Bank of Am., N.A. v. Woodcrest Homeowners Ass'n

Decision Date30 March 2019
Docket NumberCase No.: 2:16-cv-00309-GMN-GWF
Citation381 F.Supp.3d 1280
Parties BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., Plaintiff, v. WOODCREST HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Nevada

Jamie K. Combs, Tenesa S. Powell, Ariel E. Stern, Akerman LLP, Las Vegas, NV, for Plaintiff.

J. William Ebert, David A. Markman, Karen Kao, Lipson, Neilson, Cole, Seltzer & Garin, P.C., Las Vegas, NV, for Defendant Woodcrest Homeowners Association.

Shane D. Cox, Absolute Collection Services, LLC, Las Vegas, NV, for Defendant Absolute Collection Services, LLC.

Roger P. Croteau, Timothy Rhoda, Roger P. Croteau & Associates, Ltd., Las Vegas, NV, for Defendant Airmotive Investments, LLC.

AMENDED ORDER

Gloria M. Navarro, Chief Judge

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Bank of America, N.A.'s ("BANA's") Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 50). Defendants Airmotive Investments, LLC ("Airmotive") and Woodcrest Homeowners Association ("HOA") filed Responses, (ECF Nos. 55, 60), and BANA filed Replies, (ECF Nos. 61, 63).

Also pending before the Court are the Motions for Summary Judgment, (ECF Nos. 39, 49), filed by Airmotive and HOA.1 BANA filed Responses, (ECF Nos. 51, 57), and Airmotive and HOA filed Replies, (ECF Nos. 56, 62).

Also pending before the Court is Airmotive's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, (ECF No. 40), to which HOA filed a Joinder, (ECF No. 42). BANA filed a Response, (ECF No. 52), and Airmotive filed a Reply, (ECF No. 54).

For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part BANA's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 50); DENIES Airmotive's Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 39); GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Airmotive's Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 40); and GRANTS in part and DENIES in part HOA's Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 49).

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises from the non-judicial foreclosure on real property located at 6641 Chardonay Way, Las Vegas, Nevada 89108 (the "Property"). (See Deed of Trust, Ex. 1 to Airmotive's Mot. Summ. J. ("MSJ"), ECF No. 39-1). In 2009, Thomas Jeffress ("Borrower") purchased the Property by way of a loan in the amount of $ 189,869.00, secured by a deed of trust (the "DOT"). (Id. ). Countrywide Bank served as the original lender for the DOT, and Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc. ("MERS") was the nominal beneficiary on behalf of that bank. (Id. ). BANA received the DOT through an assignment on November 15, 2011. (Notice of Assignment, Ex. C to BANA's MSJ, ECF No. 50-3).

Upon Borrower's failure to stay current on his payment obligations, ACS, on behalf of HOA, initiated foreclosure proceedings by recording a notice of delinquent assessment lien and a subsequent notice of default and election to sell. (See Notice of Delinquent Assessment Lien, Ex. 2 to Airmotive's MSJ, ECF No. 39-2); (Notice of Default, Ex. 3 to Airmotive's MSJ, ECF No. 39-3).

On September 9, 2011, the law firm Miles, Bauer, Bergstrom & Winters LLP ("Miles Bauer"), on behalf of BANA, sent a letter to ACS requesting a ledger identifying the amount of HOA's superpriority lien. (See Request for Accounting at 6–9, Ex. 1 to Miles Aff., ECF No. 50-7). ACS responded with a letter stating, "without the action of [BANA's] foreclosure, a 9 month Statement of Account is not valid." (See ACS Letter, Ex. 3 to Miles Aff., ECF No. 50-7). ACS's letter also stated that it would provide a Statement of Account if BANA submitted a "Trustees Deed Upon Sale showing [BANA's] possession of the property and the date that it occurred." (Id. ).

Thereafter, ACS proceeded with foreclosure by recording a notice of foreclosure sale and subsequently foreclosing on the Property. (See Notice of Trustee's Sale, Ex. 4 to Airmotive's MSJ, ECF No. 39-4). On October 12, 2011, Las Vegas Development Group, LLC recorded a foreclosure deed, stating that it purchased the Property for $ 3,801.00. (Foreclosure Deed, Ex. 5 to Airmotive's MSJ, ECF No. 39-5). Las Vegas Development Group, LLC then conveyed ownership of the Property to Airmotive. (Deed, Ex. 6 to Airmotive's MSJ, ECF No. 39-6).

