Bank of Dearborn v. Taylor, 76

• Decision Date: 16 March 1962
• Docket Number: No. 76,76
• Citation: 365 Mich. 567,114 N.W.2d 210
• Parties: BANK OF DEARBORN, a Michigan banking corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Herman G. TAYLOR, Deputy Commissioner of Banking and Acting Commissioner for the State of Michigan, and The Michigan Bank, a Michigan banking corporation, Defendants and Appellees.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 210

114 N.W.2d 210

365 Mich. 567

BANK OF DEARBORN, a Michigan banking corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Herman G. TAYLOR, Deputy Commissioner of Banking and Acting Commissioner for the State of Michigan, and The Michigan Bank, a Michigan banking corporation, Defendants and Appellees.

No. 76.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

March 16, 1962.

Jesse W. Bollinger, Dearborn, Irwin I. Cohn, Detroit, for plaintiff and appellant. Avern Cohn, John Sklar, Detroit, of counsel.

Langs, Molyneaux & Armstrong, Detroit, for defendant and appellee Michigan Bank.

John F. Langs, Richard F. Molyneaux, Richard J. Langs, Detroit, on the brief.

Paul L. Adams, Atty. Gen., Joseph B. Bilitzke, Sol. Gen., Maurice M. Moule, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lansing, for Herman G. Taylor, Deputy Com'r of Banking.

Before the Entire Bench, except ADAMS, J.

CARR, Justice.

Defendant The Michigan Bank was originally chartered and has its principal office in Detroit. It has no branch or business in adjacent Dearborn Township. This is an action to enjoin issuance by defendant banking commissioner of a certificate of approval for and establishment by defendant bank of a branch at the northwest corner of Ford Road and Mayburn, one block west of Telegraph Road, in north Dearborn Township, Wayne County, Michigan. From decree for defendants, dismissing plaintiff's bill of complaint on the merits, plaintiff appeals.

Plaintiff is a State bank with its principla office and three branches in the city of Dearborn, and one branch in north Dearborn Township, west of Dearborn city, at the southeast corner of Ford Road and Beech Daly Road. Ford Road is the north boundary of the city of Dearborn. Plaintiff's township branch on Ford Road is approximately 1.1 miles west of the intersection of Ford Road and Mayburn at which defendant bank seeks to establish a branch. Plaintiff, in its brief, says of the intervening township area, north of Ford Road, that it is 'homogeneous and well built up.' Plaintiff therefore invokes the provisions of C.L.1948, § 487.34 (Stat.Ann. § 23.762), permitting a bank to establish and operate a branch 'within a village or city other than that in which it was originally chartered * * * Provided further, That no such branch shall be established in a city or village in which a state or national bank or branch thereof is then in operation * * *' Reference then is made to our holding in Wyandotte Savings Bank v. State Banking Commissioner, 347 Mich. 33, 78 N.W.2d 612, that, for purposes of this statute, the word 'village' includes an unincorporated as well as incorporated village.

It is plaintiff's contention that the locations of its township branch and that of defendant bank's projected branch, in north Dearborn Township, are both within one unincorporated village and that, its branch already being in operation therein, defendant bank may not, under the above statutory provision, establish another there.

The trial court held that the two branch bank locations are in separate unincorporated villages. In so holding, the trial court said:

'For the purpose of the banking law this question has been fully and carefully discussed and answered by our Supreme Court in Wyandotte [Savings Bank] v. [State] Banking Commissioner (supra). 'The word 'village' is not a technical word, or one having a peculiar meaning, but is a common word in general usage with an ancient lineage. It is merely an assemblage or community of people, a nucleus or cluster for residential and business purposes, a collective body of inhabitants gathered together in one group.' The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania calls it 'community.' Upper Darby National Bank v. Meyers [Myers], 386 Pa. 12, 124 A.2nd 116 (Sup.Ct.1956). Its frame of reference in common usage is nebulous rather than exact, and is akin to 'vicinity,' 'neighborhood' and 'community.' Cf. Lukens Steel Co. v. Perkins, 70 U.S.App.D.C. 354, 107 Fed.2nd 627 (D.C.Cir.1939) reversed on other grounds (310 U.S. 113, 60 S.Ct. 869, 84 L.Ed. 1108 (1940). It is a settlement, a centralized populous area having a general common residential and business activity serving the particular area or district. It does not have to be a separate political entity or corporation. It is a 'locality' or 'area to be served.' It has been analyzed as a 'trading area' distinct from that assigned to 'municipality.' The language in Application of Howard Savings Institution of Newark, 32 N.J. 29 (March 1960) on page 46, is appropriately applicable, 'We are no reason why the legislature cannot so differentiate if it chooses to do so or why it may not use the economically artificial municipal boundary as the preliminary measuring rod.''

The court then went on to say of the location at which defendant bank would operate:

'The area in question, determined by the Commissioner to be a village, has its point of focalization at the intersection of Ford and Telegraph Roads. Here is located a large shopping center and other commercial establishments serving a district, a community, a collective body of inhabitants, a trading area.'

The court continued:

'Plaintiff contends also, that the entire township area in this vicinity is continuous and homogeneous, that there are no physical or geographical dividing lines and hence it cannot be determined to be a separate village under the law. This position is not tenable. The law has already indicated in its definition of a village that economic rather than governmental, or geographical or physical boundaries are the controlling factor. * * * The striking similarity of the intersection of Ford Road and Telegraph and the intersection of Beech Daly Road and Ford is convincing proof that the Commissioner exercised sound judgment in designating each as a 'village.' Each is a separate trading area. Each is a separate cluster of residence and business establishments. Each is at a major intersection. A shopping center is now in operation at the Ford Road and Telegraph intersection, and one is in the process of construction at Beech Daly and Ford Road. Each has its own potenial for growth. Continuity or homogeneity over a large area makes them nonetheless economically separate. If continuity and homogeneity were restrictive factors, as plaintiff contends, then conceivably vast suburban unincorporated areas with sizeable populations and containing numerous trading and business centers at intersections interspersed throughout, even at considerable and inconvenient distances, would be deprived of banking accommodations. This theory would be in direct contravention of the purpose of the law to safeguard the interests of the public. Public needs would thus be disregarded.'

We are not persuaded that, had we been sitting in the position of the trial judge, we would have found otherwise as to the facts as above stated by him. We think the evidence, though conflicting, supports the court...