Bank v. Dean

• Docket Number: 50134-2022
• Decision Date: 30 October 2023
• Parties: D.L. EVANS BANK, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. HENRY W. DEAN, Defendant-Appellant, and VALLEY CLUB HOMES, LLC and SUN VALLEY DEVELOPMENT, LLC, Defendants.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

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D.L. EVANS BANK, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
HENRY W. DEAN, Defendant-Appellant,

and VALLEY CLUB HOMES, LLC and SUN VALLEY DEVELOPMENT, LLC, Defendants.

No. 50134-2022

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise

October 30, 2023

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Blaine County. Jonathan P. Brody, District Judge.

The decision of the district court is affirmed.

Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chtd., Boise, for Appellant. Bradley D. VandenDries argued.

Parsons, Loveland, Shirley & Lindstrom, LLP, Burley, for Respondent. Rhett M. Miller argued.

ZAHN, JUSTICE.

This appeal primarily concerns when the statute of limitations begins to run on a claim for action on a judgment. Respondent, D.L. Evans Bank, obtained a default judgment against Appellant, Henry W. Dean, in 2010. Pursuant to Idaho Code section 10-1111(1), D.L. Evans obtained orders renewing the 2010 Judgment in 2015 and 2019. In 2020, D.L. Evans filed this lawsuit, alleging a single claim for action on the 2010 Judgment and seeking a new judgment for the amount that Dean owed on the 2010 Judgment plus accrued interest, attorney fees, and costs.

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The district court concluded that D.L. Evans properly renewed the 2010 Judgment in 2015 and 2019, and that each renewal restarted the applicable six-year statute of limitations on D.L. Evans' claim for an action on a judgment. Dean argues that the district court erred because the limitation period on D.L. Evans' claim began to run when the judgment was first issued in 2010. Dean also argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and denying his Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) motion to set aside the 2010 Judgment as void. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the district court.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2009, D.L. Evans filed a complaint against Dean (and others who have not appeared in this appeal) to collect on a promissory note secured by a deed of trust. Dean was the guarantor on the promissory note pursuant to a continuing commercial guaranty. After unsuccessful attempts to personally serve Dean with a copy of the complaint and summons, D.L. Evans mailed copies of the documents to Dean via certified mail. D.L. Evans also served Dean via publication. Less than two months later, Dean sent a letter dated December 9, 2009, to D.L. Evans' attorney acknowledging the complaint and asking D.L. Evans to dismiss the lawsuit. However, Dean never appeared in the action, and, on January 12, 2010, D.L. Evans obtained the 2010 Judgment against Dean for $1,063,503.16. On January 9, 2015, after filing a motion to renew the 2010 Judgment, D.L. Evans obtained an order from the district court renewing it. On October 22, 2019, after filing another motion to renew the 2010 Judgment, D.L. Evans obtained a second order renewing the judgment.

On February 21, 2020, D.L. Evans filed a complaint ("2020 Complaint") against Dean (and others who have not appeared in this appeal) alleging a single claim for action on the 2010 Judgment. Dean's former counsel filed a document entitled, "Notice of Appearance on Behalf of Defendant Henry W. Dean,"' which stated that "[t]his appearance is without waiver of any defenses, including, but not limited to, insufficient service of process and lack of personal jurisdiction." Dean later retained his current counsel, who moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the district court did not have personal jurisdiction over him. Dean later filed a second motion to dismiss, asserting that the claim was time-barred.

The district court denied both motions. The district court denied the first motion after concluding that Dean had voluntarily submitted to the court's personal jurisdiction by filing a general notice of appearance. The district court denied the second motion on the basis that the

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parties had failed to adequately brief the issue of whether the 2020 Complaint was timely filed and advised the parties that they could brief the issue in a motion for summary judgment.

Both parties later filed motions for summary judgment. Dean argued that the 2020 Complaint should be dismissed because it was time-barred. D.L. Evans argued that it was entitled to partial summary judgment because the 2010 Judgment had been properly renewed in 2015 and 2019, and each renewal restarted the six-year statute of limitations for an action on the 2010 Judgment. As a result, the bank was entitled to summary judgment because there were no genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment. The district court denied Dean's motion and granted D.L. Evans' motion. The district court concluded that the 2020 Complaint was timely filed because D.L. Evans had properly renewed the 2010 Judgment in 2015 and 2019 and each renewal restarted the statute of limitations for an action on the 2010 Judgment.

