Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Bach, 1556 EDA 2016
| Decision Date | 29 March 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 1556 EDA 2016,1556 EDA 2016 |
| Parties | BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON f/k/a the Bank of New York, as Trustee for the Holders of the Certificates, First Horizon Mortgage Pass–Through Certificates Series FHASI 2004–7, by First Tennessee Bank National Association, Master Servicer, in it's Capacity as Agent for the Trustee under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement, v. Steven E. BACH and Barbara A. Bach, Appellants |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Steven E. and Barbara A. Bach, appellants, pro se.
Matthew T. Eyet, Bedminster, for appellee.
Appellants, Steven E. Bach and Barbara A. Bach, appeal pro se from the June 28, 2016 Judgment entered in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas granting an in rem Judgment in mortgage foreclosure. After careful review, we affirm.
We summarize the relevant portion of the factual and procedural history as follows. On September 28, 2004, Appellants purchased a home located at 10 Roberts Road, Newtown Square, Pennsylvania. To finance the purchase, Appellants obtained a loan from Financial Mortgage Corp. in the amount of $479,200.00. Appellants executed a note, secured by a mortgage on the property at 10 Roberts Road.
On December 1, 2008, Appellants defaulted on their obligations under the mortgage and the note by failing to make their required monthly payment. Appellants have not made a single payment in the more than eight years since they defaulted on their obligation. Nevertheless, they remained living in the residence at 10 Roberts Road.
On July 2, 2014, Appellee filed a Complaint in foreclosure against Appellants. In the Complaint, Appellee listed two prior assignments of the mortgage: (i) from the original Mortgagee, Financial Mortgage Corp., to First Horizon Home Loan Corp. ("First Horizon"); and (ii) from First Horizon to Appellee.
Appellants filed Preliminary Objections, which the trial court overruled. Appellants subsequently filed an Answer to the Complaint, denying "the validity of the assignments, the authority of the parties that executed the assignments and the standing of the parties to the assignments to execute same." Answer, filed 10/3/14, at 1 (unpaginated).
The trial court held a non-jury trial on February 1, 2016. The parties entered 15 joint stipulations into the record. Exhibit J–1. Appellee introduced, inter alia , the original note, signed by Appellants and properly endorsed in blank. See Exhibit P–10; Trial Court Opinion, filed 7/25/16, at 10 ().
At trial, Appellants did not challenge the validity of the mortgage or their default in payment. Instead, Appellants attempted to challenge the assignment of the mortgage to Appellee and Appellee's standing to bring the foreclosure action. In addition, Appellants alleged, for the first time, that there existed an additional "assignment," conducted prior to the assignment from First Horizon to Appellee, and that this assignment rendered the assignment to Appellee invalid.
The court entered a verdict in favor of Appellee.1 Appellants filed a timely Motion for Post–Trial Relief arguing, for the first time, that Appellee failed to include all prior assignments in the Complaint, and that this omission constituted a failure to comply with Pa.R.C.P. No. 1147. In an Order filed May 4, 2016, the trial court denied the Motion. On June 28, 2016, the trial court entered an in rem Judgment in favor of Appellee.
Appellants timely appealed. Both Appellants and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellants raise two issues, each broken down into three sub arguments. See Appellants' Brief at 7–8. For ease of disposition, we summarize Appellants' arguments as follows. Appellants aver that, prior to the assignment from First Horizon to Appellee, an "assignment" had been made from First Horizon to First Horizon Asset Securities, Inc ("Prior Transaction"). All parties conceded that Appellee did not list this Prior Transaction in the Complaint. Appellants argue that this Prior Transaction rendered the assignment to Appellee invalid, and divested Appellee of standing to bring a complaint in foreclosure. Id. at 19–26. Appellants also aver that the failure to include the Prior Transaction in the Complaint constitutes a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Id. at 12–15.
This Court's scope and standard of review well-settled:
Stephan v. Waldron Elec. Heating and Cooling LLC , 100 A.3d 660, 664–65 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation and quotation omitted).
First, Appellants aver that Appellee lacks standing to enforce the terms of the mortgage and note.2 Appellants' arguments lack merit because Appellee held the original note endorsed in blank.
This Court has repeatedly made it clear that "a note secured by a mortgage is a negotiable instrument, as that term is defined by the [Pennsylvania Uniform Commercial Code ("PUCC").]" Gerber v. Piergrossi , 142 A.3d 854, 862 (Pa. Super. 2016). Because a borrower faces no risk of double liability under the PUCC, "the chain of possession by which a party comes to hold [a] note is immaterial to its enforceability by the party." Id. (citation and quotation omitted). Where a note is endorsed in blank, meaning it does not specify that it is payable only to an identified person, the instrument is "payable to bearer and may be negotiated by transfer of possession alone until specially indorsed." JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Murray , 63 A.3d 1258, 1266 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation and quotation omitted).
In the instant case, as noted above, Appellee presented to the trial court and submitted into evidence the original note, endorsed in blank. Appellants do not challenge the authenticity of the note. Thus, the trial court correctly concluded that Appellee had standing to enforce the note through the instant foreclosure action.
We turn next to Appellants' averment that they are entitled to relief because Appellee failed to include the Prior Transaction in the Complaint, in contravention of Pa.R.C.P. 1147(a). As discussed, supra , Appellants lack standing to contest the impact of the Prior Transaction on the later assignment to Appellee. As a separate matter, however, Rule 1147(a) requires a plaintiff in a foreclosure action to list all prior assignments in the Complaint. Appellants aver that Appellee failed to do so in the instant case, and that that failure entitles them to relief.
The trial court concluded that Appellants had waived this claim by failing to raise it in their Preliminary Objections or Answer to the Complaint.3 Trial Court Opinion, at 7–8. As the trial court correctly noted, under Rule 1032(a):
A party waives all defenses and objections which are not presented either by preliminary objection, answer or reply, except a defense which is not required to be pleaded under Rule 1030(b), the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join an indispensable party, the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a claim, the defenses of failure to exercise or exhaust a statutory remedy and an adequate remedy at law and any other nonwaivable defense or objection.
In their challenge to the trial court's conclusion of waiver under Rule 1032(a), Appellants rely on Rule 1147(a). They contend that Rule 1147(a)"define[s] the factual averments required to state a cause of action." Appellants' Brief at 13. Appellants further argue that they are raising the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, which, under Rule 1032(a), need not be raised in a preliminary objection or answer.
We disagree with Appellants' assertion that Rule 1147(a) defines a cause of action in mortgage foreclosure. We also disagree with the characterization of their averment as a claim that Appellee failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We agree with the trial court that Appellants waived this issue.
As our Supreme Court has explained, "[a] cause of action is ‘a factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a remedy in court from another person.’ "...
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