O'Bannon v. Northern Petrochemical Co.
| Decision Date | 30 March 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 81-2983,81-2983 |
| Citation | 447 N.E.2d 985,69 Ill.Dec. 550,113 Ill.App.3d 734 |
| Parties | , 69 Ill.Dec. 550 Samuel O'BANNON and Patsy O'Bannon, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. NORTHERN PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY, a Corporation; Stonehouse Electric, Inc., a Corporation; Charles O'Brien and Son Construction Co., Inc., a Corporation and Safety Scaffold Company, a subsidiary of Safeway Steel Products, Inc., a Corporation, Defendants-Appellees, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, a corporation, Petitioner to Intervene-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Rooks, Pitts, Fullagar & Poust, Chicago, for plaintiffs-appellees; Terrance E. Kiwala and James J. Stamos, Chicago, of counsel.
Clausen, Miller, Gorman, Caffrey & Witous, Chicago, for Morrison Const. Co.; William E. Hourigan, Wheaton, James T. Ferrini and Thomas J. Burke, Chicago, of counsel.
Jerome H. Torshen, Ltd. and Garretson & Santora, Chicago, for Northern Petrochemical Co.; Jerome H. Torshen, Abigail K. Spreyer, Chicago, of counsel.
This appeal arises out of the settlement of an action based upon alleged violations of the Structural Work Act. Subsequent to the settlement and dismissal of the action, Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company an insurer for two of the defendants, petitioned to intervene and to vacate a portion of the settlement order. The trial court denied both motions and Hartford appeals.
On October 4, 1977, plaintiff Samuel O'Bannon, an employee of Morrison Construction Company, brought this suit seeking $1,400,000 in damages for injuries sustained by plaintiff on December 6, 1976, when he fell from a scaffold while working at a construction site owned by defendant Northern Petrochemical Company. Northern, acting as its own general contractor, had issued contracts to six prime contractors to perform certain aspects of the work. Among those prime contractors were plaintiff's employer Morrison and defendant Charles O'Brien & Son Construction Co., Inc. Plaintiff alleged in an amended complaint that O'Brien had erected the scaffold and that violations of the Act by Northern and O'Brien had caused his injuries. Morrison, having paid Workmen's Compensation to plaintiff, intervened in order to protect its lien.
The contract between O'Brien and Northern required O'Brien to provide insurance coverage for any liability Northern might have for injuries arising out of work performed by O'Brien for Northern. O'Brien purchased such a policy from Hartford. Morrison, pursuant to similar contractual obligations to Northern, purchased an insurance policy from Continental Insurance Company to cover Northern's liability for injuries arising out of work performed by Morrison for Northern. Each of these policies had a limit of liability of $1,000,000.
Continental retained the law firm of Garretson & Santora to defend Northern in this suit. In a letter dated July 29, 1980, Northern tendered the defense of this suit to O'Brien under the insurance coverage O'Brien had purchased from Hartford. Northern received no response. Shortly after that, Garretson & Santora wrote demanding O'Brien's cooperation in the defense of this suit. This letter informed O'Brien of a pretrial hearing set for September 9, 1980, and demanded that a representative of either O'Brien or Hartford be present. The letter noted that plaintiff was suing Northern for an amount in excess of the Continental policy limits. Again no response was received.
On September 12, 1980, Northern filed a complaint against Hartford and O'Brien seeking a declaratory judgment that Hartford had a duty to defend and to indemnify Northern. It was Hartford's position that plaintiff's injuries were not covered by the Hartford policy because they had not arisen out of any work performed by O'Brien. Nevertheless, in response to Northern's tender of defense, Hartford agreed, in a letter dated October 27, 1980, while the declaratory judgment action was still pending, to participate in Northern's defense but only under a full and complete reservation of rights. Specifically, Hartford stated that it would share defense costs paid to Garretson and Santora if it were determined that Hartford's policy was primary over that of Continental. Hartford asserted further that if Northern wished to retain its own counsel Hartford would reimburse Northern for reasonable attorney's fees in the event Hartford's policy was found to be primary.
By order of February 2, 1981, the trial court ruled in the declaratory judgment action that Hartford did have a contractual duty to defend Northern subject to Hartford's reservation of rights. The indemnification issue was found to be premature.
While the declaratory judgment action was pending, Northern's counsel kept Hartford advised of pretrials and continually requested Hartford's participation. Hartford's attorneys did attend three pretrials but made no settlement offer.
By letter dated May 27, 1981, Hartford was advised that Continental was entering into active negotiations with plaintiff's attorney. Although Hartford's participation was requested, it took no part in the negotiations. In Hartford's absence a settlement agreement was reached between the parties whereby plaintiff received $975,000, $935,000 from Continental on Northern's behalf and the balance from O'Brien. Morrison agreed to reduce its workmen's compensation lien claim from $130,000 to $70,000 in exchange for Northern's waiver of any indemnity claims it might have against Morrison. Pursuant to this agreement, the trial court, on June 23, 1981, entered an order which provided that "the above titled cause, including any and all counter-claims, third party claims and Workmen's Compensation claims, be and the same hereby are dismissed with prejudice and without costs."
On July 21, 1981, Hartford filed its petition to intervene, alleging that it had interests in the suit which were not adequately represented and that it might be bound by the order of dismissal. Hartford had been advised the declaratory judgment action would be reinstated against it unless Hartford voluntarily reimbursed Continental for one half of the $935,000 Continental had paid plaintiff on Northern's behalf. Although Hartford still denied that Northern was covered for plaintiff's injuries under its policy with Hartford, Hartford asserted that in the event the declaratory judgment action was reinstated, Hartford, as subrogee of Northern would want to file for indemnity against Morrison. Hartford expressed concern that the language in the court's order purporting to dismiss all counterclaims and third-party claims might be misconstrued to preclude Hartford from seeking such indemnity. Noting that Continental insured both Northern and Morrison, Hartford charged that the parties had included this language in the order for the specific purpose of preventing Hartford from exercising its subrogation rights against Morrison.
On the same date Hartford also filed a motion to vacate that part of the June 23 order purporting to dismiss "all counterclaims [and] third party claims * * *." After a hearing the trial court denied both petitions.
On appeal, Hartford contends that it should have been allowed to intervene pursuant to the Civil Practice Act. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 110, par. 26.1(1)(b).)
Timeliness of a petition to intervene is a matter for the discretion of the trial court. (Avery v. Moseley (1974), 19 Ill.App.3d 1001, 313 N.E.2d 274.) Hartford's petition was filed after the case was settled and dismissed. Although intervention is usually allowed only before judgment, it may be granted after judgment when necessary to protect the rights of the...
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