Bank of New York v. United States
Decision Date | 29 May 1956 |
Parties | BANK OF NEW YORK and Margaret T. Seckel, as Executors of the Will of Josiah C. Thaw, Deceased, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Morris & McVeigh, New York City, for plaintiffs (Francis J. Rogers, New York City, of counsel).
Paul W. Williams, U. S. Atty. for Southern Dist. of New York, New York City, for defendant (Milton E. Lacina, New York City, of counsel).
This is an action by the executors of the estate of Josiah C. Thaw for a refund of an estate tax deficiency.
The decedent died March 15, 1944, and thereafter an estate tax of $420,309.17 was duly paid. After an audit of the return plaintiffs received a thirty-day letter on October 23, 1946, wherein they were advised that the Treasury was asserting a deficiency based upon, among other items, the full value of a trust created by the decedent on December 30, 1935. This amount was "included under the provisions of § 811(c) of the Internal Revenue Code" of 1939, 53 Stat. 121, 26 U.S.C.A. § 811(c). The executors thereupon filed a protest objecting inter alia to the inclusion of any part of this trust in the gross estate, and more particularly to the refusal to deduct the value of the life estate. Thereafter plaintiffs participated in a series of conferences with the Technical Staff. On July 11, 1947, plaintiffs, by their attorney, wrote to Mr. Kluttz of the Technical Staff proposing that the issues be compromised by including the remainder value of the trust in the gross estate. On September 26, 1947, plaintiffs signed the following waiver which was accepted by Mr. Kluttz on December 8, 1947.
The deficiency was thereafter paid with interest.
Subsequently Congress amended § 811 (c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 by § 7 of the Technical Changes Act of 1949, 63 Stat. 894. This, in short, retroactively excluded from the gross estate of decedents making transfers before October 8, 1949, expressly created reversionary interests unless they exceeded 5 per centum of the value of the property. Plaintiffs, relying upon this Act, filed a timely claim for a refund. This was denied and the present action was instituted.
The government has interposed three defenses: (1) the waiver signed by the plaintiffs is binding upon them and constitutes a bar to this action; (2) even if the waiver is not binding the plaintiffs are barred by the doctrine of equitable estoppel, and (3) even if plaintiffs are entitled to maintain this action, the deficiency was assessed on the theory that the grantor retained the right to the income from the trust and not that he retained a reversionary interest so that plaintiffs are not entitled to the benefits of the amendment.
As to the government's first defense, the binding effect of waivers not rising to the dignity of closing agreements or compromises contemplated in §§ 3760, 3761 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 53 Stat. 462, 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 3760, 3761, has been the subject of considerable litigation. There now seems to be general agreement that waivers, similar to but not identical with the one presently under consideration, do not bind either party unless they conform to the requirements of the above-cited sections of the Code, or more specifically, unless the closing agreement or compromise is made with the approval of the Secretary, Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary of the Treasury. Leach v. Nichols, 1 Cir., 1927, 23 F.2d 275; Anderson v. P. W. Madsen Inv. Co., 10 Cir., 1934, 72 F. 2d 768; Brast v. Winding Gulf Colliery Co., 4 Cir., 1938, 94 F.2d 179; Joyce v. Gentsch, 6 Cir., 1944, 141 F.2d 891; Bank of New York v. United States, 3 Cir., 1948, 170 F.2d 20; Sanders v. Commissioner, 10 Cir., 1955, 225 F.2d 629; Davidson v. United States, D.C.E.D.Wis. 1944, 58 F.Supp. 481; O'Connor v. United States, D.C.S.D.N.Y.1948, 76 F.Supp. 962; Steiden Stores, Inc., v. Glenn, D.C. W.D.Ky.1950, 94 F.Supp. 712; Cuba Railroad Co. v. United States, D.C.S.D. N.Y.1954, 124 F.Supp. 182; Cuba Railroad Co. v. United States, D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1955, 135 F.Supp. 847; Schneider v. Kelm, D.C.D.Minn.1956, 137 F.Supp. 871; Cf. L. Loewy & Son, Inc., v. Commissioner, 2 Cir., 1929, 31 F.2d 652; United States v. Lustig, 2 Cir., 1947, 163 F.2d 85. Indeed, this result is clearly required by Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 1939, 278 U.S. 282, 49 S. Ct. 129, 131, 73 L.Ed. 379, wherein the Supreme Court said:
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