Bank of Lewisburg v. Sheffey

• Decision Date: 11 May 1891
• Citation: Bank of Lewisburg v. Sheffey, 140 U.S. 445, 11 S.Ct. 755, 35 L.Ed. 493 (1891)
• Parties: BANK OF LEWISBURG v. SHEFFEY et al
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

140 U.S. 445

11 S.Ct. 755

35 L.Ed. 493

BANK OF LEWISBURG v. SHEFFEY et al.

May 11, 1891.

[Statement of Case from pages 445-450 intentionally omitted] A. C. Snyder, for appellant.

A. T. Britton, A. B. Browne, and Jas. Bumgardner, for appellees.

Mr. Chief Justice FULLER, after stating the facts as above, delivered the opinion of the court.

Describing the decree of May 4, 1878, as 'interlocutory,' and that of November 30, 1887, as 'final,' appellant assigns errors as follows: That the decree of May 4th is erroneous, because it in effect overruled the demurrer to the bill, and denied appellant's motion to file its amended and supplemental answer; and that the decree of November 30, 1887, is erroneous because (1) it rejected the petition for a rehearing; (2) held the deed of November 20, 1876, valid; (3) overruled appellant's exceptions to the master's report; (4) held that the deed to plaintiffs had priority over that of October 11, 1875 (5) held that the debt of appellant was not entitled to priority under the provisions of the deed to plaintiffs; and because (6) it should have held that the appellant was entitled to the fund in controversy, if for no other reason, upon the ground of its judgment obtained after Glendy had acquired the legal title to the land. If the decree of May 4, 1878, were final, no errors can now be assigned to it or considered upon this appeal; and if that decree, being final, covered all the grounds of error was confessedly made after the djo urnment then the latter decree must necessarily be affirmed. The application for a rehearing was confessedly made after theadjournment of the May term, at which the prior decree was entered, and too late, if that decree were final. Equity Rule 88; McMicken v. Perin, 18 How. 507, 511; Roemer v. Simon, 91 U. S. 149; Central Trust Co. v. Grant Locomotive Works, 135 U. S. 207, 224, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 736. The controversy raised by the pleadings and to be determined by the court was whether the property passed under the deed to plaintiffs or under that to Mathews, and whether the bank was entitled to priority. The effect of the sale by consent was merely to substitute the fund in place of the real estate, and did not change the issues. On behalf of the bank it was claimed that the trust-deed to the plaintiffs was void on its face, and that by the terms of that deed, if valid, the debt of the bank was preferred. By the amended and supplemental answer, which it sought to file, the bank raised the question that Glendy not having the legal title when he executed the deed to the plaintiffs, and having by his prior deed to the bank divested himself of his equitable title, the plaintiffs did not, as Glendy's grantees, under a conveyance 'without any warranty whatever,' occupy the position of bona fide purchasers, nor were they protected by the recording statutes of the state; and the facts set forth therein involved, moreover, the position urged in the petition for rehearing, that, the deed to the plaintiffs being...