Banks v. U.S.

• Citation: 614 F.2d 95
• Decision Date: 30 January 1980
• Docket Number: No. 79-5099,79-5099
• Parties: Cynthia M. BANKS, Defendant-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 95

614 F.2d 95

Cynthia M. BANKS, Defendant-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee.

No. 79-5099.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued Oct. 10, 1979.

Decided Jan. 30, 1980.

Larry L. Saunders, Louisville, Ky. (Court-appointed), for defendant-appellant.

Albert Jones, U. S. Atty., Hancy Jones, III, Louisville, Ky., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before KEITH and MERRITT, Circuit Judges, and PECK, Senior Circuit Judge.

DAMON J. KEITH, Circuit Judge.

The question presented by this case is whether a federal district judge may delegate the task of conducting a probation revocation hearing to a United States Magistrate. We hold that the judge may not.

FACTS

The facts are simple and undisputed. Cynthia M. Banks pleaded guilty in October of 1977 to possession of stolen mail matter. The district court sentenced her to 30 days in jail and two years probation. As a special condition of probation, the defendant was to make restitution in the amount of $235.00.

In December of 1978, the Chief Probation Officer for the U. S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky petitioned the court to issue a probation violation warrant ordering Ms. Bank's appearance at a probation revocation hearing. In January of 1979, a preliminary hearing was held before a Magistrate. He found probable cause to believe that the defendant had violated the terms of her probation and directed that a final probation revocation hearing be held on February 1, 1979.

Over objection, the final hearing was held before the magistrate instead of the district judge. The defendant's probation officer testified that the defendant had not made restitution and had not filed required monthly reports for the months of October and November, 1978. In addition, he testified that the defendant had been arrested on an unrelated charge, but that she did not report this fact to him. The defendant then took the stand and testified that she had not made restitution because she was living on $135.00 per month welfare money and needed every penny to support herself and her child. The defendant also admitted that she had been derelict in reporting to her probation officer, but argued that she was afraid and had heard that she was on the probation officer's "bad list." In addition, the defendant claimed that her mother had been ill and that she (the defendant) had called the Probation Officer once, but that he was out. She pointed out that after her arrest she had complied with all requirements of probation reporting. The defendant also stated that she would make a good faith effort to repay the monies owed.

After hearing the arguments of counsel, the magistrate recommended that the defendant's probation be revoked and that she appear before a district judge on February 22, 1979 for sentencing or reinstatement on probation. The district court found that the magistrate had properly and fairly conducted the revocation hearing. It adopted the magistrate's recommendation that probation be revoked and ordered the defendant to serve 23 months in prison. ¹ The defendant has appealed.

I.

Probation revocation proceedings in the federal system consist of three steps. First, there is a preliminary hearing to determine if there is probable cause that a defendant is a probation violator. Second, there is a full administrative hearing on whether the defendant violated the terms of her probation. Third, assuming a violation, there is a final resentencing which cannot be for more time than originally given. See 18 U.S.C. § 3653; Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781-82, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973). No one disputes that a magistrate can conduct the preliminary hearing. ² And the government does not argue that a magistrate could re-sentence a defendant. ³ The question is whether a magistrate can conduct the actual revocation hearing and recommend a result to the district judge.

The judges of the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, acting pursuant to their local Rule 14, have adopted a policy statement which allows magistrates to conduct probation revocation hearings. The statutory basis for this action is the 1976 amendments to the Federal Magistrates Act. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) (1976) Amending 28 U.S.C. § 636 (1968), states that "a magistrate may be assigned such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the laws and Constitution of the United States." The question before us is whether this provision should be construed to allow Magistrates to hold final probation revocation hearings.

A.

Congress amended 28 U.S.C. § 636 in 1976. Specific authority was granted magistrates in three distinct areas. First, purely procedural pre-trial motions can be referred to a magistrate for adjudication. A federal district judge can overturn the magistrate's actions, but only if they are "clearly erroneous or contrary to law." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). Second, a magistrate may submit proposed findings of fact and recommendations on a variety of substantive motions. That is, motions for injunctive relief, ⁴ for judgment on the pleadings, for summary judgment, to quash an indictment or information, to suppress evidence in a criminal case, for class certification, and for an involuntary dismissal of the case. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Third, specific provision has been made for handling prisoner cases, both habeas corpus petitions and civil suits challenging conditions of confinement. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). When dealing with substantive motions or prisoner's cases, a magistrate may conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). ⁵ However, the magistrates' findings are subject to De novo review by the district judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).

The plain language of the statute's express provisions demonstrates that Congress was careful to limit referrals to a magistrate. Only certain carefully defined matters can be referred. The standard of district court review varies with the matter referred. Probation revocation hearings are not within these express provisions.

B.

In contrast, the separate section of the statute on which the government relies, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3), gives a district court open-ended authority to assign "additional duties" to a magistrate. The government argues that a probation revocation hearing fits nicely within the "additional duties" contemplated by the statutory scheme. Our review of the statute and the legislative history persuades us otherwise.

The statute clearly contemplates that a magistrate be allowed to help a district judge with a variety of pre-trial motions. However, absent consent, the magistrate cannot conduct a trial itself. Under our system of law, when there are factual controversies, there must be a trial. Only when a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law may a trial be aborted. See e. g. F.R.Civ.Pro. 12, 56. Congress was careful to recognize this distinction when it amended the Federal Magistrate's Act. The Act permits a magistrate to prepare proposed findings on a variety of "case dispositive" motions such as summary judgment. Except for prisoner's cases, the act does not permit the magistrate to perform fact-finding on the merits of a case. That is the exclusive function of a district judge. Indeed, the magistrate's role is to free the judge from pre-trial wrangling so that he can try cases. ⁶

The legislative history of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3)'s allowance of magistrates assuming "additional duties" is entirely consistent with this view. The legislative history speaks of "innovative experimentations" in the use of a magistrate, but does not suggest that probation revocation hearings were meant to be so included. On the contrary, the legislative history suggests that this provision was meant to apply only to procedural and administrative matters:

Under this subsection, the district courts would remain free to experiment in the assignment of other duties to magistrates which may not necessarily be included in the broad category of "pretrial matters." This subsection would permit, for example, a magistrate to review default judgments, order the exoneration of forfeiture of bonds in criminal cases, and accept returns of jury verdicts where the trial judge is unavailable. This subsection would also enable the court to delegate some of the more administrative functions to a magistrate, such as the appointment of attorneys in criminal cases and assistance in the preparation of plans to achieve prompt disposition of cases in the court.

If district judges are willing to experiment with the assignment to magistrates of other functions in aid of the business of the courts, there will be increased time available to judges for the careful and unhurried performance of their vital and traditional adjudicatory duties, and a consequent benefit to both efficiency and the quality of justice in the Federal Courts.

H.R. No. 94-1609 12, Reprinted in 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, pp. 6162, 6172.

In our view, a probation revocation hearing was not meant to be included as one of the duties which could be delegated to a magistrate. ⁷ The revocation hearing, while informal, necessarily requires fact-finding and credibility assessment. The issues adjudicated at the hearing are not procedural or administrative and do not turn on pure matters of law. With two exceptions, Congress has been careful to retain fact-finding functions in district judges. The two exceptions are evidentiary hearings in habeas corpus cases and hearings in prisoner suits challenging conditions of confinement. ⁸ 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). We will not lightly infer that Congress meant to include probation revocation hearings as well.

II.

Important policy considerations support our view of the statute. Probation revocation in the federal system is a discretionary open-ended process. See 18 U.S.C. § 3653. A district court has broad discretion whether to revoke probation and, if...