Bank v. Bank

• Decision Date: 13 January 1942
• Docket Number: 56-58.
• Parties: BANK v. BANK. PLEET v. BANK (two cases).
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

23 A.2d 700

180 Md. 254

BANK v. BANK.

PLEET v. BANK (two cases).

Nos. 56-58.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

January 13, 1942

Appeals from Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City; Eli Frank, Judge.

Action by Samuel L. Bank against Beatrice Bank and others to restrain the named defendants from prosecuting suit for absolute divorce and restrain the defendants Jacob A. Plett and Dora Pleet from assisting, abetting, supporting, and co-operating with Beatrice Bank in the divorce proceedings wherein supplemental bill was filed seeking other relief. From orders overruling separate demurrers filed by the defendant, the defendants separately appeal.

Orders overruling the demurrers reversed, and cause against Beatrice Bank remanded for further proceedings, and bill dismissed as to Jacob A. Pleet and Dora Pleet.

Edward L. Ward and Daniel Ellison, both of Baltimore, for appellant in all three cases.

Isaac Lobe Straus, of Baltimore (Isidor Roman, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellees in all three cases.

Before BOND, C.J., and SLOAN, JOHNSON, DELAPLAINE, COLLINS FORSYTHE, and MARBURY, JJ.

FORSYTHE Judge.

This record contains three appeals from orders of the Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City, overruling separate demurrers filed by the three Appellants who were defendants in an Amended and Supplemental bill, filed against them on July 6, 1940, by the Appellee.

On February 5, 1940, the appellee, Samuel L. Bank, filed a bill of complaint against the appellants, his wife Beatrice Bank, and her parents Jacob A. Pleet and Dora Pleet. The bill sought an injunction to restrain his wife from prosecuting to a conclusion a suit for an absolute divorce from the appellee which she had instituted in a Florida Court; and to restrain her parents from assisting, abetting, supporting and cooperating with his wife in the said divorce proceeding. But before proper process could be served upon Beatrice Bank, who then was in Florida, a decree was passed by the Court in Florida granting her an absolute divorce.

The appellee then secured an order from the Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City permitting him to file an amended and supplemental bill, which, accordingly, was filed on July 6, 1940. The amended and supplemental bill is against the same parties. The relief sought differs from that sought in the original bill. After the filing of the original bill and before the filing of the amended and supplemental bill, the divorce was granted by the Court in Florida. The relief sought in the amended and supplemental bill is, (1) that the Florida divorce be declared void; (2) that the appellants Jacob A. and Dora Pleet make discovery of all monies expended by them on account of, or in connection with, the Florida divorce cause, and the support and maintenance of the said Beatrice Bank in Florida, and later in New Jersey; (3) that the said Jacob A. and Dora Pleet be enjoined from supporting, inducing and prevailing upon the said Beatrice Bank to remain away from the appellee.

Each of the appellants demurred to the amended and supplemental bill. The grounds of the demurrer of Beatrice Bank are: (1) That the amended and supplemental bill is multifarious; (2) that the allegations are uncertain and indefinite; (3) that many of the averments of the bill have been determined, and are res judicata. The grounds of the demurrers of Jacob A. and Dora Pleet are practically the same as those of Beatrice Bank, with the additional ground that a Court of Equity may not enjoin a parent from giving financial aid to a dependent daughter.

Each of the demurrers were overruled, and these appeals were entered.

The amended and supplemental bill is very long, and the original bill, and all proceedings in a connection with it, either are included in the amended bill, or filed as exhibits. It alleges that the appellee, and the appellant Beatrice Bank, were married on June 10, 1934, and now are, and have always been, residents of Baltimore City, Maryland; that on or about August 7, 1937, the appellant, Beatrice Bank, without just cause, and persuaded, induced and prevailed upon by her parents, the appellants Jacob A. and Dora Pleet, abandoned and deserted the appellee, and the abandonment still continues. Also, it is alleged that the appellee, on November 11, 1938, obtained a judgment for five thousand dollars, in the Superior Court of Baltimore City, against the appellants Jacob A. and Dora Pleet, for the alienation of the affections of Beatrice Bank, which judgment has been paid and satisfied; that the appellant, Beatrice Bank, aided and abetted by the appellants Jacob A. and Dora Pleet, obtained a divorce in Florida, on February 10, 1940; that the said divorce was planned, financed and abetted by the appellants Jacob A. and Dora Pleet, and they are continuing to prevail upon Beatrice Bank to remain away, and live apart from the appellee, and to provide her with financial means to live now in the state of New Jersey.

