Bank of Monticello v. Dooly

Decision Date11 March 1902
Citation89 N.W. 490,113 Wis. 590
PartiesBANK OF MONTICELLO v. DOOLY ET AL.
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from circuit court, Green county; B. F. Dunwiddie, Judge.

Action on a note by the Bank of Monticello against James Dooly and another. From a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant Dooly appeals. Affirmed.

This is an action against the defendant Dooly and one Prisk upon a joint and several promissory note for $1,000, dated March 11, 1901, signed by one J. F. Sears (now deceased) and the defendant Prisk as makers, payable September 1, 1901, to the order of the appellant Dooly, and indorsed in blank by Dooly. The complaint is the ordinary complaint upon a promissory note against the maker and indorser. The defendant Prisk answered separately, but does not appeal from the judgment; hence it is not necessary to state his answer at length. The defendant Dooly answered separately, alleging that he had no knowledge or information as to the execution of the note, and that on the 11th of March, 1901, and up to the 20th of April, 1901, one J. F. Sears, now deceased, was the cashier of the plaintiff bank. Further answering, the defendant Dooly denies that he ever indorsed or delivered said note to the plaintiff for value or to procure credit, and alleges that he knew nothing of said note until the 20th of April, 1901, when the plaintiff represented to him that it owned said note, and that it would be necessary for the defendant to indorse the same in order to confer title on the plaintiff, and that upon such request, and for the sole accommodation of the plaintiff, the defendant Dooly indorsed said note for the purpose only of conferring title, and without receiving any consideration or value therefor. The action was tried before a jury. The plaintiff introduced the note and rested. Thereupon the defendant introduced the testimony of one Humiston, the vice president of the plaintiff bank, and proved by him that Sears was cashier of the bank up to April 18, 1901, on which day a directors' meeting was held, and the loans of the bank were examined by the full board of directors; that among the notes held by the bank which were examined by the board was the note in question, signed by Prisk and Sears, but not then indorsed by Dooly; that he (Humiston) called Sears' attention to the note, and Sears “said that Jim Dooly has to sign that note.’ He said it was a three-cornered deal, and Jim Dooly has to sign it,--has to go on that note with us.’ Being asked what there was about the note that specially attracted his attention, he said, the size of the note, the amount of the note, and the signatures. The court then asked, “What is the purport of this testimony?” and Mr. Becker, defendant's attorney, replied, “I want to prove that Mr. Sears was requested by the officers of the bank to have Mr. Dooly come and indorse the note.” Plaintiff's counsel then said: We concede that Mr. Dooly was called in to go on this note. Mr. Becker: Do you concede that he said it was a three-cornered affair? Mr. Jeffreys: It was a three-cornered affair. Mr. Becker: All right.” Defendant was then called on his own behalf, and said that he knew nothing of the note until the 19th or 20th of April, 1901, when he put his name on the back at the Bank of Monticello. Being asked at whose request, and whether he received any consideration for his signature, the court ruled that if the request was by Mr. Sears, who had been shown to be dead at the time of the trial, the testimony could not be received. Thereupon Humiston was again called, and it was shown by him that at the directors' meeting on the 18th of April he told Sears to call Dooly in and have him sign the note; that he did this because the directors did not consider the note good without Dooly's signature, and he...

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2 cases
  • Baker v. McLeod (In re McAskill's Estate)
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Supreme Court
    • November 6, 1934
    ...negotiable, they are deemed prima facie to have been issued for a valuable consideration (section 116.29, Stats.: Bank of Monticello v. Dooly, 113 Wis. 590, 89 N. W. 490); and also that, as the notes were executed under seal, the latter imports consideration (section 328.27, Stats.). Howeve......
  • Rylander v. Laursen
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Supreme Court
    • March 11, 1902

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