Banta v. Serban, 7

• Decision Date: 03 June 1963
• Docket Number: No. 7,7
• Citation: 370 Mich. 367,121 N.W.2d 854
• Parties: Harry BANTA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Steve SERBAN, Defendant and Appellee.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 854

121 N.W.2d 854

370 Mich. 367

Harry BANTA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Steve SERBAN, Defendant and Appellee.

No. 7.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

June 3, 1963.

John T. Vojdik, Richard C. Fruit, Flint, of counsel, for plaintiff and appellant. lant.

Ransom & Fazenbaker, Robert B. Norgren, Flint, of counsel, for defendant and appellee.

Before the Entire Bench.

SOURIS, Justice (for affirmance).

Plaintiff's declaration alleged a cause of action for negligent injury. Following a pre-trial conference, the case was placed on the term docket for trial and, in due course, it was called for trial in March of 1961. Neither plaintiff nor his counsel being in court when the case was called for trial, the trial judge dismissed it. Plaintiff's subsequent motion for reinstatement, supported by his counsel's affidavit, was denied after hearing.

We have recognized the inherent power of a court to control the movement of cases on its docket by a variety of sanctions including dismissal, discontinuance or involuntary nonsuit even when requests for continuances are timely made and, lacking persuasive merit, are denied. Stevens v. N. Z. Graves Corp., 210 Mich. 585, 177 N.W. 964; Goldstein v. Goldstein, 259 Mich. 300, 243 N.W. 12; Reed v. Burton Abstract & Title Company, 344 Mich. 375, 73 N.W.2d 828; and Andrews v. Roberts, 366 Mich. 620, 115 N.W.2d 322. It necessarily follows that a trial court has power to dismiss an action upon the unexcused absence of plaintiff and his counsel when the case is called for trial.

At the subsequent hearing on plaintiff's motion for reinstatement, the trial judge commented that when it was discovered that plaintiff and his counsel were not present when the case was called for trial, he called counsel's office and was advised by a secretary that she was uncertain where counsel was, but believed he was then in Lansing. ¹ Under the circumstances disclosed by this record, plaintiff's counsel having had ample notice of the impending trial and having failed to move for continuance, the trial court did not err in dismissing the action.

Nor do we believe the record made on plaintiff's motion for reinstatement would justify our reversal of the trial judge's refusal to set aside the dismissal and reinstate the cause. The motion, prepared as an affidavit by counsel, refers to prior failures to comply with the pre-trial order (including plaintiff's failure to answer affirmative defenses pleaded by defendant) settlement efforts between counsel, and difficulties encountered in communication between nonresident plaintiff and his counsel. However, nothing contained in the affidavit explains plaintiff's or counsel's absence from court on the trial date, for which absence the case was dismissed, nor was there an offer of proof at the hearing on the motion for reinstatement to excuse or explain their absences.

Very few cases have been presented to this Court for review of dismissals for failure of plaintiff's to respond to trial calls, and perhaps the infrequency of such appeals would justify our conclusion that such dismissals rarely occur. That they should rarely occur is obvious, but it is equally obvious to us that trial judges must be empowered to invoke such drastic sanction if...