Banville v. Huckins

• Decision Date: 29 October 1979
• Citation: Banville v. Huckins, 407 A.2d 294 (Me. 1979)
• Parties: Ronald BANVILLE v. Paul HUCKINS and Thomas Bucknam.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 294

407 A.2d 294

Ronald BANVILLE v. Paul HUCKINS and Thomas Bucknam.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Oct. 29, 1979.

Erwin, Austin & Lucas, P. A. by Ralph W. Austin (orally), James S. Erwin, York, for plaintiff.

George S. Hutchins, Jr. (orally), York, for Huckins.

Cole & Daughan by Francis P. Daughan (orally), Wells, for Bucknam.

Before McKUSICK, C. J., and WERNICK, ARCHIBALD, GODFREY and NICHOLS, JJ.

ARCHIBALD, Justice.

The plaintiff purchased a home from the defendants. On occupancy the plaintiff discovered that the basement would flood following a rainstorm and he also discovered that the well water was nonusable for domestic purposes. As a result, this action ensued premised (1) on a breach of implied warranty of habitability, (2) on breach of contract, and (3) on a violation of the Uniform Trade Practices Act. In a jury-waived trial the single justice found the defendants were guilty of a breach of an implied warranty of habitability, and he assessed damages for the plaintiff in the sum of $12,500. He also ruled, however, that the plaintiff had failed to prove his allegation of breach of contract and violation of the Uniform Trade Practices Act. The defendants appealed from the ensuing judgment, and the plaintiff cross-appealed from the decision concerning breach of contract and the ruling on the Uniform Trade Practices Act.

We deny both appeals and affirm the judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $12,500.

FACTS

The real estate involved is located in the town of York. Prior to its acquisition by the plaintiff, the title to the land had been acquired in the names of both defendants. After acquiring title to the land, the defendants erected thereon a dwelling house. This house was prefabricated, but the defendants had to prepare and grade the lot and construct a foundation for the house. When the house was nearly completed, both defendants signed a "Contract for Sale of Real Estate" with the plaintiff. The original price was $36,000, but another $3,000 was added thereto in order to finish the basement. ¹

The land on which this home was constructed was in an area lower than the surrounding terrain, the adjacent road being some three to four feet above the top level of the foundation. The garage was located in the basement of the house beside the family room. Entrance to the garage was gained by using a ramp which necessarily sloped downward.

The plaintiff completed the purchase in accordance with the contract terms, accepting a deed executed by both defendants.

Shortly after occupancy, it became apparent that the water supplied from a drilled well was unsatisfactory and, because of its excessive metallic content (iron magnesium), was not usable for drinking, bathing, or laundry. The plaintiff and his wife were obliged to get water from another source for usual domestic use. Neither the plaintiff nor his wife was aware of this problem prior to acceptance of the deed and occupancy of the premises.

After the plaintiff and his wife had moved into their new home, they discovered that following a rainstorm water would run into the basement, on occasions rising as high as ten inches. ² The plaintiff was unaware of this propensity until after the purchase and sale had been completed. Various methods were attempted to meet this problem, including the installation of a new drain and digging a dry well outside the foundation. The only satisfactory method to rid the basement of accumulated water was the utilization of a pump.

The plaintiff introduced testimony from an experienced general contractor, who concluded that the only feasible way to eliminate the flooding problem was to disconnect the house from its foundation, raise the house a sufficient amount so that the foundation wall could be heightened, fill the basement to raise the floor an equivalent distance, pour a new basement floor, and then lower the house back onto the elevated foundation, re-connecting the utilities, wiring, etc. The estimated cost of such a project was $11,777. There was evidence that the permanent installation of a pump would cost $500.

The plaintiff testified that his home in its then condition, because of the flooding and poor water supply, had no value. Another witness, however, agreeing that the house, if habitable, should have been fairly worth its purchase price, was of the opinion that its only value under existing conditions was for some type of warehousing.

