Baptist Medical Center of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Aguirre, 84933

• Decision Date: 24 December 1996
• Docket Number: No. 84933,84933
• Parties: BAPTIST MEDICAL CENTER OF OKLAHOMA, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Indalecio A. AGUIRRE, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Page 213

930 P.2d 213

1996 OK 133

BAPTIST MEDICAL CENTER OF OKLAHOMA, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Indalecio A. AGUIRRE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 84933.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

Dec. 24, 1996.

Barry K. Roberts and B. David Sisson, Norman, for Defendant-Appellant.

Robert T. Luttrell, III and John K. Williams, Williams, Luttrell & Boren, P.C., Oklahoma City, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPALA, Justice.

The dispositive issue on certiorari is whether the district court must defer to the Workers' Compensation Court [WC court] the tendered issue of an injured worker's liability for medical bills incurred in treatment of a compensable injury when the latter tribunal's jurisdiction is invoked during the pendency of a health care provider's [district court] action for recovery on open account against the worker. We answer in the affirmative.

I THE ANATOMY OF LITIGATION

Indalecio Aguirre [Aguirre, injured worker or worker] was injured on November 18, 1993 and treated at the Baptist Medical Center of Oklahoma, Inc. [BMC or health care provider] for four days. Upon his admission, Aguirre informed BMC his expenses were covered by WC insurance. BMC commenced a district court action on August 31, 1994 to recover against Aguirre for medical services rendered "on open account" as well as for its counsel fees and costs. BMC pressed for default judgment when Aguirre failed to answer its petition. Aguirre then moved to stay or dismiss the action. He argued that on October 18, 1994 he had invoked the jurisdiction of the WC court by filing a Form 3 ¹ against his employer, ZMD, Inc., d/b/a Advanced Solutions, and that BMC's remedy now lay solely in the latter tribunal. According to BMC's argument below, ZMD was without compensation insurance coverage and bankrupt.

On December 2, 1994 the district court gave default judgment to BMC with counsel fees and costs. ² Seven days later (on December 9, 1994 ) Aguirre moved to stay the proceedings and to vacate the judgment, reasserting the jurisdictional challenge pressed in his earlier dismissal quest. The trial court's February 16, 1995 order denied Aguirre's motion to vacate. Aguirre appealed from the motion's denial.

Because Aguirre's vacation quest was filed within ten days of the default judgment's entry, we will treat it as a new trial motion. A timely-brought motion for new trial will extend appeal time for review of a judgment (or order) until the disposition's memorial is filed. ³ Aguirre's December 9 motion to vacate the December 2 default judgment extended The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the nisi prius decision, reasoning that (a) subject matter jurisdiction over work-related medical bills lies exclusively in the WC court and (b) until expiration of the full statutory period within which a worker may file a claim, the district court has no cognizance of a medical care provider's claim for services rendered to an injured worker. We granted certiorari on BMC's petition to settle an apparent conflict of jurisdiction and now, for the reasons to be explained, vacate the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion and reverse the trial court's judgment.

                appeal time until its denial on February 16, 1995.   The filing of an amended petition in error--within 30 days of the entry of the vacation request's denial (on February 24, 1995 )--was timely effected. 4
                

II

MATERIAL ATTACHED TO SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF, WHICH WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE APPELLATE RECORD

The worker sought to strike from BMC's supplemental brief on certiorari certain pleading material filed in the District Court, Oklahoma County, in an unrelated case, which was represented as having been attached in violation of Rule 18, Rules of the Supreme Court. ⁵

We agree the material must be stricken. The cited rule prohibits litigants from appending to the briefs on review any material not included in the record prepared for the appeal. ⁶ The motion is accordingly sustained and the clerk is directed to sever and remove the offending attachment from BMC's April 15, 1996 supplemental brief.

