Bank South Leasing, Inc. v. Williams
| Decision Date | 03 September 1985 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 84-3274,84-3275 and 84-3350,s. 84-3274 |
| Citation | 769 F.2d 1497 |
| Parties | BANK SOUTH LEASING, INC., a Georgia Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James R. WILLIAMS and Julius M. Garner, Defendants-Appellants. BANK SOUTH LEASING, INC., a Georgia Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FLORIDA NATIONAL BANK OF ORLANDO, a National Banking Association, Defendant-Appellee. BANK SOUTH LEASING, INC., a Georgia Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James R. WILLIAMS, Julius M. Garner, Florida National Bank of Orlando, a national banking association, Defendants, and Allen G. MacArthur, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Arthur J. Ranson, III, Orlando, Fla., for Williams and Garner.
Guy B. Bailey, Jr., Mercedes C. Busto, Miami, Fla., for Bank South Leasing, Inc.
William G. Cooper, Jacksonville, Fla., for Florida Nat. Bank of Orlando.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.
Before VANCE, ANDERSON * and HENLEY **, Circuit Judges.
This case is a consolidation of three appeals taken from the district court's judgment in a diversity action that includes both contract and fraud claims. The district court by written order has retained jurisdiction in the case for purposes of considering the appropriateness and amount of attorneys' fees. Because we conclude that the unresolved questions about attorneys' fees deprive the district court's judgment of finality, we dismiss these appeals for want of appellate jurisdiction.
The underlying dispute in this case revolves around an arrangement between two individuals and a bank to finance a third party in manufacturing and distributing ice machines. Bank South Leasing, Inc. ("Bank South") advanced funds to Polar Chips International, Inc. ("Polar Chips"), and took title to ice machines Polar Chips was to manufacture. By the arrangement, Bank South then leased the machines to two individuals, Williams and Garner, who in turn subleased them back to Polar Chips. In practice, Polar Chips was to keep the machines and place them with various businesses. Polar Chips would then collect rentals and make payments to Williams and Garner, who in turn would pay Bank South under the lease agreement.
Before paying for the machines, Bank South asked a second bank, First National Bank of Orlando ("FNBO"), about Polar Chips' credit history and received a generally favorable and accurate report from MacArthur, who was president, chairman, and chief executive officer of FNBO. MacArthur, however, was also a personal friend of a Polar Chips principal. In rendering his credit report, MacArthur omitted to tell Bank South of substantial and consistent overdrafts by Polar Chips in the two months immediately preceding Bank South's credit inquiry.
Polar Chips failed to manufacture and place the ice machines and defaulted on its obligation under the sublease to Williams and Garner, who in turn failed to make the payments required of them to Bank South. Bank South filed two actions in federal district court, the first against Williams and Garner for breach of the lease agreement, and the second against FNBO and MacArthur alleging fraud in connection with the favorable credit report. These actions were consolidated and tried together. At the close of plaintiff Bank South's case, the trial court directed a verdict in favor of FNBO on the fraud claim. The trial continued with respect to the remaining defendants, with the jury returning verdicts in favor of Bank South and against Williams and Garner on the contract claim and in favor of Bank South on the fraud claim against MacArthur. Judgment was entered on these verdicts and, as noted, the district court issued a written order retaining jurisdiction to decide the appropriateness and amount of attorneys' fees.
The appeal in No. 84-3274 was filed by Williams and Garner, who complain that the trial court instructed the jury on a point of law outside the presence of counsel, and who further cite as error the trial court's refusal to give certain requested jury instructions. The second appeal before us, No. 84-3275, was filed by Bank South. It argues that there was sufficient evidence before the jury to support its claim against FNBO for fraud, and that consequently the trial court erred in directing a verdict on the claim. Finally, Bank South in No. 84-3350 has appealed the denial of its request for interest on the punitive damage award it won from MacArthur. This appeal is unopposed.
Counsel for Bank South and for FNBO separately informed this panel several days before oral argument in these appeals about a recent decision by another panel of this court in the case of Certain British Underwriters v. Jet Charter Serv. Inc., 739 F.2d 534 (11th Cir.1984). The court in that case dismissed an appeal from a grant of summary judgment for lack of finality since the district court had reserved jurisdiction to consider an award of attorneys' fees. We must decide whether the district court's similar reservation of decision in this case requires dismissal of these appeals for want of appellate jurisdiction.
The only basis that has been submitted for this court's jurisdiction is 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291, which provides that "the courts of appeals ... shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts." We can assume for purposes of these appeals that aside from the undecided questions about attorneys' fees, the district court's judgment is final within the meaning of this statutory provision.
This circuit has adopted a test articulated by the new Fifth Circuit for determining whether a ruling on attorneys' fees is necessary for a judgment to be final:
When attorney's fees are similar to costs or collateral to an action, a lack of determination as to the amount does not preclude the issuance of a final, appealable judgment on the merits. When, however the attorney's fees are an integral part of the merits of the case and the scope of relief, they cannot be characterized as costs or as collateral and their determination is a part of any final, appealable judgment.
McQurter v. City of Atlanta, 724 F.2d 881, 882 (11th Cir.1984) (citations omitted) . Whether attorneys' fees are "collateral to an action" or instead are an "integral part of the merits of the case" depends on...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Shultz v. Crowley
...F.H. Krear & Co. v. Nineteen Named Trustees, 776 F.2d 1563, 1563-64 (2d Cir.1985) (per curiam); Bank South Leasing, Inc. v. Williams, 769 F.2d 1497, 1499-1500 (11th Cir.1985) (per curiam). But see, e.g., Exchange National Bank v. Daniels, 763 F.2d 286, 292-94, modified on other grounds, 768......
-
Richmond v. Ricketts
...less than the penalty of death." Songer v. Wainwright, 733 F.2d 788, 792 (8th Cir.1984), vacated, 758 F.2d 552 (1985); reinstated, 769 F.2d 1497 (1985); rev'd on other grounds, 769 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1985), quoting, Songer v. Wainwright, 423 So.2d 355, 356 (Fla.1982). Requiring the Defend......
-
Thompson v. Calderon
... ... See, e.g., Committee for Idaho's High Desert, Inc. v. Yost, 92 F.3d 814, 824 (9th Cir.1996), ("inadvertence, ... ...
-
Robinson v. Tanner, 85-7456
...of the merits of the case, the notice of appeal was premature and did not give this court jurisdiction. Bank South Leasing, Inc. v. Williams, 769 F.2d 1497, 1499-1500 (11th Cir.1985). Upon rehearing by the panel, it was found that a subsequent order deciding the attorney's fees issue cured ......