Bank of Babylon v. Quirk

• Decision Date: 13 March 1984
• Citation: 472 A.2d 21,192 Conn. 447
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: BANK OF BABYLON v. Thomas P. QUIRK.

Page 21

472 A.2d 21

192 Conn. 447

BANK OF BABYLON v. Thomas P. QUIRK.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Jan. 3, 1984.

Decided March 13, 1984.

Donald E. Grossfield, Westport, with whom was James P. Driscoll, Westport, for appellant (plaintiff).

Stewart I. Edelstein, Bridgeport, with whom, on the brief, was Randi Levine, Bridgeport, for appellee (defendant).

Before SPEZIALE, C.J., and PETERS, ARTHUR H. HEALEY, PARSKEY and SHEA, JJ.

PARSKEY, Judge.

The plaintiff secured a default judgment against the defendant in the state of New York. ¹ Thereafter it brought an action in this state and in connection therewith, pursuant to a court order, attached the defendant's boat which was docked at a marina in Old Saybrook. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the court lacked both subject matter and personal jurisdiction. The trial court granted the motion on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction to render a judgment because of the absence of minimum contacts between the defendant and this state, from which judgment the plaintiff has appealed. We find error.

The complaint is in three counts. The first and third counts are based on claims against the defendant as the maker and guarantor, respectively, of a promissory note. As to these counts, in the absence of territorial jurisdiction; see Chrysler Credit Corporation v. Fairfield Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 180 Conn. 223, 226, 429 A.2d 478 (1980); the court would have no power to render a judgment against him or his property. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 2584, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977).

The second count involves an action to enforce the New York judgment. The question involved in this count is whether under the full faith and credit clause; U.S. Const., art. IV § 1; the New York judgment may be enforced in this state in the absence of minimum contacts by the defendant with this state. Our disposition of the issue raised by this count is dispositive of this appeal. It is therefore unnecessary for us to consider whether, for the purpose of quasi in rem jurisdiction, there were sufficient contacts with this state to satisfy the requirements of due process. ²

The defendant is a resident of Tennessee. Before the commencement of the present action the defendant turned his boat over to a New York broker for the purpose of sale. Subsequently, the broker brought the boat to Connecticut when he moved his entire business to this state.

We may quickly dispose of the defendant's claim that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Jurisdiction of the subject matter is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong. State v. Malkowski, 189 Conn. 101, 105-106, 454 A.2d 275 (1983); Reed v. Reincke, 155 Conn. 591, 598, 236 A.2d 909 (1967). It is stating the obvious to observe that the Superior Court, a court of general jurisdiction, has the power to hear and determine cases involving an action on a promissory note and an action to enforce the judgment of a court of a sister state.

We may also dispose of the claim that the court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant under our long arm statute, General Statutes § 52-59(b). This statute authorizes jurisdiction over nonresidents who transact any business within the state provided that the cause of action arises out of such transaction. We may assume arguendo that the actions of the broker in bringing the defendant's boat to this state for the purpose of sale constitute the transaction of business within the meaning of the statute; see Zartolas v. Nisenfeld, 184 Conn. 471, 473-74, 440 A.2d 179 (1981); and that the actions of the broker may be imputed to the defendant as his principal. See Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. South Windsor Bank & Trust Co., 171 Conn. 63, 70, 368 A.2d 76 (1976). Since, however, there is nothing in the complaint to suggest that the plaintiff's causes of action are in any respect related to activities concerning the defendant's boat, the plaintiff's reliance on the long arm statute is misplaced. Zartolas v. Nisenfeld, supra, 184 Conn. at 477, 440 A.2d 179.

On the second count the defendant argues that due process requires the existence of minimum contacts even in cases involving the enforcement of judgments from sister states. To follow the defendant's reasoning one would be obliged to recognize a tension between the full faith and credit and the due process clauses of the constitution of the United States. But there is...