" Federal Rule of Civil Procedure otherwise applicable to habeas proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 12.

B

This case began when, nearly two decades ago, petitioner Gregory Banister struck and killed a bicyclist while driving a car. Texas charged him with the crime of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. A jury found him guilty, and he was sentenced to 30 years in prison. State courts upheld the conviction on direct appeal and in collateral proceedings. Banister then turned to federal district court for habeas relief. Although raising many claims, his petition mainly argued that his trial and appellate counsel provided him with constitutionally ineffective assistance. The District Court disagreed and entered judgment denying the application.

At that point, Banister timely filed a Rule 59(e) motion asking the District Court to alter its judgment. Consistent with the Rule's corrective purpose, Banister urged the court to fix what he saw as "manifest errors of law and fact." App. 219. Five days later and without requiring a response from the State, the court issued a one-paragraph order explaining that it had reviewed all relevant materials and stood by its decision. See id. , at 254. In accordance with the timeline for appealing a judgment after the denial of a Rule 59(e) motion, see supra, at 1703 – 1704, Banister then filed a notice of appeal (along with a request for a certificate of appealability) to challenge the District Court's rejection of his habeas application.

Yet the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal as untimely. That ruling rested on the view that Banister's Rule 59(e) motion, although captioned as such, was not really a Rule 59(e) motion at all. Because it "attack[ed] the federal court's previous resolution of [his] claim on the merits," the Fifth Circuit held that the motion must be "construed as a successive habeas petition." App. 305 (internal quotation marks omitted). In any future case, that holding would prohibit a habeas court from considering claims made in a self-styled Rule 59(e) motion except in rare circumstances—that is, when a court of appeals gave permission and the claim fell within one of § 2244(b)'s two slender categories. See supra, at 1703 – 1704. In Banister's own case, that bar was of no moment because the District Court had already addressed his motion's merits. But viewing a Rule 59(e) motion as a successive habeas petition also had another consequence, and this one would affect him. Unlike a Rule 59(e) motion, the Court of Appeals noted, a successive habeas application does not postpone the time to file an appeal. That meant the clock started ticking when the District Court denied Banister's habeas application (rather than his subsequent motion)—and so Banister's appeal was several weeks late.

We granted certiorari to resolve a Circuit split about whether a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend a habeas court's judgment counts as a second or successive habeas application. 588 U.S. ––––, 139 S.Ct. 2742, 204 L.Ed.2d 1130 (2019). We hold it does not, and reverse.

II

This case requires us to choose between two rules—more specifically, to decide whether AEDPA's § 2244(b) displaces Rule 59(e) in federal habeas litigation. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally govern habeas proceedings. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 81(a)(4). They give way, however, if and to the extent "inconsistent with any statutory provisions or [habeas-specific] rules." 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 12; see supra, at 1703 – 1704. Here, the Fifth Circuit concluded and Texas now contends that AEDPA's limitation of repetitive habeas applications conflicts with Rule 59(e)'s ordinary operation. That argument in turn hinges on viewing a Rule 59(e) motion in a habeas case as a "second or successive application." § 2244(b) ; see Brief for Respondent 10. If such a motion constitutes a second or successive petition, then all of § 2244(b)'s restrictions kick in—limiting the filings Rule 59(e) would allow. But if a Rule 59(e) motion is not so understood—if it is instead part of resolving a prisoner's first habeas application—then § 2244(b)'s requirements never come into the picture.

The phrase "second or successive application," on which all this rides, is a "term of art," which "is not self-defining." Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 486, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000) ; Panetti v....