The single justice stated: "In my opinion the plaintiff does not need to put up with this pump solution. He would still have a brook in his cellar." He then ruled that "building a house in a water pocket was a design failure on the part of the builder-vendors and they are responsible for it under the implied warranty of habitability." The single justice then found damages to be $12,500 but also stated, "the plaintiff failed to prove his other two counts."

IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY

It is clear from the decision that damages were not predicated on the defective water supply because the justice stated: "There is no direct or opinion evidence of the defective well damage." In arriving at the damages, the justice ruled that the measure of damage "is the difference in value as set by the contract and what the purchaser received," citing as authority Gosselin v. Better Homes, Inc., Me., 256 A.2d 629, 640 (1969).

As we have recently held, the acceptance by the plaintiff of the deed from the defendants does not prevent him from seeking damages for breach of warranty by the defendants who are builder-vendors. Wimmer v. Down East Properties, Inc., Me., 406 A.2d 88 (1979). It would be irrational to say that such a conclusion would not be equally applicable to the matter now under consideration where the plaintiff purchaser is alleging breach of an implied warranty of habitability against the builder-vendors.

Maine has not definitively held that a builder-vendor is liable to a purchaser for breach of an implied warranty of habitability. In Wimmer we expressly held that a builder-vendor of a new home impliedly warranted that the work involved in the construction thereof would be performed in a reasonably skillful and workmanlike manner. In reaffirming our holding in Gosselin, we pointed out in Wimmer that "(t)here is no good reason for distinguishing the contractor who builds for a landowner from the contractor who builds on his own land for the purpose of sale." Id. at 92. Wimmer, however, avoided adoption of an implied warranty of habitability because it was an issue not necessarily raised by the facts therein. We conceive no rational basis, however, for not adopting such a doctrine, bearing in mind that this holding is restricted to facts similar to those of this case wherein we are dealing only with the relationship existing between a contract purchaser of real estate and the builder-vendors of that particular property.

Other jurisdictions have reached a comparable result, particularly when they are concerned with the relationship between builder-vendor and purchaser. See, e. g., Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 254 S.C. 407, 175 S.E.2d 792 (1970); Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 449 S.W.2d 922 (1970); Conyers v. Molloy, 50 Ill.App.3d 17, 7 Ill.Dec. 695, 364 N.E.2d 986 (1977). See Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 383, 413. Our adoption of an implied warranty of habitability is consistent with precedent and is a logical extension of the doctrines espoused in Wimmer and Gosselin.

We next must determine whether the facts of this case fall within the parameters of this implied warranty. Habitability is a term difficult of precise definition. Every minor defect in a new home does not necessarily make the structure uninhabitable. On the other hand, the warranty should not be defined in such strict terms as to require the defect to be of such magnitude as to require that the structure be deemed unlivable. Thus, we are required to look at each situation and to analyze the extent, or magnitude, of the defect and determine whether it resulted in unsuitability for habitation, as we suggested in Wimmer. Whether or not a particular defect renders the dwelling "unsuitable" necessarily requires inquiry as to whether a reasonable person faced with such a defect would be warranted in concluding that a major impediment to habitation existed.

Reverting to the facts of the case before us, we have a situation where a basement area which was planned and designed for family occupancy becomes unusable as such following rainstorms. Certainly a reasonable person would not live in an area subject to the threat of flooding every time it rains. In footnote 1, Supra, we delineated specifications for this area to emphasize that it was the intent of the parties to the contract that this basement area should be and remain usable for a variety of family purposes. Eight to ten inches of water periodically flooding this room clearly falls within the parameters of our concept of uninhabitability. Hanavan v. Dye, 4 Ill.App.3d 576, 281 N.E.2d 398 (1972), was a case in which the contractor-builder had made a direct sale of a home to the plaintiff-purchaser and is comparable to the instant case on its facts because it involved flooding of a basement area "in places up to the plaintiffs' ankles." The Illinois court adopted the implied warranty of habitability under those...