Bankers Trust Co v. Blodgett

• Decision Date: 22 January 1923
• Docket Number: No. 169,169
• Citation: 67 L.Ed. 439,260 U.S. 647,43 S.Ct. 233
• Parties: BANKERS' TRUST CO. et al. v. BLODGETT, State Tax Com'r
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

260 U.S. 647

43 S.Ct. 233

67 L.Ed. 439

BANKERS' TRUST CO. et al.

v BLODGETT, State Tax Com'r.

No. 169.

Argued Jan. 3, 1923.

Decided Jan. 22, 1923.

Messrs. W. H. Comley and Daniel Davenport, both of Bridgeport, Conn., for plaintiffs in error.

Mr. Justice McKENNA delivered the opinion of the Court.

By section 1190 of a statute of the state of Connecticut passed in 1915 it is provided that:

'All taxable property of any estate upon which no town or city tax has been assessed * * * or upon which no tax has been paid to the state during the year preceding the date of the death of the decedent, shall be liable to a tax of two per centum per annum on the appraised inventory value of such property for the five years next preceding the date of the death of such decedent, provided, the executor or administrator of any estate may, by furnishing evidence to the satisfaction of the tax commissioner that a state, town or city tax has been paid on any of such property for a portion of said five years or that the ownership of such property has not been in the decedent for a portion of said period, obtain a proportionate deduction from the tax hereby imposed. * * *'

It is further provided (section 1192) that:

'Any executor, administrator or representative of such an estate aggrieved by the action of the tax commissioner in determining such tax, if unable to agree with the tax commissioner upon the amount of such tax as provided in section 1190, may, within ninety days from the time of the filing by the tax commissioner of such statement or corrected statement with the judge of probate, make application in the nature of an appeal therefrom to the superior court of the county in which such probate court is located which shall be accompanied by a citation to said tax commissioner to appear before such court.'

Lena McMullen died in 1919, and the information required by an act passed in that year, amendatory of an act concerning inventories of estates,¹ having been filed by plaintiffs in error as her executors, and sent, as required by the probate judge to the tax commissioner, that officer filed with the state treasurer a statement that there was due from the estate of the decedent to the state of Connecticut by virtue of its statutes, $10,286.39, and made claim for such sum.

Plaintiffs in error, within the time provided in section 1192, made, to quote from the language of the section, 'application in the nature of an appeal' from the claim to the superior court of the county in which the probate court was located, in accordance with section 1192.

The tax commissioner, acting for the state, demurred 'to the reasons of application and appeal,' and the superior court, by consent of the parties, reserved the questions of law arising upon the demurrer 'for the advice of the Supreme Court of Errors * * * as to what judgment should be entered' on the demurrer. In fulfillment of the 'reservation' the Supreme Court of Errors took the case, adjudged the statute to be valid, and advised the superior court 'to sustain the demurrer and to dismiss the application.'

The superior court, in execution of that direction, sustained the demurrer and entered judgment dismissing the 'application in the nature of an appeal.' To review that judgment is the purpose of this writ of error. Manifestly, however, it is the views and reasoning of the Supreme Court of Errors that must engage our attention, as they constituted the foundation of the judgment of the superior court.

In description of the statute the Court of Errors said its purpose is 'to compel estates to pay to the state a sum which shall approximately equal the taxes which the property of the estate has escaped paying while in the hands of the decedent,' and 'the single point raised by the demurrer,' the court further said, 'is that the statutes which authorize this action of the commissioner are unconstitutional.'

The specifications of the ground of offense urged by plaintiffs in error against the Fourteenth Amendment (and with this we are only concerned) were said by the court to be that the statute deprived——

'creditors and distributees of this estate of their property without due process of law (a) by exacting a penalty from them for the failure of the decedent to list his property for taxation; and (b) by creating against them a presumption of guilt for such omission.'

The comment of the court upon the specifications was that both——

'rest on the unfounded premise that the property of this estate upon the decease of the owner passed to the distributees subject to the payment of the just debts of the estate.'

And the court further said:

'The right to dispose of one's property by will and the right to have it disposed of by law after decease is created by statute and therefore the state may impose such conditions upon the exercise of this right as it may determine. Stone et al. Appeal, 74 Conn. 301, 302, 50 Atl. 734; Hatheway v. Smith, 79 Conn. 506, 65 Atl. 1058, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 310, 9 Ann. Cas. 99.'

See also Plumber v. Coler, 178 U. S....