Banks v. Spirit Aerosystems Inc.
| Decision Date | 14 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 120,335,120,335 |
| Citation | 457 P.3d 213 (Table) |
| Parties | Curtis S. BANKS, Appellant, v. SPIRIT AEROSYSTEMS INC. and Ins. Co. of State of Pennsylvania, Appellees. |
| Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Roger A. Riedmiller, of Riedmiller, Andersen & Scott, LLC, of Wichita, for appellant.
Kirby A. Vernon, of Law Office of Kirby A. Vernon, L.L.C., of Wichita, for appellees.
Before Powell, P.J., Pierron and Atcheson, JJ.
An administrative law judge and the Workers Compensation Board denied benefits to Curtis S. Banks because he could not establish that his work at Spirit Aerosystems Inc. was the prevailing factor in causing the physical problems he experienced in both shoulders. In this appeal, Banks asks us to find the term "prevailing factor" as defined and used in the Workers Compensation Act, K.S.A. 44-501 et seq., to be unconstitutionally vague and, thus, void. Since the Act entails economic or business regulation, the void-for-vagueness doctrine does not apply. The definition of "prevailing factor," although sometimes difficult to apply to particular facts and possibly ambiguous, does not run afoul of due process protections for being impermissibly vague. We, therefore, reject Banks' challenge and affirm the Board's denial of benefits.
Banks began working at Spirit in mid-2012 as a sheet metal mechanic, a skilled job that required him to move his arms in a repetitive pattern throughout the workday. Before starting at Spirit, Banks worked for a number of companies doing jobs involving the repetitive use of his arms and shoulders. Banks filed a workers compensation claim in January 2014 for a repetitive trauma injury to his right shoulder. He filed a like claim for his left shoulder in May 2016. The claims were consolidated for disposition through the administrative hearing process. An administrative law judge denied Banks benefits because the evidence did not show his work at Spirit was the prevailing factor in causing his shoulder problems. The Board affirmed that decision.
Banks raised his void for vagueness argument at the administrative level, and the Board acknowledged but declined to address the point as a constitutional issue outside its purview. For his sole issue on appeal, Banks presents the argument to us. As the issue has been framed, we see no disputed material facts and tackle a question of law affording us unlimited review. Estate of Belden v. Brown County , 46 Kan. App. 2d 247, 258-59, 261 P.3d 943 (2011) ().
Under the Act, an employee may receive benefits only if the claimed injury "arises out of" his or her employment. K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 44-508(f)(2). The Act, in turn, circumscribes when repetitive trauma can be considered arising from employment by imposing three necessary conditions for coverage:
So coverage pivots, in part, on the causal links between the employee's work conditions and the repetitive trauma and then between the repetitive trauma and the claimed injury. In each step, the causative element must be "the prevailing factor" in bringing about the required result. The Act ascribes a specific meaning to prevailing factor, making it a term of art. In K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 44-508(g), the Act defines a prevailing factor as "the primary factor, in relation to any other factor[,]" taking into account "all relevant evidence" in a given case.
Banks assails the statutory description of a prevailing factor as so vague that it should be judicially declared void and, thus, unenforceable. But Banks' argument rests on a misappropriation of the void-for-vagueness doctrine.
The doctrine sets forth a due process protection grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution against the government's impermissible deprivation of a person's liberty or property through a criminal punishment or an extreme civil penalty. Consistent with constitutional due process, the government may not impose a punishment or penalty based on a statute, regulation, or other enactment that fails to provide fair notice of the conduct triggering the deprivation. In other words, a governmental entity must fairly apprise persons of what actions will result in imprisonment (a loss of liberty) or a fine (loss of property, i.e., money), so those persons may conduct themselves in a manner well clear of the prohibited behavior. See United States v. Batchelder , 442 U.S. 114, 123, 99 S. Ct. 2198, 60 L. Ed. 2d 755 (1979) (); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville , 405 U.S. 156, 162, 165, 92 S. Ct. 839, 31 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1972) ; State v. Watson , 273 Kan. 426, 430, 44 P.3d 357 (2002) () (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford , 408 U.S. 104, 108, 92 S. Ct. 2294, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222 [1972] ). Likewise, a criminal statute must be sufficiently definite that government agents may apply it without engaging in broad guesswork or arbitrary enforcement. Smith v. Goguen , 415 U.S. 566, 572-73, 94 S. Ct. 1242, 39 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1974) (). The void-for-vagueness doctrine also may be applied to extreme civil penalties. See Sessions v. Dimaya , 584 U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1212-13, 200 L. Ed. 2d 549 (2018) (); Kansas State Board of Healing Arts v. Acker , 228 Kan. 145, 152, 612 P.2d 610 (1980) (); but see In re Comfort , 284 Kan. 183, 199, 159 P.3d 1011 (2007) ().
Courts may be particularly solicitous of vagueness challenges to criminal statutes that conceivably could, absent specific judicial construction, apply to constitutionally protected speech or conduct. Without a judicial narrowing of the statute, persons in that circumstance could be deterred from engaging in activity otherwise protected under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Grayned , 408 U.S. at 109 ; State v. Price , No. 119,411, 2019 WL 3367891, at *7 (Kan. App. 2019) (unpublished opinion).
But Banks' workers compensation case is, rather obviously,...
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