The particular questions raised by the demurrers now before us are: (1) Whether the amended and supplemental bill is multifarious; (2) whether the appellee is entitled to discovery, and (3) whether an injunction may be issued, as prayed against parents, enjoining them from maintaining and supporting a dependent daughter, and, as alleged, influencing her to live apart from her former husband.

The briefs devoted a great deal of argument, and cited many authorities, in support of questions about which there is no serious dispute. The fact that a suit at law for alienation of affections will lie against parents, as against third parties, is universally accepted. Also, the jurisdiction of a Court of Equity in this State to consider a bill for the annulment of a divorce obtained in another state, provided proper allegations of facts are made, is well settled.

In considering the question of multifariousness it will be observed that that question more often has been considered, and discussed by the Courts of this country, under varying circumstances, than any other subject of Equity procedure, and it is one upon which there is less uniformity of opinion. There is so much confusion about it that the great majority of decisions agree that no fixed rule has been, or can be adopted, which will apply in all cases. The determination of the question must be left to the discretion of the Chancellor, to be exercised with regard to the particular circumstances of each case. Emerson v. Gaither, 103 Md. 564, 572, 64 A. 26, 8 L.R.A.,N.S., 738, 7 Ann.Cas. 1114; Whitaker v. Coudon, 130 Md. 234, 100 A. 279; American Surety Co. v. Noble, 154 Md. 150, 140 A. 42; Whitman v. United Surety Co., 110 Md. 421, 72 A. 1042; Roth v. Stuerken, 124 Md. 404, 92 A. 808; 10 R.C.L. sec. 190, p. 428; 21 C.J. § 427, p. 408; 19 Am.Jur. §§ 246-250, pp. 190-193.

The test is, that the rule 'must be applied to the facts of each particular case in the light of the general principles regulating singleness in pleading which forbid the blending in the same suit entirely distinct and separate matters relating to different parties.' Whitman v. United Surety Co., supra [110 Md. 421, 72 A. 1045]; Ruhe v. Ruhe, 113 Md. 595, 599, 77 A. 797. And in Gaither v. Bauernschmidt, 108 Md. 1, 8, 69 A. 425, 428, it is said: 'desirable as it may be to avoid a multiplicity of suits and to do complete justice to as many parties as possible in one litigation, the rules of equity pleading, which forbid uniting in one bill defendants some of whom are not interested in the whole of the relief sought, cannot be disregarded in framing bills of complaint. The 'parties in interest' whose rights can be completely disposed of in one litigation in equity comprise only those persons who can be united in a single bill of complaint in the due course of equity procedure.' Reckefus v. Lyon, 69 Md. 589, 590, 16 A. 233, 530.

Applying the rules as above stated, to the amended and supplemental bill in this case which seeks against one defendant to have a divorce declared void, and against two defendants discovery and an injunction, would seem to bring this case well within the ruling in Carey v. Mercantile Credit Company, 159 Md. 387, 150 A. 806, 807, where it was said: 'There would be no common ground of litigation for all of them. The remedies sought are different, and effect different persons. * * * the combination of them all in one suit is too likely to involve confusion.' Mitchell et al. v. Frederick et al., 166 Md. 42, 53, 170 A. 733, 92 A.L.R. 1412; Reckefus v. Lyon, supra. In 19 Am.Jur. § 252, p. 194, it is said, in speaking of uniting two or more causes of action, that it must be determined with reference to 'the origin, absis or foundation of the causes, as being the same with respect to each; the questions or issues presented for adjudication as being of the same character; the rights or interests of the defendants, as being identical or similar; and the relief which each invokes as being of the same general character.' King v. Rice, 285 Ill. 123, 120 N.E. 449; Abbott v. Loving, 303 Ill. 154, 135 N.E. 442; Alabama v. Arizona, 291 U.S. 286, 54 S.Ct. 399, 78 L.Ed. 798. The relief sought in the instant case would require different answers, different proof, and different decrees. The relief against the former wife concerns her alone, and the decree, if against her divorce, would not affect the parents; and a decree for discovery and injunction, against the parents would not affect the former wife. As applied in this State, the rule will not permit Courts of Equity to approve the uniting in one bill matters so dissimilar as are those in this case.

The discovery sought in this case is unusual. No authority in a case like this has been cited, nor have we found any holding under allegations of a bill similar to those in this...