BANA filed its Complaint on February 17, 2016, asserting the following causes of action arising from the foreclosure and sale of the Property: (1) quiet title; (2) breach of NRS 116.1113 ; (3) wrongful foreclosure; and (4) injunctive relief. (See Compl. ¶¶ 27–78).

II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Motion to Dismiss

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) mandates that a court dismiss a cause of action that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See N. Star Int'l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n , 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, dismissal is appropriate only when the complaint does not give the defendant fair notice of a legally cognizable claim and the grounds on which it rests. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). In considering whether the complaint is sufficient to state a claim, the Court will take all material allegations as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan , 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986).

The Court, however, is not required to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences. See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors , 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). A formulaic recitation of a cause of action with conclusory allegations is not sufficient; a plaintiff must plead facts showing that a violation is plausible , not just possible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

A court may also dismiss a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Hearns v. San Bernardino Police Dept. , 530 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 2008). Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a plaintiff's complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). "Prolix, confusing complaints" should be dismissed because "they impose unfair burdens on litigants and judges." McHenry v. Renne , 84 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 1996).

"Generally, a district court may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.... However, material which is properly submitted as part of the complaint may be considered on a motion to dismiss." Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co. , 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). Similarly, "documents whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss" without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Branch v. Tunnell , 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994). Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, a court may take judicial notice of "matters of public record." Mack v. S. Bay Beer Distrib. , 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986). Otherwise, if the district court considers materials outside of the pleadings, the motion to dismiss is converted into a motion for summary judgment. See Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency , 261 F.3d 912, 925 (9th Cir. 2001).

If the court grants a motion to dismiss, it must then decide whether to grant leave to amend. The court should "freely give" leave to amend when there is no "undue delay, bad faith[,] dilatory motive on the part of the movant ... undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of ... the amendment, [or] futility of the amendment...." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) ; Foman v. Davis , 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962). Generally, leave to amend is only denied when it is clear that the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be cured by amendment. See DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. , 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992).

B. Motion for Summary Judgment

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary adjudication when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. "Summary judgment is inappropriate if reasonable jurors, drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, could return a verdict in the nonmoving party's favor." Diaz v. Eagle Produce Ltd. P'ship , 521 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Shumway , 199 F.3d 1093, 1103–04 (9th Cir. 1999) ). A principal purpose of summary judgment is "to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323–24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

In determining summary judgment, a court applies a burden-shifting analysis. "When the party moving for summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, it must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial. In such a case, the moving party has the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact on each issue material to its case." C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc. , 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). In contrast, when the nonmoving party bears the burden of proving the claim or defense, the moving party can meet its burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence to negate an essential element of the nonmoving party's...

To continue reading

Request your trial
4 cases
  • Diamond House of SE Idaho, LLC v. City of Ammon
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Idaho
    • 5 Abril 2019
  • United States v. Clark Cnty.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Nevada
    • 24 Febrero 2021
    ...favorable limitations period to the extent there is any ambiguity. See id. at 1307, 09; see also Bank of Am., N.A. v. Woodcrest Homeowners Ass'n, 381 F. Supp. 3d 1280, 1286 n.3 (D. Nev. 2019), appeal dismissed sub nom. Bank of Am., N.A. v. Airmotive Investments, LLC, Case No. 20-15631, 2020......
  • Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. SFR Invs. Pool I, Case No. 2:18-CV-597 JCM (VCF)
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Nevada
    • 27 Septiembre 2019
    ...at *3 (D. Nev. May 30, 2019) (issued by Judge Miranda M. Du); see also, e.g., Bank of America, N.A. v. Woodcrest Homeowners Ass'n, 381 F. Supp. 3d 1280, 1286 (D. Nev. 2019) (issued by Judge Gloria M. Navarro); see also, e.g., Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Kree, LLC, 3:17-cv-00730-LRH-WGC, 20......
  • M&T Bank v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC, Case No. 2:17-CV-1867 JCM (CWH)
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Nevada
    • 6 Agosto 2019
    ...at *3 (D. Nev. May 30, 2019) (issued by Judge Miranda M. Du); see also, e.g., Bank of America, N.A. v. Woodcrest Homeowners Ass'n, 381 F. Supp. 3d 1280, 1286 (D. Nev. 2019) (issued by Judge Gloria M. Navarro); see also, e.g., Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Kree, LLC, 3:17-cv-00730-LRH-WGC, 20......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT