Banks v. Soc'y of St. Vincent De Paul

• Decision Date: 28 October 2015
• Docket Number: Case No. C15–0304JLR.
• Citation: 143 F.Supp.3d 1097
• Parties: Johnny D. BANKS, Plaintiff, v. SOCIETY OF ST. VINCENT DE PAUL, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington

143 F.Supp.3d 1097

Johnny D. BANKS, Plaintiff,
v.
SOCIETY OF ST. VINCENT DE PAUL, et al., Defendants.

Case No. C15–0304JLR.

United States District Court, W.D. Washington, at Seattle.

Signed Oct. 28, 2015.

143 F.Supp.3d 1098

Johnny D. Banks, Seattle, WA, pro se.

Laura E. Kruse, Steven Goldstein, Betts Patterson & Mines, Seattle, WA, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

JAMES L. ROBART, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the court on Defendants Society of St. Vincent DePaul Seattle/King County ("St. Vincent"), Steve Knipp, and Lori Bedwell's¹ (collectively, "Defendants") motion seeking summary judgment on all of Plaintiff Johnny Banks' claims. (See Mot. (Dkt. # 12); see also Reply (Dkt. # 17).) Mr. Banks opposes that motion. (See Resp. (Dkt. # 16).) Having considered the submissions of the parties, the balance of the record, and the relevant law,² the court GRANTS Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

II. BACKGROUND

This lawsuit arises out of Mr. Banks' employment with St. Vincent. (See generally Compl.) St. Vincent hired Mr. Banks to a temporary position on December 7, 2012, and transferred him to a full-time position as a trucking assistant on March 25, 2013. (See Knipp Decl. (Dkt. # 13) ¶ 2.) He worked for St. Vincent until March 21, 2014, when he was terminated for refusal to perform his job duties. (See id. ¶ 9, Ex. 7 ("Term. Not.") at 1.) He alleges St. Vincent's workplace environment and his termination violated federal labor law and state tort law. (See Compl. ¶¶ 36–54.) He also sues Steve Knipp, St. Vincent's director of human resources, and Lori Bedwell, a manager at St. Vincent, for their

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roles in his employment and termination. (See id. ¶¶ 4–5.)

On several occasions during his employment, Mr. Banks received notice of deficient performance. First, Mr. Banks received a disciplinary notice on August 2, 2013, which cited him for giving false information to management regarding unauthorized stops on his truck routes in June, July, and August 2013. (See Knipp Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. 1 ("8/2/13 Disc. Not.") at 1.) The notice informed Mr. Banks that this behavior violated Section 6.1 of the employee handbook, which deals with personal conduct. (See id. ) Next, Mr. Banks received an evaluation in November 2013, which indicated that his job performance fell between "needs improvement" and "satisfactory." (See Knipp Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. 2 ("Perf. Eval.") at 4.) Mr. Banks also received only a "modest" raise of $0.20 per hour. (Knipp Decl. ¶ 4; see also Perf. Eval. at 4.) However, because Mr. Banks "had missed a lot of work due to injuries" during the period covered in the November 2013 evaluation, St. Vincent informed him it would do another review and consider a further pay raise in March 2014. (See Perf. Eval. at 4.)

On December 9, 2013, Mr. Banks injured his back at work, for which St. Vincent offered and Mr. Banks accepted leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., (See Knipp Decl. ¶ 5.) Mr. Banks' FMLA leave extended until March 6, 2014 (See id. ¶ 5, Ex. 3 ("FMLA Letter") at 1, 3), at which point he accepted a light duty custodial position with St. Vincent (See id. ¶ 6, Ex. 4 ("Job Descr.") at 1). One of the associated duties was "campus-wide custodial service as scheduled. This include[d], but [sic] not limited to, ... cleaning floors in main areas and restrooms." (Job Descr. at 1.) Mr. Banks performed that job but "refused to clean site restrooms with chemicals," which St. Vincent accommodated by "purchasing organic cleaning chemicals." (Knipp Decl. ¶ 8a³ , Ex. 6 ("3/20/14 Emails") at 2.)