D.L. Evans next moved the district court for summary judgment on the amount it was owed. D.L. Evans sought an award of $1,780,479.56-the principal amount of the 2010 Judgment plus accrued interest. In his memorandum in opposition to the motion, Dean argued that the 2010 Judgment was void and requested that the district court set it aside under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4). Specifically, Dean argued that D.L. Evans failed to properly serve him with the summons and complaint in 2009 and failed to mail other court filings to Dean's last known address. The district court denied Dean's motion, concluding that Dean could not collaterally attack the 2010 Judgment because Dean had failed to demonstrate that it was void on its face. The district court also concluded that, even if Dean were able to collaterally attack the 2010 Judgment, his attempt to do so was untimely. The district court entered a final judgment in favor of D.L. Evans, which Dean timely appealed.

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Whether the district court erred in denying Dean's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

2. Whether the district court erred in granting D.L. Evans' motion for partial summary judgment because D.L. Evans' claim for an action on its judgment was time-barred.

3. Whether the district court erred in denying Dean's Rule 60(b)(4) motion to set aside the 2010 Judgment as void.

4. Whether either party is entitled to attorney fees on appeal.

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III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

When reviewing a district court's order granting or denying a motion to dismiss, the standard of review for this Court depends on which subsection of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) is at issue. Compare Fulfer v. Sorrento Lactalis, Inc., 171 Idaho 296, 300, 520 P.3d 708, 712 (2022) (de novo review of a dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)), with Herrera v. Estay, 146 Idaho 674, 678-79, 201 P.3d 647, 651-52 (2009) (bifurcated review of a dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5)). We freely review a district court's decision that it possessed personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, which may be challenged pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). See Dep't of Fin., Sec. Bureau v. Zarinegar, 167 Idaho 611, 621, 474 P.3d 683, 693 (2020).

"When reviewing an order for summary judgment, the standard of review for this Court is the same standard used by the district court in ruling on the motion." Neeser v. Inland Empire Paper Co., 170 Idaho 692, 696, 516 P.3d 562, 566 (2022) (quoting Mendenhall v. Aldous, 146 Idaho 434, 436, 196 P.3d 352, 354 (2008)). "The court must grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(a). "The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests at all times with the party moving for summary judgment." Neeser, 170 Idaho at 696, 516 P.3d at 566 (quoting Van v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., 147 Idaho 552, 556, 212 P.3d 982, 986 (2009)). "If there is no genuine issue of material fact, only a question of law remains, over which this Court exercises free review." Demoney-Hendrickson v. Larsen, 171 Idaho 917, 921, 527 P.3d 520, 524 (2023) (citation omitted).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. The district court had personal jurisdiction over Dean.

Dean argues that the district court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Dean asserts that the 2020 Complaint failed to allege a basis for the district court's personal jurisdiction over him. Dean also disputes the district court's conclusion that he voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the district court because the notice of appearance specifically stated that it did not waive any defenses, including lack of personal jurisdiction.

D.L. Evans counters that the district court had personal jurisdiction over Dean under Idaho Code section 5-514(a) because the 2010 Judgment arose from a business relationship that Dean had in Idaho. Additionally, D.L. Evans asserts that Dean waived his objection to personal

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jurisdiction when he consented to jurisdiction in a continuing commercial guaranty and when his attorney filed a notice of appearance in the matter.

The district court denied Dean's motion. It first concluded that the 2020 Complaint alleged sufficient facts to establish personal jurisdiction under Idaho Code section 5-514(a) and (c) because the 2010 Judgment was "predicated on the transaction of business by the parties and on the ownership, use and possession of real property." The district court then determined that Dean voluntarily submitted to the court's personal jurisdiction when his counsel filed a general notice of appearance in the action.

We agree that Dean's notice of appearance constituted a voluntary appearance waiving any right to contest personal jurisdiction and affirm the district court's decision on that basis. Our analysis of this issue begins with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure...