Banton v. Opryland U.S.A., Inc.
| Decision Date | 06 February 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 20574-9-I,20574-9-I |
| Citation | 767 P.2d 584,53 Wn.App. 409 |
| Parties | Walter BANTON and Louise Banton, husband and wife, Appellants, v. OPRYLAND U.S.A., INC., a foreign corporation; Gaylord Broadcasting Enterprises, Inc., a foreign corporation; W.S.M., Inc., a foreign corporation, d/b/a Tennessee Grand Ole Opry House, Respondents. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Gerald B. Netzky, Redmond, for appellants, Walter and Louise banton.
Richard Dunlap, Robert B. Gardner, Seattle, for respondents, Opryland, U.S.A., Inc., Gaylord Broadcasting Enterprises, and W.S.M., Inc.
Walter Banton appeals a summary judgment dismissal of his personal injury suit against two foreign corporations. We affirm, holding that the trial court correctly determined that it lacked in personam jurisdiction over the defendants.
Banton suffered an injury while visiting the Grand Ole Opry House in Nashville, Tennessee, on September 4, 1982.
Prior to his trip to Nashville, Banton attended a presentation in Washington promoting Opryland USA, Inc., an entertainment and lodging facility in Nashville. A representative of Opryland conducted the presentation for a National Guard enlisted association of which Banton is a member. The promotion offered a reduced rate to the group of National Guard members.
Banton and his wife decided to visit the Opryland facilities and sent a check for $200 to reserve his hotel room and musical performance tickets. According to the representative of Opry, a deposit was necessary to reserve a hotel room in the Opryland complex. Opryland sent confirmation of the reservation to Banton after receiving his $200 check in Nashville.
Banton slipped and fell his first day in Nashville while attending a musical performance in the Grand Ole Opry House. Thereafter, Banton obtained medical treatment in Washington.
Opryland broadcasts its country and western music in Washington. In addition, Opryland pays commissions to travel agents in Washington who, on occasion, book visits to the Opryland complex. Nothing in the record indicates that a travel agent assisted Banton in booking his hotel accommodations.
Banton filed this suit on November 9, 1983, against three foreign corporations allegedly responsible for his injuries. Gaylord Broadcasting, Inc., one of the defendants, moved for summary judgment on December 10, 1986. Banton concedes that the trial court properly dismissed Gaylord. The two remaining defendants, Opryland and W.S.M. (hereinafter Opry), moved for dismissal in early 1987 challenging the Washington court's personal jurisdiction. Initially, the court denied the motion without prejudice to allow Banton an opportunity to conduct further discovery related to the jurisdiction issue. The court entered other orders in the interim compelling Opry to comply with Banton's discovery request. Opry unsuccessfully resisted certain discovery requests by Banton. When Opry renewed its motion the court dismissed the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction. Banton never filed a suit in Nashville, Tennessee, against Opry, and the Tennessee statute of limitations has subsequently expired on his claim for personal injuries.
Two separate and distinct theories of jurisdiction warrant discussion in this case. Banton asserts jurisdiction in his complaint based on RCW 4.28.185(1)(a), the longarm statute. This type of jurisdiction, known as specific jurisdiction, statutorily requires that the cause of action arise out of the defendant's contact with the forum. Tyee Constr. Co. v. Dulien Steel Prods., Inc., 62 Wash.2d 106, 115-16, 381 P.2d 245 (1963); Williams v. Canadian Fishing Co., 8 Wash.App. 765, 767-68, 509 P.2d 64 (1973). In contrast, RCW 4.28.080(10) establishes general jurisdiction over causes of action unrelated to the defendant's contacts. Under this jurisdictional theory foreign corporations "doing business" in Washington are subject to state court jurisdiction and the cause of action need not arise from their activities within the state. Crose v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 88 Wash.2d 50, 54, 558 P.2d 764 (1977).
Analysis of longarm jurisdiction typically involves two separate inquiries: (1) whether jurisdiction complies with the statute, and (2) whether imposition of jurisdiction violates due process. Grange Ins. Ass'n v. State, 110 Wash.2d 752, 756, 757 P.2d 933 (1988). Washington's longarm statute imparts jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant
as to any cause of action arising from ...
(a) The transaction of any business within this state;
* * *
(3) Only causes of action arising from acts enumerated herein may be asserted against [such] a defendant....
RCW 4.28.185(1) and (3).
Banton asserts that his negligence claim against Opry for his slip and fall in Nashville constitutes a cause of action arising from Opry's transaction of business within Washington. Banton points to Opry's promotion of its services in Washington as well as the reservation of the hotel accommodations as constituting "transaction of business" within the meaning of the statute. Opry maintains that, while it may have solicited business and contracted within Washington, the cause of action does not arise from those transactions.
Specific jurisdiction is limited to suits arising out of or related to the defendant's contacts with the forum. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 412, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 1871, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984). Generally, when a cause of action arises from defendant's contacts with the forum, less is required to support jurisdiction than when the cause of action is unrelated to those contacts. Forsythe v. Overmyer, 576 F.2d 779, 782 (9th Cir.1978), cert. den'd, 439 U.S. 864, 99 S.Ct. 188, 58 L.Ed.2d 174 (1978); Tillay v. Idaho Power Co., 425 F.Supp. 376, 379 (E.D.Wash.1976); Camelback Ski Corp. v. Behning, 312 Md. 330, 539 A.2d 1107, 1111, cert. den'd, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 130, 102 L.Ed.2d 103 (1988).
Washington has little case law interpreting the "arises from" language contained in our longarm statute. None of these cases determine whether a suit for personal injuries suffered outside the forum against a foreign corporation "arises from" that corporation's promotion and consummation of business transactions within the State. However, other jurisdictions have interpreted the "arise from" language of similar longarm statutes in cases factually analogous to the instant one. These cases provide persuasive authority that Banton's cause of action does not arise from Opry's contacts in Washington.
One case directly on point determines the same issue presented here and involves the same defendant and nearly the identical injury. The Eighth Circuit determined that a negligence claim occurring out of state did not "arise from" the promotion of Opryland within the forum state. Pearrow v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 703 F.2d 1067, 1069 (8th Cir.1983). In Pearrow, the court found that Opryland USA promoted its entertainment facilities in Arkansas. Id. at 1069 n. 3. In addition, the court found that the owner of Opryland conducted insurance business in Arkansas. Id. at 1067. Pearrow decided to visit Opryland in Nashville where she fell and broke her arm. Id. at 1068. The court stated that Pearrow's arm injury had nothing to do with the defendant's business dealings nor with its promotions of its entertainment complex in Arkansas. Id. at 1069. The court held that the cause of action for negligence could not be said to have arisen out of the solicitation in Arkansas. Id. The court concluded that Arkansas had no personal jurisdiction over the negligence claim against Opryland because the claim did not "arise from" Opryland's contacts in Arkansas. Id.
Similarly, the First Circuit held that a plaintiff's suit for personal injuries suffered while vacationing in a hotel in Hawaii did not "arise from" a reservation contract made in Massachusetts. Marino v. Hyatt Corp., 793 F.2d 427, 431 (1st Cir.1986). In Marino, the court held that making a hotel reservation while in the forum state is not the type of business transaction which could support jurisdiction over an unrelated claim for negligence outside the forum. Id.
Still another court has held that a defendant's promotion of its business in the forum is not the sort of contact which could support a cause of action for negligence. Larson v. Association of Apt. Owners of Lahaina Shores, 606 F.Supp. 579, 583 (D.Minn.1985). In Larson the court found that the plaintiff's suit did not allege injuries resulting from the defendant's promotional activities in Minnesota. Rather, the suit alleged negligence causing injuries to the plaintiff while the plaintiff was visiting the defendant's recreational facilities in Hawaii. The court held that in personam jurisdiction does not lie because there is no nexus between the cause of action and the activity within the state. Id.
In Krone v. AMI, Inc., 367 F.Supp. 1141 (E.D.Ark.1973), the court interpreted an Arkansas longarm statute almost identical to Washington's. See Ark.Stat. § 27-2502, Subd. C(1)(a) and (2). Krone held that the plaintiff's reservation in the forum of a hotel room located in another state had nothing to do with the injuries sustained by the plaintiff while the plaintiff was using defendant's lodging. Id. at 1143. The court concluded that it had no jurisdiction over the negligence cause of action because the suit did not allege a breach of duty related to the hotel reservation. Id. The Krone court did acknowledge that jurisdiction might lie for a breach of contract suit if the foreign defendant had breached the reservation contract consummated within the forum state. Id. at 1143-44.
Many decisions in Illinois address the meaning of the term "arise from." The test developed by these courts is whether the cause of action "lies in the wake of" the transaction of business within the forum. Young v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 790 F.2d...
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