On approximately March 19, 2014, Mr. Banks brought a note from his doctor indicating that he "was to avoid contact with cleaning agents," including the organic ones that St. Vincent had purchased. (Knipp Decl. ¶ 7.) Ms. Bedwell and Ben Johnston, Mr. Banks' supervisor, met with Mr. Banks on March 20, 2014, regarding the doctor's note. (See id. ¶ 7, Ex. 5 ("Meeting Summs.") at 1.) Although Mr. Johnston offered to accommodate Mr. Banks' sensitivity by allowing him to clean the bathroom using only warm water, Mr. Banks initially refused to clean the bathroom, insisting instead that he would only stock the bathroom with paper products. (See Meeting Summs. at 1, 3.) Mr. Johnston and Mr. Banks also clashed over whether Mr. Banks would wear his uniform and what parts of the facility Mr. Banks was to access during work. (See id. ) At the conclusion of the meeting, Mr. Banks pointed at Ms. Bedwell and accused her of being a racist, "pulled the door open very hard," and proceeded to create a scene in the hallways. (Id. ) Throughout the meeting and its aftermath, he repeatedly accused Ms. Bedwell and Mr. Johnston of being racially biased. (See id. ) After confirming that Mr. Banks would not do his job that day, Mr. Johnston sent Mr. Banks home for the day with pay. (Id. )

On the afternoon of March 20, 2014, following the meeting with Mr. Banks, Mr. Johnston emailed Mr. Banks. (See Knipp Decl. ¶ 8a; 3/20/14 Emails at 1–2.) Mr. Johnston's email confirmed that Mr. Banks' job was still available but only if he

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performed all of the tasks listed in the job description. (See id. ) The letter warned Mr. Banks that "if you show up and fail to complete all your assigned tasks, it will lead to your immediate termination." (Id. ) Mr. Banks responded on the evening of March 20, 2014, confirming his intent to continue his employment with St. Vincent. (See id. at 1.) The next day, Mr. Banks reported to work and cleaned the restroom using only water, but he refused to do so going forward. (See 7/17/15 Goldstein Decl. (Dkt. # 14) ¶ 3, Ex. 1 ("Banks Dep.") at 93:11–13; Term. Not. at 1.) Mr. Banks also reported to Mr. Johnston and other employees potential violations of the Occupational Safety and Health Act ("OSHA"), 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq., based on the conditions of his employment. (See Banks Dep. at 42:2–22, 64:1–25; Johnston Decl. (Dkt. # 15) ¶ 8; Knipp Decl ¶ 8b.) Mr. Banks based this assertion on his conversation with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and/or Washington's Environmental Health and Safety Board, which confirmed that cleaning restrooms with only warm water is unsanitary. (See Banks Dep. at 91:1–93:13.) He relayed this concern to Mr. Johnston and Mr. Knipp on March 21, 2014, although Mr. Knipp and Mr. Johnston refute that Mr. Banks' message indicated cleaning a bathroom with warm water was an OSHA violation. (See id. at 93:5–13; Knipp Decl. ¶ 10; Johnston Decl. ¶ 10.)

When Mr. Banks refused to do his job going forward, Mr. Knipp, acting on behalf of St. Vincent, terminated Mr. Banks for violating Section 6.1 of the employee handbook. (See Knipp Decl ¶ 9; Term Not. at 3; 8/2/13 Disc. Not. at 1.) Section 6.1 provides that "employees are expected to conduct themselves professionally and behave in a manner that is conducive to the efficient operation of" St. Vincent. (Term. Not. at 3.) Section 6.1 lists as specific examples of inappropriate behavior "[s]houting, raising voice at a coworker or customer in public and/or in private," and "[i]nsubordination (e.g., refusing to follow management's instructions concerning a job-related matter) or encouraging others to engage in insubordination." (Id. )

Mr. Banks filed this lawsuit as a pro se plaintiff against St. Vincent, Mr. Knipp, and Ms. Bedwell. (See Compl. at 1.) He divides his claims into five counts: Count I alleges violations of OSHA and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (see id. ¶¶ 36–43a);⁴ Count II alleges "vicarious liability" (id. ¶¶ 43b44); Count III alleges infliction of emotional distress (See id. ¶¶ 45–46); Count IV alleges negligence/gross negligence (See id. ¶¶ 47–51); and Count v. alleges outrage (See id. ¶¶ 52–54). Defendants seek summary judgment on all five counts. (See generally Mot.)

III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, demonstrates "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a) ; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ; Galen v. Cty. of L.A., 477 F.3d 652, 658 (9th Cir.2007). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he or she is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

If the moving party meets his or her burden, then the non-moving party "must make a showing sufficient to establish a

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genuine dispute of material fact regarding the existence of the essential elements of his case that he must prove at trial" in order to withstand summary judgment. Galen, 477 F.3d at 658. The non-moving party may do this by use of affidavits (or declarations), including his or her own, depositions, answers to interrogatories or requests for admissions. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,...