Baptiste v. Superior Court

• Citation: 164 Cal.Rptr. 789,106 Cal.App.3d 87
• Parties: , 1980 A.M.C. 1523 Gilbert A. BAPTISTE, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California FOR the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent; CHEVRON SHIPPING CO. (Standard Oil Co. of California), Real Party in Interest-Defendant. Civ. 58176.
• Decision Date: 23 May 1980
• Court: California Court of Appeals

Page 789

164 Cal.Rptr. 789

106 Cal.App.3d 87, 1980 A.M.C. 1523

Gilbert A. BAPTISTE, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California FOR the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent;

CHEVRON SHIPPING CO. (Standard Oil Co. of California), Real Party in Interest-Defendant.

Civ. 58176.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 1, California.

May 23, 1980.

Hearing Denied July 16, 1980.

Silver & McWilliams, Lawrence R. Booth, Wilmington, Donna Silver, and Leonard Sacks, Encino, for petitioner.

Lawler, Felix & Hall, Thomas E. Workman, Jr., Jane H. Barrett, Los Angeles, and Mary J. Bush, for real party in interest-defendant.

JEFFERSON, Presiding Justice.

This petition for mandate compels resolution of the question of whether Gilbert A. Baptiste, the petitioner (hereinafter plaintiff), who is prosecuting in the superior court a maritime tort action against his corporate employer, Chevron Shipping Co. (Standard Oil Co. of California), real party in interest before us (hereinafter defendant), may there seek an award of punitive damages in addition to other relief. As we shall articulate, we have determined that petitioner may do so.

I The Procedural Facts

Plaintiff filed a personal injury complaint in the superior court on December 4, 1974, in which he sought damages from defendant pursuant to the Jones Act ¹ and general maritime law. He alleged that he had been employed by defendant from 1966 to 1974 as a seaman on various vessels owned and operated by defendant in navigable waters, and had sustained injuries due to defendant's negligence and failure to provide and maintain the seaworthiness of the vessels upon which plaintiff had worked.

In a second cause of action, plaintiff alleged that he was entitled to damages for maintenance and cure, and that defendant had "failed and refused to furnish plaintiff with the same." Plaintiff sought general damages of $200,000, maintenance and cure damages of $5,000, and damages according to proof for medical expenses, loss of earnings, costs of suit, and "(f)or such other and further relief as the Court deems proper."

Defendant's answer, denying liability, was filed February 12, 1975; thereafter discovery was pursued. In 1979, plaintiff received some documents from defendant which caused plaintiff to reevaluate his case.

On August 14, 1979, plaintiff moved to amend his complaint to include allegations concerning his entitlement to punitive damages; the proposed amendment sought $200,000,000 in punitive damages and $1,000,000 in general damages. Accompanying the motion were certain copies of documents received from defendant and the affidavit of plaintiff's counsel which revealed that in 1970 defendant was informed and made aware of the fact that there were impermissibly high noise levels in the engine rooms of two of defendant's ships, described as "five to 10 times (a man's) suggested allowable daily exposure limit" and that "(c)ontinued unprotected exposure at these levels will result in a gradual but permanent loss of hearing." In 1971, a similar problem was detected on a third vessel. The recommendation to defendant was that "(i)mmediate steps should be taken to reduce noise exposures. Personal hearing protection should be provided and its use required until noise reduction is achieved."

In 1972, it had been determined that the impermissibly high noise levels that permeated the engine rooms resulted from gears in the engine rooms of the affected vessels; certain financial projections were made with respect to the alternatives available to reduce the noise; the cost of reduction ranged from $800 per vessel to $6,500 per vessel, the latter estimate constituting the cost of gear replacement. It was pointed out, however, that "the cheapest solution . . . is to provide and enforce use of earphones while in the engine room." Shortly thereafter the alternatives were again listed, and ear plugs for the seamen were recommended due to the "short remaining life" of the vessels involved. On October 31, 1972, a directive was issued to the masters of defendant's ships requiring that warning signs be posted in the engine rooms and that ear plugs or muffs be worn by all personnel while on duty there.

According to the declaration of plaintiff's counsel, plaintiff had served on ships in the same fleet as those tested, of the same vintage in service since World War II. Plaintiff, and other seamen, had not only worked in the engine rooms of these vessels but had lived in close proximity to them while not on duty. Plaintiff had discovered in 1974 that he was becoming deaf, and had instituted this action, but, until 1979, was unaware of defendant's specific knowledge of the dangerous condition in the engine rooms and the actions taken as the result of that knowledge.

