Banks v. Warner

• Decision Date: 26 July 1912
• Citation: 84 A. 325,85 Conn. 613
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: BANKS v. WARNER.

84 A. 325

85 Conn. 613

BANKS v. WARNER.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

July 26, 1912

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, New Haven County; Earnest C Simpson, Judge.

Action by Ralph Banks against Hubert E. Warner, Jr. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

The plaintiff in his bill of particulars claimed for 20 stone pier blocks furnished the defendant at an agreed price of $7 each to be used on an Essex job. The defendant by way of special defense and counterclaim alleged that the plaintiff agreed to furnish him 15 other pier blocks, to be used on a Brennan job, for the sum of $70; that the plaintiff failed to furnish these, and the defendant was obliged to get them elsewhere at a cost of $126.50; and claimed damages for the plaintiff's breach of this contract. The court found that on the first contract there was a balance of $50 due the plaintiff at the time the action was commenced, and that at the same time there was due the defendant from the plaintiff for breach of the contract set up in the counterclaim $51.50 and rendered judgment for the defendant for $1.50. The finding is that, when the plaintiff upon demand refused to furnish the 15 stone pier blocks for the Brennan job, the defendant purchased the stone blocks in the rough and had them cut by men employed by him for that purpose; the stone costing $33 and the cutting $93.50. The defendant, having testified that he purchased the stone from one Brazos and that he paid him therefor $33 and took a receipted bill for the same, was permitted to introduce against the plaintiff's objection the receipted bill from Brazos which corroborated the statement. No evidence was offered to contradict the defendant's testimony that he purchased and paid Brazos for the stone. The only grounds of appeal argued were that the court erred in ruling that the measure of damages for the breach of the contract by the plaintiff was what the defendant paid for the pier blocks and to the men for cutting the blocks; that it erred in admitting the receipt of Brazos, and also in refusing to correct the finding as requested by the plaintiff.

Richard H. Tyner, of New Haven, for appellant.

Carl A. Mears, of New Haven, for appellee.

THAYER, J. (after stating the facts as above).

It is apparent from the facts appearing in the statement of the case that the court did not adopt as the measure of damages the rule stated in the reasons of appeal. Had it done so, the defendant's damages would have been $126.50 instead of the amount which was allowed. The amount which was allowed was the difference between this sum, which was what the defendant paid for the pier blocks after the plaintiff's breach of contract, and the sum for which the plaintiff agreed to furnish them.

But the plaintiff's contention before us has been that the true measure of damages in such a case is the difference between the agreed price and the market price at the time and place of delivery under the contract, and that this is not the rule which the court adopted.

It is well established that, where there is an available market for the goods in question, the measure of damages, in the absence of special circumstances showing proximate damages of a greater amount, is the difference between the contract price and the market or current price of the goods at the time or times when, and at the place where, they ought to have been delivered; but where there is no available market for the goods, or where there is an available market and special circumstances are present showing proximate damages of a greater amount than the difference between the market price and the contract price, a different measure of damages has to be adopted. The measure of damages in any case is the loss naturally and directly resulting, in the ordinary course of events, to the vendee from the seller's breach of contract. Sales Act (Pub. Acts 1907, p. 783) § 67. This has always been the rule in this state. Jordan, Marsh & Co. v. Patterson, 67 Conn. 473, 475 35 A. 521; Marshall v. Clark, 78...