Banks v. St. Francis Health Ctr., Inc.
| Decision Date | 21 November 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 15-CV-2602-JAR |
| Parties | PAMELA BANKS, Plaintiff, v. ST. FRANCIS HEALTH CENTER, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
Plaintiff Pamela Banks brings this action against Defendant St. Francis Health Center, Inc. ("St. Francis") alleging a claim of race discrimination and harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 and § 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.2 The Court previously dismissed Plaintiff's claims of retaliation and interference with contractual relations.3
Before the Court are Defendant's two Motions to Dismiss (Doc. 120 and 130) and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 127). The Motions to Dismiss are identical, but the first Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 120), which is not briefed, is moot. The second Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 130) and the Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 127) are fully briefed, and the Court is prepared to rule. For the reasons explained in detail below, the Court denies Defendant's motion to dismiss, and grants Defendant's motion for summary judgment.
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's claims as a sanction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 and D. Kan. Rule 11.1(a)(2), for allegedly providing false testimony that caused Defendant considerable expense and delay and has interfered with the judicial process. Defendant alleges that Plaintiff falsely testified about three subjects: (1) her criminal history; (2) her litigation history; and (3) her applications for other positions with Conifer.
First, Defendant alleges that Plaintiff falsely testified about her criminal convictions for fraud and perjury. Certified copies of the records of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois show that Plaintiff was indicted, arrested, released on bond, found guilty of both benefits fraud and perjury, and sentenced to thirty months of probation and payment of restitution of $4,048.00. Defendant cites Plaintiff's interrogatory responses and deposition testimony where she denied any prior criminal arrests, charges, or convictions. When confronted with the dockets for the charges during deposition, Plaintiff claimed that the charges were dismissed. Plaintiff responds that she made an honest mistake about the disposition of the charges. She had merely received a document containing the information on the charges through certified mail. She was never arrested. She hired an attorney to handle the matter, and she believed that the charges were dismissed and off her record.
Second, Defendant alleges that Plaintiff falsely testified about her litigation history. Defendant claims that court records in Cook County, Illinois, and Shawnee County, Kansas revealed that Plaintiff was a defendant in more than twenty different lawsuits and that Plaintiff's Schedule F to her 2005 Bankruptcy Petition confirms she had several collection actions filed against her. But in her answers to interrogatories, Plaintiff denied ever having a lawsuit filedagainst her. And Defendant claims that when Plaintiff was deposed about specific suits, she denied knowledge of the suits or stated they were in error.
Plaintiff responds that the court records of the lawsuits, as well as the 2005 bankruptcy petition pertained to a different Pamela Banks, not her. And Plaintiff suggested this to Defendant during her deposition, noting that the social security number on the bankruptcy petition was not her social security number.4
Third, Defendant alleges that Plaintiff did not testify truthfully during her deposition about her desire to remain as a patient advocate with Defendant, nor her efforts to find a new position with Conifer Revenue Cycle Solutions, Inc. ("Conifer").5 Plaintiff denies testifying falsely, in that she did not want to be out of the patient advocate position she held with Defendant, and in that Conifer transferred her to a "less desirable" position in accounting in Boca Raton, Florida.
A district court has inherent equitable powers to impose the sanction of dismissal with prejudice for abusive litigation practices during discovery.6 Because dismissal is a harsh remedy, due process requires that the violation be predicated upon willfulness, bad faith, or fault of the petitioner rather than inability to comply.7 In many cases, a lesser sanction than dismissal will deter the errant party from further misconduct.8 In determining what sanction should beimposed, it is most important that the court consider the purposes to be served by imposing that sanction.9
Before choosing dismissal as a sanction, the Tenth Circuit suggests that district courts evaluate five factors: (1) the degree of actual prejudice to the defendant; (2) the amount of interference with the judicial process; (3) the culpability of the litigant; (4) whether the court warned the party in advance that dismissal of the action would be a likely sanction for non-compliance; and (5) the efficacy of lesser sanction.10
Considering all relevant factors, the Court finds that dismissal of Plaintiff's claims is not an appropriate sanction. First, there is very little actual prejudice to Defendant based on the alleged false testimony. Defendant argues that it has incurred substantial expenses in terms of time and money to verify Plaintiff's discovery responses, including obtaining certified copies of Plaintiff's criminal convictions and issuing a subpoena to Conifer to obtain Plaintiff's personnel file and documents regarding Plaintiff's interest in obtaining another position. But, as Plaintiff posits, Defendant was aware of Plaintiff's convictions before her deposition, and simply needed to obtain certified copies of the court records to determine the veracity of Plaintiff's statements about her convictions. Moreover, this is not the type of prejudice that affected Defendant's ability to litigate the matter, as this pertains to impeachment evidence, not evidence concerning the claims at issue.