III

PRIMARY JURISDICTION OF THE WC COURT OVER COVERED EMPLOYEE'S MEDICAL TREATMENT EXPENSE

The Interplay of Worker/Employer-Carrier Liability Under The WC Act

The worker's statutory right to be relieved from the costs of medical treatment for a compensable injury is accommodated not so much by jurisdictional boundaries that separate the cognizance of the district court from that of the compensation tribunal as it is by the distinct concepts of legal obligation owed by the employer, the insurer and the worker. The interplay of these divergent liabilities is governed by the WC Act. ⁷ Section 14 of the Act makes the employer responsible for the injury-related medical treatment of a covered employee. ⁸ The employer's liability extends to those claims for necessary medical services which have been presented and allowed by the WC court. ⁹

                Until the trial tribunal has ruled otherwise, the primary obligation of the employer is fully co-extensive with that of the injured worker. 10  Before the WC court has either imposed upon or absolved the employer from liability, the worker is to be regarded as immune from individual accountability that would be imposable in the district court for self-procured health care expense arising from treatment of a compensable injury
                

Duality of Jurisdiction

Because health-care-related liability in a compensation case stands imposed, in the first instance, on the employer, ¹¹ the WC court has primary jurisdiction not only of compensation claims but also of ancillary quests by providers for approval of their necessary medical services. ¹² Once the WC court's jurisdiction is invoked and the district court has been given proper notice that the former tribunal has the claim sub judice, the latter forum must defer to the primary jurisdiction of the WC court and await that forum's adjudication. ¹³ In short, the worker is not to be deemed liable in a district court action for medical treatment arising from a compensable injury until the WC court has acted in a pending claim by either imposing liability upon the employer or absolving it from the statutory burden.

When Aguirre formally apprised the district court of the WC claim's pendency, it was the trial court's duty to reinquire into its own jurisdiction of the case with a view to deciding if, at that point, the provider's demand was in fact cognizable in a different forum. ¹⁴ If satisfied that a WC claim for the accident in which the worker sustained an injury was then pending, the trial court would be under a duty to stay further proceedings in the action and await the outcome of the compensation case. The district court's power would be deemed restored We are of course mindful of the language in 85 O.S.Supp.1996 § 14(E) by which the district court appears to be "ousted" of its cognizance over actions that deal with a worker's medical expense. The pertinent terms of § 14(E) are:

after final adjudication of the employer's obligation has been effected in the WC proceeding.

"* * * The order of the judge [for payment of medical expenses] shall be subject to the same appellate procedure set forth in Section 3.6 of this title for all other orders of the Court. The right to recover charges for every type of medical care for personal injuries arising out of and in the course of covered employment as herein defined, shall lie solely with the Workers' Compensation Court, and all jurisdiction of the other trial courts of this state over such action is hereby abolished. * * * " (Emphasis added.)

In light of the provisions of Art. 7 § 7, Okl. Const., ¹⁵ which confer on the district court unlimited original jurisdiction, the attempted statutory ouster--in § 14(E)--must be treated as no more than a legislative call for that constitutional forum's mandated deference to the WC court's unimpaired power over its pending claims. Today's pronouncement gives that very meaning to the quoted provisions of § 14(E). When a statute is susceptible to more than one construction, it must be given that meaning which will free it from constitutional doubt rather than one which would leave it fraught with some lingering fundamental-law infirmities. ¹⁶

IV AGUIRRE'S QUEST FOR COUNSEL-FEE AWARD AND COSTS

Although Aguirre was the victorious party in the Court of Civil Appeals, his claim for appeal-related counsel-fee award and costs was left unaddressed by that court. He now seeks the same relief from this court, together with certiorari-related legal expenses. Much like taxable costs, counsel fees for appeal-related services may be judicially authorized in the case in which the services were performed. ¹⁷

Aguirre may be allowed a counsel-fee award if his plea for that award falls into one or more categories enumerated in 12 O.S.1991 § 936. ¹⁸ BMC's petition framed its action as one "for care and services rendered" to Aguirre "on an open account." ¹⁹ The trial court treated BMC's claim as an "action" within the meaning of § 936 ²⁰ and awarded it counsel fees as the prevailing party [plaintiff] in the case. ²¹ Where, as here, there is statutory authority to allow an On remand, upon due notice and adversarial hearing, the trial court is accordingly authorized to allow the victorious defendant a reasonable counsel-fee award for services rendered not only in the trial court, but also for those that are incident to appeal and certiorari, together with taxable costs in the nisi prius action. ²³ Costs in this court shall stand taxed to BMC.

attorney's fee at the trial level, additional fees may be assessed for legal services rendered in an appellate court. ²²

V SUMMARY

The health care provider offended the rule that prohibits the parties from attaching to the briefs on review any material not included in the record prepared for the appeal.

An injured worker covered by WC is entitled to the protection afforded by the WC law from liability for medical treatment incidental to the on-the-job injury. Once an inquiry...