Banks v. Sch. Directors of Dist. No. 1 of McLean Cnty.
Decision Date | 18 December 1901 |
Citation | 194 Ill. 247,62 N.E. 604 |
Parties | BANKS et al. v. SCHOOL DIRECTORS OF DIST. NO. 1 OF McLEAN COUNTY. |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from McLean county court; R. A. Russell, Judge.
Petition by the school directors of district No. 1 of McLean county against Marks Banks and another for the condemnation of certain land for a school-house site. From a judgment in favor of petitioners, defendants appeal. Reversed.
Rowell, Neville & Lindley, for appellants.
Chas. M. Peirce, for appellees.
Appellees filed their petition in the county court of McLean county, alleging that a certain tract of land, 12.7 rods square, had been chosen as a school-house site, and that they had been unable to agree with the appellant Marks Banks, the owner, or the other appellant, Millard Banks, a tenant by sufferance of the premises, upon the compensation to be paid for the same, and asking the court to ascertain such compensation, and vest title in them, under the eminent domain laws of the state, upon payment of such compensation. Appellants were made defendants, and demurred to the petition. Their demurrer was overruled, and they filed an answer alleging, among other things, that the tract sought to be condemned was in the center of an inclosed pasture, and that there were no public roads near the site, or right of way to the same. The answer was stricken from the files. Defendants then filed a cross petition alleging the same facts, and that they refused to grant any right of way to the site, and claiming damages to the whole tract by reason of the location of the school house in the center, not including any damages for right of way to the school house. There was a trial before a jury, and they returned a verdict finding the value of the land taken to be $75, and the damage to the remaining land $100, to be paid to the defendant Marks Banks, the owner, and damages for the leasehold interest of Millard Banks 50 cents. The court entered the judgment provided for by the statute,-that, upon payment of the compensation so ascertained, the petitioners should have the right to enter upon the tract, and the use of the same as a school-house site.
The school district is composed of four sections of land. The defendant Marks Banks owns a farm of 374 acres, and his son, Millard Banks, the other defendant, is tenant at sufferance of the land. The tract which the petition asked to condemn is near the center of an inclosed pasture, and there is no highway to the proposed site. The district has no right of way to that place, nor any right to apss over the defendants' land to reach it. The petition did not ask for a right of way, or specify any way or proposed way to the site, but simply asked for a condemnation of the tract. The defendants insisted at the trial that their land could not be taken in the manner proposed. In their cross petition they expressly excluded any damages for a right of way to the tract, and none were assessed. The judgment authorized the petitioners to enter upon the use of the tract of land described in the petition upon paying the compensation assessed, although they had no right of way to it, and acquired none in the proceeding. Counsel say that they could condemn the tract in the center of defendants' lands under the statute, and, having acquired the land, they would then have a way by necessity to it from the public highway; that, having obtained good title to the site, the law would give them a right of way, which defendants could locate in the first instance, and upon their failure to do so the school directors could make such a location. The rules under which a way by necessity arises and is presumed to have been granted cannot be applied to this case, and no such way would be acquired by condemning the tract. When anything is granted, all the means to attain it are granted with it, and pass inclusive with the grant of the thing itself. So, if one grants a piece of land in the midst of his own, he thereby impliedly grants a way to reach it, and the grantee may cross the grantor's land for that purpose without trespass. Shep. Touch. 96. In such a case the way itself is...
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United States v. AN EASEMENT AND RIGHT OF WAY, ETC.
...case. Unless the specific right of ingress and egress is condemned, the Government does not obtain any such right. Banks v. School Directors, 1901, 194 Ill. 247, 62 N.E. 604. See also Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 1922, 260 U.S. 393, 43 S.Ct. 158, 67 L.Ed. 8. Torts Committed by Plaintiff.......
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...supra; Trustees of Schools v. Griffith, 263 Ill. 550, 105 N.E. 760, Ann.Cas.1914D, 1136; Schuler v. Wilson, supra; Banks v. School Directors, 194 Ill. 247, 62 N.E. 604. The cases called to our attention involving conveyances to school directors do not modify this rule. O'Donnell v. Robson, ......
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City of Bismarck v. Casey
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