Further, Defendant mistakenly attributed lawsuits and a 2005 bankruptcy filing to Plaintiff; she did not testify falsely in denying knowledge of or involvement in this litigation. Further, with respect to Plaintiff's 2012 bankruptcy filing and its listing on one collection action, Plaintiff did not falsely testify. She acknowledged the existence of the collections action but explained that it was filed against her husband. Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff did not fully and completely testify about this action, Defendant has not suffered the type of prejudice that affected Defendant's ability to litigate. Again, this is impeachment evidence.
Lastly, Plaintiff did not falsely deny that she had sought transfers or applied for other positions with Conifer. She admitted this in her deposition testimony. To be sure, Plaintiff did not identify each position that she applied for or sought transfers to, but there is no indication that she willfully omitted this detail from her testimony. And, Defendant suffered no prejudice, because Defendant knew, based on Plaintiff's deposition testimony, that Plaintiff had sought multiple other positions within Conifer, which was relevant to litigate the claims going forward. In short, given that Defendant had evidence contradicting much of the alleged false testimony prior to deposing Plaintiff and sought confirmation of the testimony after deposing Plaintiff, Defendant did not rely to its detriment and has suffered only minimal prejudice, if any.
Second, there has been no more than minimal interference with the judicial process. Plaintiff's deposition testimony prompted both Defendant and Plaintiff to subpoena documents from Conifer in October 2015 to confirm the exact positions for which Plaintiff had applied. While this resulted in an extension of the discovery period, neither party had control over Conifer's timely response to the subpoenas, as Conifer is not a party to this action. Furthermore, Defendant issued another subpoena to Conifer regarding La'Sherrez Clark in February 2016, months after the subpoena complained of here. Discovery could not close until Coniferproduced documents to both Plaintiff and Defendant, so there was no interference with the judicial process.
Third, although Defendant suffered minimal prejudice from Plaintiff's false testimony about her convictions, there is little indication that Plaintiff is culpable for the alleged false testimony. Plaintiff had a reasonable explanation for her testimony about the disposition of her perjury and fraud conviction. These twenty-three-year-old convictions resulted in a sentence of probation and restitution. Plaintiff was never taken into custody or handcuffed, and she was notified of the charges by certified mail. She insisted during her deposition that she believed the charges had been dismissed and had not resulted in a finding of guilty. It is likely that Plaintiff misunderstood the disposition of the charges, believing that the charges were dismissed or expunged.
And, with respect to Plaintiff's litigation history, there is no indication that she testified falsely at all. Plaintiff admitted to the only proven collections suit brought against her and explained that she understood that the action was actually instituted against her husband. Given that Plaintiff was questioned based on a bankruptcy schedule that was not hers, the Court is not convinced she is culpable for any alleged false testimony. Lastly, in her deposition testimony, Plaintiff admitted that she sought transfer and other positions within Conifer. While she was not completely forthcoming about all of the positions she applied for, she did admit to the basic underlying fact of seeking transfer and/or other positions. None of the alleged false testimony Defendant has pointed to appears to be intentionally deceptive.
Fourth, the Court was not apprised of the alleged false testimony until Defendant's motion to dismiss. T...
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