The amended complaint alleged that defendant had "willfully, wantonly, intentionally and with reckless disregard for the safety of the plaintiff and other seamen employed by said defendant, permitted extremely high noise levels to exist in the environment in which the plaintiff and other seamen were required to work, with full knowledge that such noise would cause permanent hearing loss to said plaintiff and others."

On August 30, 1979, the trial court granted plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint. Defendant then filed a motion to strike the amended allegations which set forth plaintiff's entitlement to punitive damages, on the ground that, "as a matter of law punitive damages are not recoverable in an action pled pursuant to the Jones Act and doctrine of unseaworthiness."

On November 5, 1979, the trial court granted defendant's motion to strike, declaring that "(i)n this regard the Court notes the following: (a) federal law is applicable; (b) there is no authority for punitive damages in a maritime case, though there is some dicta to that effect; (c) in the absence of maritime law on this subject, FELA cases are the most persuasive available authority; (d) punitive damages are not allowable in FELA cases; (e) extensions of substantive law, regardless of their desirability, are better left to the appellate courts the judicial system functions more effectively if litigants can, at the trial court level, rely on what appears to be the existing status of the law."

Plaintiff then sought a writ of mandate in the appellate court, seeking to have vacated the order granting the motion to strike and to have reinstated the punitive damages allegations. The writ was denied. Plaintiff then sought a hearing before the California Supreme Court; on February 20, 1980, the high court granted plaintiff's petition for a hearing and ordered the matter transferred to this court, with directions for us to issue an alternative writ and place the matter on calendar. This was done on March 3, 1980. We now consider the matter on the merits.

II Jurisdiction to Entertain Jones Act and General Maritime Law Actions

State courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts to entertain and try actions pleaded pursuant to the Jones Act and the general maritime law. Federal jurisdiction is derived from Article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution, which confers that jurisdiction on "United States Courts" over "all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction."

Section 1333 of title 28 of the United States Code provides for exclusive federal jurisdiction in admiralty cases with the exception of "saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled." The exception allows such litigants as plaintiff to pursue recovery in a state court. (See Engel v. Davenport (1926) 271 U.S. 33, 46 S.Ct. 410, 70 L.Ed. 813.)

The prevailing rule is that, regardless of the forum, federal substantive law applies. Numerous United States Supreme Court cases have discussed this principle e. g., Engel, supra; Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co. (1942) 317 U.S. 239, 63 S.Ct. 246, 87 L.Ed. 239; Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn (1953) 346 U.S. 406, 74 S.Ct. 202, 98 L.Ed. 143; Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale (1959) 358 U.S. 625, 79 S.Ct. 406, 3 L.Ed.2d 550. The rationale is the perceived need for uniformity in maritime tort law, regardless of the place of injury or forum of trial. In addition, it has been of historical importance to fashion and apply federal law liberally with protection of the rights of injured seamen as the goal; as a consequence, some obstacles traditionally posed by state law have been avoided.

The California courts have recognized that, in the area of maritime torts, their task has been that of ascertaining and applying appropriate legal principles derived from the considerable body of federal maritime law that has developed in the United States. (See, e. g., Dixon v. Grace Lines, Inc. (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 278, 103 Cal.Rptr. 595; Catania v. Halcyon Steamship Co. (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 348, 118 Cal.Rptr. 513.) As with any body of law, conflicts and confusing signals may exist within it; it remains the task of the reviewing court to explicate and determine the issues presented. (See, e. g., Prohoroff v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd. (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 640, 644-645, 153 Cal.Rptr. 287.)

III The Concept of Punitive Damages in General

There is substantial controversy in all American jurisdictions concerning the imposition of punitive damages. As Prosser explains, "(s)omething more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive damages. There must be circumstances of aggravation or outrage, such as spite or 'malice' or a fraudulent or evil motive on the part of the defendant, or such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that his conduct may be called wilful or wanton." (Prosser on Torts (4th ed. 1971) § 2, pp. 9-10; see also, Stein, Damages and Recovery, Personal Injury and Death Actions (1st ed. 1972), Ch. 12, p. 347 et seq.)

Punitive damages have been condemned as undue compensation of the plaintiff beyond his just deserts and defended as a salutary method of...